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BICENTENNIAL BENCHMARK: TWO CENTURIES
OF EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESSES*
FRANK R. STRONGt
Resolved, That we, the citizens of Mecklenburg county, do
hereby dissolve the political bands which have connected us to the
mother country, and hereby absolve ourselves from all allegiance
to the British Crown, and abjure all political connection, contract,
or association, with that nation, who have wantonly trampled on
our rights and liberties, and inhumanly shed the blood of American
patriots at Lexington.
Resolved, That we do hereby declare ourselves a free and
independent people; are, and of right ought to be, a sovereign and
self-governing Association, under the control of no power other
than that of our God and the general government of the Congress;
to the maintenance of which independence, we solemnly pledge to
each other our mutual co-operation, our lives, our fortunes, and our
most sacred honor.
These Resolves, numbers two and three, were the central two of
the five in the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence of May 20,
1775.1 Despite continuing question as to the authenticity of this
action,' North Carolina automobile license plates proclaim the state as
"First in Freedom" on the basis of wishful acceptance of the May 20
* The William T. Joyner Lecture on Constitutional Law, delivered at the
University of North Carolina School of Law, April 9, 1976, revised to incorporate
comment on major Supreme Court decisions handed down at the end of the 1975 Term.
This Lecture Series was created by the Sarah Graham Kenan Foundation on December
11, 1971, to honor Colonel Joyner for his outstanding contributions to the legal profes-
sion and the citizenry of the State of North Carolina. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., gave
the initial Lecture on November 1, 1974.
t Cary C. Boshamer University Distinguished Professor, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill; Dean and Professor of Law Emeritus, Ohio State University.
The author records with appreciation the assistance in research provided by Ms.
Claire Bledsoe Pratt, M.S. in L.S., and Mr. Peter Shea, Ph.D. in English Literature. Ms.
Pratt is Reference Librarian and Mr. Shea a student at the University of North Carolina
School of Law.
1. W. HOYT, THE MECKLENBURG DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 244-46 (1972).
2. The less drastic Mecklenburg Resolves of May 31, 1775, are viewed by some
scholars as the "true 'Declaration.'" Id. at 22-31. Those later Resolves did not assert
independence but only suspended English laws and provided substitutions therefor "until
instructions from the Provincial Congress, regulating the jurisprudence of the province,
shall provide otherwise, or the legislative body of Great-Britain, resign its unjust and
arbitrary pretentions with respect to America." Id. at 25, quoting Resolve XVIII.
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Resolves as genuine. In any event continuing scholarly debate over
what did issue out of Mecklenburg County in May of 1775 need not
detain us; what is significant is that developments in North Carolina
reflected mounting tensions among the colonies with the mother
country that were approaching the breaking point and threatening to
spill over into open defiance and sovereignly separation.
A year later the chasm had deepened to the point that the Con-
tinental Congress on May 10 of 1776
Resolved, That it be recommended to the respective as-
semblies and conventions of the United Colonies where no
government, sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs, hath been
hitherto established, to adopt such government as shall, in the
opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the
happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and
America in general.3
It has been said by one scholar that
[t]his resolution was the turning-point in the Revolution, since it
foreshadowed and necessitated that of July 4th, 1776, declaring
the independence of the colonies. So well was this understood,
that, in the debate upon it those delegates who opposed its passage
did so on the ground that it was the first step, to which, if taken,
independence must succeed.
4
New Hampshire and South Carolina had already acted. The
Constitution of New Hampshire, framed by a "congress" that assembled
on December 21, 1775, and that completed its work on January 5,
1776, is said by Thorpe to have been "the first constitution framed by
an American Commonwealth."'5 Requiring but two printed pages as
preserved,6 it was hardly a constitution in any full sense; it only estab-
lished "A FORM OF GOVERNMENT to continue during the present
unhappy and unnatural contest with Great Britain" until, it was hoped,
a reconciliation could be effected. With that hope dashed by subse-
quent events, a convention met in June of 1778 to draft a permanent
constitution for the new State. Although the completed document
employed the form that quickly became popular, that of a Declaration
of Rights followed by a Plan of Government, the former was quite
inadequate in coverage and the latter vested essentially complete power
3. 4 JouR. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 342 (1906 ed.).
4. J. JAMESON, A TREATSE ON CONsTrrTIONAL CONVENTIONS 116-17 (1887).
5. 4 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTTrUTnONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AN OTmE ORGANIC LAws 2451 n.a (1909) [hereinafter cited as THORPE].
6. Id. at 2451-53.
7. Id. at 2452.
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in a General Court with executive and judicial authority subordinated
to it.8  This constitution, unlike the original document, was submitted
to the people through their town meetings but rejected.'
New Hampshire did not have an acceptable constitution until 1784
when the people ratified the work of a new convention that labored
through much of 1783.10 The Bill of Rights of this document, contain-
ing thirty-eight articles, contrasted with the paucity of rights declared
in the proposal of 1778; moreover, the failure to differentiate among
governmental powers characteristic of the earlier submission was now
met by the declaration of article XXXVII that
[i]n the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof,
to wit, the legislative, executive -and judicial, ought to be kept as
separate from and independent of each other, as the nature of free
government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of con-
nection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indis-
soluble bond of unity and amity."
The Form of Government specified in great detail respecting the legis-
lative and executive branches; the much shorter subsection on judiciary
power declared:
All judicial officers, duly appointed, commissioned and sworn,
shall hold their offices during good behaviour, excdpting those con-
cerning whom there is a different provision made in this constitu-
tion: Provided nevertheless, the president, with consent of council,
may remove them upon the address of both houses of the
legislature.
12
The South Carolina action of March 26, 1776, was much like that
taken two and one-half months earlier in New Hampshire.' 3 Although
designated as a constitution, the instrument was limited to providing for
transition of governmental authority to locally chosen officers should
reconciliation with Britain fail. It was promulgated by the Provincial
Congress; there was no submission to the people. However, it was
much more detailed in its specifications than was New Hampshire's first
attempt at constitution making, employing thirty-four numbered re-
solves. No declaration of rights was set forth as such although many
rights were implicit in the long opening paragraph justifying the taking
8. 9 TowN PAPERs OF N.H. 837-41 (1875).
9. Id. at 842.
10. 4 THORPE, supra note 5, at 2453 n.b, 2453-70.
11. Id. at 2457.
12. Id. at 2466. The entire Constitution of 1784 requires eighteen pages in 4
THORPE.
13. 6 id. at 3241-48.
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of constitutional action, but an embryonic separation of powers mani-
fested itself in some differentiation among legislative, executive, and
judicial functions. Two years later the General Assembly, created un-
der the earlier document, framed and passed as an act the Constitution
of 1778.1' Of the provisions of this constitution, consisting of a total of
forty-five articles, two toward the end specified liberty of the press15
and due process (expressed as law of the land),16 and earlier provisions
effected greater separation of powers. Judicial officers, chosen by the
General Assembly and commissioned by the Governor, were to serve
during good behavior "but [were to] be removed on address of the
senate and house of representatives.' 7  By article XLIV no part of
the constitution could be changed "without the consent of a majority
of the members of the senate and house of representatives."'"
Between the May 10 Resolve of the Continental Congress and its
Declaration of Independence on July 4, New Jersey and Virginia tried
their respective hands at constitutional drafting. Of these two the New
Jersey Constitution exhibited features present in the initial efforts in
New Hampshire and South Carolina. Essentially, the New Jersey
instrument 9 created a structure of government to replace that formerly
existing under British authority with the provision that "if a reconcilia-
tion between Great-Britain and these Colonies should take place...
this Charter shall be null and void-otherwise to remain firm and
inviolable." 20  At the same time, however, some development in con-
stitution making is discernible, anticipatory of improvements made in
later drafting in New Hampshire and South Carolina. Rights of religi-
ous liberty and trial by jury were declared; there was more careful dis-
tinction between legislative and executive powers; annual elections
were stipulated for members of the General Assembly; and the judges
of the supreme and lower courts were to serve for a term of years while
at the same time being forbidden to sit in the General Assembly during
judicial tenure.21
Drafted in Tune of 1776 by forty-five members of the colonial
House of Burgesses, the Virginia Constitution predated all others in
14. Id. at 3248 & n.a.
15. Id. at 3257, art. XL .
16. Id. art. XLI.
17. Id. at 3254.
18. Id. at 3257.
19. 5 id. at 2594-98.
20. Id. at 2598.
21. Id. at 2595-98, arts. XVIII & XIX (religious liberty); art. III (annual elec-
tions); arts. XII & XX (judges); arts. VI & VIII (separation of powers).
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specificity of the framework and content achieved at first try.22 It must
have been the pattern for the constitution making that followed; cer-
tainly it foreshadowed the unique contribution to American constitu-
tional law that would be made by Virginians. The total instrument con-
sisted of a Bill of Rights and a Form of Government. The former was
not so inclusive as in some of the state constitutions to follow, such as
the Bill of Rights of the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, but that
inclusive coverage was achieved only on third try. A feature of the
sixteen sections of the Virginia Bill of Rights was "[t]hat the legislative
and executive powers of the State should be separate and distinct from
the judiciary. '23 The importance of this political principle to the drafts-
men is demonstrated by the even more specific declaration in the Form
of Government to the effect that "[tihe legislative, executive, and
judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither
exercise the powers properly belonging to the other . ... 1"1 It must
be conceded that theory was somewhat ahead of practice; the Governor
was to be chosen by the two houses, and, while the judges were to
serve during good behavior, they were to be appointed (subsequent to
an initial appointment by the Legislature) by the Governor with the
advice of the Privy Council and subject to approval or displacement by
both houses."s Yet the seed of judicial independence had been
planted in politically fertile soil, with immeasurable consequences for
America's future.
During the second half of the year 1776, following upon the
Declaration of Independence, four. additional former colonies com-
menced and completed constitutional drafting. Two moved quickly to
the task. The resulting document for Delaware26 consisted of thirty
articles, the last of which made reference to a "declaration of rights and
fundamental rules of this State, agreed to by this convention .... -27
Three departments of government were provided, but there was no
formal articulation of a fractionalized structure of government. The
declaration consisted of twenty-three sections, forming a fairly embrac-
ive enumeration of fundamental rights not to be violated.
22. 7 id. at 3812-19.
23. Id. at 3813, § 5.
24. Id. at 3815.
25. Id. at 3816-17.
26. 1 id. at 562-68.
27. Id. at 568, art. 30. Thorpe does not include the "declaration of rights"; it can
be found in R. PERRY, Sotmcns oF OuR Lmaams 338-40 (1959).
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Pennsylvania's convention completed its labors on September 28,
one week after Delaware. The instrument there resulting 8 was
divided into two parts, a Declaration of Rights and a Plan or Frame
of Government. The sixteen articles in the former gave good coverage
to individual rights, with "trial by jury as heretofore" added by section
twenty-five of the Frame. Legislative power was vested in one house
of representatives, to be known as the general assembly. Elections
were to be annual. "The supreme executive power [was to] be vested
in a president and council. '29 Council members were to be elected
as were the representatives, but separately and for three years. "The
president and vice-president [were to] be chosen annually by the joint
ballot of the general assembly and council, of the members of the
council."30 The president was given power to "appoint and commision-
ate [sic]" the judges;"1 a subsequent section specified that "[t]he judges
of the supreme court of judicature [were to] have fixed salaries, be
commissioned for seven years only, though capable of re-appointment
at the end of that term, but removable for misbehaviour at any time
by the general assembly .. *,2
The Maryland convention, consisting of "Delegates of the freemen
of Maryland," is recorded as having labored almost three months in
framing the first constitution for that State. This fact may explain the
length of the resulting document."3  The Declaration of Rights con-
sisted of forty-two articles, the "Constitution, or Form of Government"
of sixty divisions; the document was by far the most extended of all
the earliest constitutions. The bulk was found in the provisions con-
cerning the form, organization and operation of government, with
specificity often amounting to great detail. The listing of fundamental
rights was the most inclusive of the original constitutions. Included
were the declarations "[t]hat the legislative, executive and judicial
powers of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from
each other"3 4 and that commissions of the judges ought to be held dur-
ing good behavior because "the independency and uprightness of
Judges are essential to the impartial administration of justice, and a
great security to the rights and liberties of the people . . 6
28. 5 THoRPE, supra note 5, at 3081-92.
29. Id. at 3084, § 4.
30. Id. at 3087, § 19.
31. Id.§20.
32. Id. at 3088, § 23.
33. 3 id. at 1686-701.
34. Id. at 1687, art. VI.
35. Id. at 1689, art. XXX.
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North Carolina was the last state to complete a constitution before
the close of the fateful year of 1776. A congress, elected for the pur-
pose of constitutional drafting, assembled at Halifax only on November
12 and completed its work December 18. As in the case of Maryland,
the instrument36 was divided into two grand parts: "A Declaration of
Rights, &c" and "The Constitution, or Form of Government, &c." Also
similar to the Maryland document's language was the early provision
in the declaration of rights "that the legislative, executive, and su-
preme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate
and distinct from each other."3" At the same time, however, the theory
of separation of powers was not well implemented in the frame of gov-
ernment. The Governor and the judges were to be named by the
General Assembly and there was no tenure provision for the latter.
Neither the Declaration nor the Form of Government was so embracive
as those of the first constitution of Maryland. But religious liberty was
deemed so fundamental that facets of its full protection appear in both
of the instrument's grand divisions, 8 and annual elections were stipu-
lated for both houses of the legislative branch.3 9
A constitutional convention had assembled in Savannah, Georgia,
before the North Carolina Congress commenced its work, but comple-
tion and promulgation went over until February 5, 1777. Despite the
greater elapsed time, the product40 was inferior by comparison with
earlier constitution making by other states. The document started out
well by declaring in article I that "tt]he legislative, executive, and judi-
ciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise
the powers properly belonging to the other." 41 But in the total of sixty-
three articles there was no differentiation between declared rights and
decreed frame of government; the legislature was unicameral; the
Governor was chosen by this "house of assembly" and shared his execu-
tive powers with an executive council drawn by ballot by and from the
elected representatives; there was no provision for selection or tenure
of the judiciary; and the fundamental rights recognized were but four-
non-excessive fines and bail, habeas corpus, jury trial, and freedom of
the press. Much attention was given to selection of the state legisla-
36. 5 id. at 2787-94.
37. Id. at 2787, art. IV.
38. Id. at 2788, art. XIX of the Declaration; id. at 2793, no. XXXV of the Form
of Government
39. Id. at 2790, nos. HI & I.
40. 2 id. at 777.85.
41. Id. at 778.
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ture, including the franchise and the specifics of oaths required of
representatives, the Governor and the executive council. An unusual
provision in connection with the annual elections commonly specified
in the initial constitutions was one penalizing, in an amount not to
exceed five pounds, the qualified voter who failed to cast his ballot.42
New York also made the initial move for constitutional drafting
in 1776. However, completion of the task was delayed until April 20
of 1777 by repeated adjournments and changes of location. The
resulting document bore resemblances to that of Georgia. 8 Following
a long opening justification for the break with Britain, it consisted of
forty-two numbered sections. There was no formal differentiation
between declaration of rights and provision of governmental frame-
work; much attention was given to representation in the bicameral
legislature and to voter qualifications; and recognition of rights deemed
fundamental was limited to religious liberty44 and trial by jury.45 On
the other hand, the Governor was to be elected for a three-year term,40
and the members of the judiciary, appointive by a council consisting
of senators and the Governor, were to "hold their offices during good
behavior or until they [had] respectively attained the age of sixty years."4
It has been said that "[a]lthough the Revolutionary troubles
began in Massachusetts with the Boston Tea Party, the Bay Colony was
more deliberate than any other in institutionalizing the constitutional
change from colony to commonwealth."48  This fact does not mean,
however, that Massachusetts was slow in starting the process. As with
other former colonies, interest in constitution making in the Bay State
dated from the Year of Independence, when the General Court,
elected under the direction of the Provincial Congress, sought by
Resolution of September 17, 1776, the consent of the "Male Inhabit-
ants of each Town in this State" to the drafting of a constitution. 9
Response of the Towns was generally favorable to the establishment
of a "good constitution" but there were strong differences as to whether
the drafting should be by the legislative body or by the people more
directly. After political skirmishing that ran through the first half of
42. Id. art. XIL
43. 5 id. at 2623-38.
44. Id. at 2636-37, art. XXXVIII.
45. Id. at 2637, art. XI..
46. Id. at 2632, arts. XVII & XVIII.
47. Id. at 2634, art. XXIV.
48. MAssAcHmJSrs, CoLoN Y TO CommoNwA.LTH 3 (L Taylor ed. 1961) [herein-
after cited as Taylor].
49. Id. at 41.
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1777 the former method prevailed. The actual drafting was done by
a working committee, whose report was tendered on December 11,
1777. Acceptance was voted February 28, 1778, and the constitution
thus produced was submitted to universal suffrage on March 4 of 1778.
Rejection was by a one-sided vote of about 5 to 1.50 Examination of
the proposed constitution of 1778 explains this overwhelming reaction.
The proffered instrument51 was largely concerned with the mode of
selection and the powers of the General Court; it contained no bill of
rights, and "forever allowed" religious liberty only for Protestants;" the
only indications of fractionalization of governmental powers lay in
popular election of the Governor, who however was to be President of
the Senate, and in the "good behavior" guarantee for Justices and
judges.
53
Despite the overwhelming rejection of the proposed constitution
of 1778, sentiment continued for a constitution to replace the provi-
sional government; what was desired was a document emanating from
the people themselves. "The story of the struggle for a constitution in
Massachusetts exemplifies that cardinal principle of the American Rev-
olution, that government shall be by consent of the governed." 54  In
early 1779 the General Court called for an expression from the people
as to their wishes, and the response was two to one in favor of the call-
ing of a convention for the express purpose of framing a constitution.
Election of delegates was called in June and those elected convened on
September 1. The completed instrument was referred to the people
in early 1780; was declared on June 16 of that year, by a ratifying con-
vention, to have received the mandated two-thirds vote; and went into
effect October 25. The Constitution of 1780 55 was a vast improvement
over that of 1778. Part the First was the Declaration of Rights, quite
inclusive in the rights deemed fundamental, including "the right of
every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial, and independent
as the lot of humanity will permit."5 This last right was to be imple-
mented by providing that "[tihe judges of the supreme judicial court
should hold their offices as long as they behave themselves well.
50. Detail on these developments is provided by Taylor, id. at 50-89.
51. The document is not available in Thorpe's work but can be found in Taylor at
51-58, and in A. BRADFoim, HiStoRY OF MAssACHUSmrrs 349-62 (1825).
52. Taylor at 58, art. XXXIV.
53. Taylor at 59-89 records the opposition in detail.
54. Id. at 114. J. JAMESON, supra note 4, at 143, is specific on the point that
constitutional drafting by the General Court was anomalous.
55. 3 THORPE, supra note 5, at 1888-911; Taylor, supra note 48, at 127-46.
56. 3 THORPE at 1893, Part the First, art. XXIX; Taylor at 131.
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* . ., Then followed the last article, number XXX, celebrated for its
concise acceptance of Montesquieuan philosophy:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers,
or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to
the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.0 s
Part the Second, on The Frame of Government, was neatly di-
vided into a total of six chapters. By far the longest were the initial two
chapters treating first The Legislative Power and then The Executive
Power. Chapter MI on Judiciary Power, while short, provided that all
judicial officers should serve during good behavior and contained provi-
sion for rendition of advisory opinions. Chapter IV concerned Dele-
gates to Congress; Chapter V treated in two sections of the University
at Cambridge, and the Encouragement of Literature, Etc.; and Chapter
VI embraced a number of matters, one of which is discussed below.
Vermont, the only State to act wholly within the year of 1777, had
not been one of the original colonies. Portions of the lands constitut-
ing Vermont were claimed by Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New
York. Vermont's constitution 9 consequently opened with an assertion
of independence not alone from Great Britain but also from New York,
which appears to have been most persistent in its claim. Massachusetts
and New Hampshire released their respective claims in the early 1780's
but New York did not do so until 1790, upon which event Vermont
became the fourteenth State of the United States. Another unusual
feature of the first Vermont Constitution was the rapidity with which
the constitutional convention acted to produce an instrument of design
and content equal to that of the best of the original round of constitu-
tion making. The explanation appears to lie in Thorpe's statement that
"[t]he groundwork of the constitution of 1777 was the Pennsylvania con-
stitution of 1776, which had been recommended to the inhabitants of
Vermont, as a model, by Dr. Thomas Young.60 In his editorial note,
Thorpe demonstrated the many similarities between the two docu-
ments, nevertheless noting that "the Vermont constitution of 1777 was
not a mere copy of the Pennsylvania model."' 1  Chapter I on "A
57. 3 THORPE at 1893; Taylor at 131.
58. 3 THORPE at 1893; Taylor at 131.
59. 6 TaoRPE at 3737-49.
60. Id. at 3778.
61. Id. at 3779.
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Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Vermont"
specified nineteen fundamental rights, with three more included in
Chapter II, "Plan or Frame of Government."62 The Frame had several
features in common with the Pennsylvania Constitution on which there
will be comment later.
From this account it is apparent that constitution making was
coterminous with political severance from England. Save for Connecti-
cut -and Rhode Island, which resolved to continue under their royal
Charters, all of the thirteen colonies had, during 1776, taken at least
preliminary steps toward provision of a written constitutional foundation
for their new independent governments. Eight States, among them
North Carolina, were operating under constitutions by the close of the
year of independence. With some, joined by Vermont, completion car-
ried over until the next year. By 1778 constitutions had been drafted in
all the twelve jurisdictions, with ten in force and two to be further per-
fected as a consequence of initial rejection on submission to the people.
Failure in ten States to provide a ratification process may have
been in part the consequence of a sense of pressure to provide, with
the least possible delay, organic governments in substitution for those
of the colonial period. Yet this absence of ratification in most of the
states, the failure of a number of the new instruments, especially the
earliest, to provide for amendment,6 and the very concern of the
peoples of Massachusetts and New Hampshire that their constitutions
be fully satisfactory before acceptance suggest the presence of a view
that under divine guidance it was possible at a given time to set out
in written form the full parameters of governmental power and limita-
tion when sovereignty resides in the governed. As an able scholar has
observed:
Such popular attachment to a free constitution as higher and con-
trolling law was justified by one, two, or all, of three assumptions:
62. Id. at 3746, §§ XXII, XXV, & XXVI.
63. The number not providing for amendment depends on which constitutions are
considered (for in some states it required two or more sessions to come up with an
acceptable version), and how they are interpreted. One authority counts five. J.
D_.ALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE, CONsnITTIMONS 32 (1915). Not counting the
skeletal instruments designed only for the transition period from colonial status to full
statehood, the number of constitutions making no provision for full amendatory powers
at the hands of the people appears to be six.
By contrast the Maryland Constitution incorporated a provision unusual even by
modem conventions for liberal amendability. Neither the Declaration of Rights nor the
Form of Government was to be altered unless a bill therefor passed an assembly, was
published for three months, and then was confirmed by legislative action after a new
election of delegates. 3 THORPE, supra note 5, at 1701, Form of Government no. LIX.
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that the constitution was the command of the people, an original
compact expressing their unalienable sovereignty; that it was the
handiwork of the wisest men in the body politic; and that it was
an earthly expression of the eternal principles of the law of
nature.6 4
Belief in the capacity of fallible humans to -articulate political funda-
mentals by a formal enactment process continued as an article of faith
in the nineteenth century only to become a casualty of the relativism
of the twentieth,65 with major implications for the judicial function in
the interpretation of written constitutions.
Concern for adherence to the fundamentals of the new constitu-
tionalism is reflected in the constitutions whose bicentennial is now at
hand. Five patterns are discernible. One is that of annual elections
of the legislative branch. *
Frequent elections, which in fact and principle meant annual
elections, were the one sure way to secure almost continuous
accountability. Not only was a short term -the best possible guar-
antee that the legislature would remain 'in miniature an exact
portrait of the people at large'; it was a major bulwark against
abuse and usurpation of power.66
The original instrument of North Carolina provides an excellent il-
lustration of another of these patterns. Article XLIV of "The Constitu-
tion or Form of Government, &c" specified "[tihat the Declaration of
Rights is hereby declared to be part of the Constitution of this State,
and ought never to be violated, on any pretence whatsoever. 607 Reli-
ance upon admonishment was also found in the Delaware Constitution
of 1776, where it was provided in the last article (30) that
[n]o article of the declaration of rights and fundamental rules of
this State, agreed to by this convention, nor the first (Statehood),
second (bicameralism), fifth (suffrage and rules of the legislative
chambers) (except that part thereof that relates to the right of suf-
frage), twenty-sixth (prohibition of importation of slaves), and
twenty-ninth (non-establishment) articles of this constitution, ought
ever to be violated on any pretence whatever.08
Other parts of the constitution could be altered but only by five-sevenths
of the assembly, together with seven members of the legislative council.
64. C. RossrrER, Tim POLTICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 181
(1963).
65. Gabriel, Constitutional Democracy: A Nineteenth-Century Faith, in TMH CON-
STITUTION RECONSIDEREo 247 (C. Read ed. 1968).
66. C. RossrrER, supra note 64, at 133.
67. 5 THORPE, supra note 5, at 2794.
68. 1 id. at 568.
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The New Jersey Constitution sought from every member of the
House of Assembly and the Legislative Council a solemn declaration
that he would not assent "to any law, vote or proceeding" that would
"annul or repeal" constitutional provisions establishing annual elections
of Assembly or Council, guaranteeing jury trial and religious liberty,
or forbidding religious establishment.69 For double assurance Pennsyl-
vania and Vermont included both oath and admonishment provisions;
70
yet dissatisfied even then, they resorted as well to the device of a Coun-
cil of Censors. In each instance the provision for such a Council consti-
tuted the last section in the Frame of Government 71 and the wording
was largely identical, indicative of the assertion earlier noted that
Vermont copied extensively from Pennsylvania.
The Councils of Censors were to meet every seven years. Mem-
bers were to be elected by the people, Vermont taking the precaution
to disqualify anyone then a member of the legislative branch of
government. Their chief duty
it shall be to enquire whether the constitution has been preserved
inviolate, in every part; and whether the legislative and executive
branches of government have performed their duty as guardians of
the people; or assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or greater
powers, than they are entitled to by the constitution. . . . For
these purposes they shall have power to send for persons, papers
and records; they shall have authority to pass public censures-to
order impeachments, and to recommend to the legislature the
repealing such laws as appear to them to have been enacted con-
trary to the principles of the constitution.
72
In further support of this supervisory function the Councils were
empowered to call a Convention when there was felt "an absolute
necessity" of amending any constitutional article thought defective in
expression or of "adding such as are necessary for the preservation of
the rights and happiness of the people. .. .
The constitutions finally approved in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire made no use of the pattern of admonition but did employ
oaths and mechanisms for periodic review akin to those of Pennsyl-
vania and Vermont. Yet the oaths were not so specific in exacting
69. 5 id. at 2598, art. XXIII.
70. For Pennsylvania, 5 id. at 3085, § 10 (oath); id. at 3091, § 46 (admonition).
For Vermont, 6 id. at 3743, § IX (oath); id. at 3748, § XLIII (admonition).
71. For Pennsylvania, 5 id. at 3091-92, § 47. For Vermont, 6 id. at 3748-49, §
XLIV.
72. 6 id. at 3748-49, § XLIV.
73. Id.
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pledges of adherence, to the constitutions, 74 and the review devices,
while designed to effect such adherence, looked to periodic calling of
conventions by the legislative branches without employment of an inter-
vening body of censors.75 New Hampshire used the seven-year period
of Pennsylvania and Vermont, whereas Massachusetts set the first year
at 1795, fifteen years from the Constitution of 1780.
Alone among the states New York sought t6 achieve adherence
to its constitution by providing for a council of revision. Because "laws
inconsistent with the spirit of this constitution, or with the public good,
may be hastily and unadvisedly passed," provision was made in an early
section of the instrument for "a council . . . to revise all bills about
to be passed into laws by the legislature" and to review for "revisal
and consideration" before they became laws "all bills which have
passed the senate and assembly." 76  With respect to the latter class
of review the council was to exercise what amounted to a quali-
fied veto power, setting forth its reasons why a bill was deemed
improper to become a law but yielding should each house of the legis-
lature, after reconsideration, approve it by two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers present. The council was to be constituted of "the chancellor, the
judges of the supreme court, or any two of them, together with the
governor. . . ."" The composition was significant; with notions of
legislative supremacy still appealing to some, the greatest threat to lim-
ited government was to the provinces of the executive and judiciary if
by separation of the three political freedom was to be realized.
Of these five patterns devised to enforce the basic provisions of
the first state constitutions, little need be said concerning the efficacy
of the first three. Annual election of legislators might be effective, yet
it had obvious defects of discontinuity and impracticality. If elections
were not held annually, then as later observed by a Maryland judge in
the course of justifying reliance upon the judiciary as the enforcement
agency:
The interference of the people by elections cannot be consid-
ered as the proper and only check and a suitable remedy, because
in the interval of time, between the elections of the members who
74. For Massachusetts, 3 id. at 1908-09 (ch. VI, art. I of the Frame). For New
Hampshire, 4 id. at 2468 (last division of the Form).
75. For Massachusetts, 3 id. at 1911 (ch. VI, art. X of the Frame). For New
Hampshire, 4 id. at 2470 (last paragraph of the Form).
76. 5 id. at 2628-29, no. IH.




compose the different legislatures, the law may have had its full
operation, and the evil arising from it become irremediable; nor is
it probable that the elections will be made with the view to afford
redress in such particular case, and if they were, and the law should
be repealed, it would not be an adequate remedy.78
Only if men were angels could mere admonition or even the moral com-
punction of an oath prevent unconstitutional action.
Periodic review by a Council of Censors or an equivalent offered
a more promising pattern for enforced adherence. In Pennsylvania the
first Council met in the year prescribed (1783) and at that and at an
adjourned session the next year did report on a number of instances
of violation of the constitution, including denial of trial by jury and
usurpation of executive and judicial authority. Its conclusion was that
the Constitution of 1776, if properly administered, would continue to
give the State excellent government. 79  But political conflict that
engulfed the Council, in part over the issue of uni- or bi-cameralism,
and the lack of power of enforcement of its conclusions on constitu-
tional violation rather quickly led to a decline in its popularity. Before
a second Council was scheduled to meet, the legislature resolved to call
a convention for constitutional amendment rather than wait for another
Council, which was heavily criticized as a body "not only unequal and
unnecessarily expensive but too dilatory to produce the speedy and
necessary alterations. 80  The convention that met in response to the
legislative call produced the Constitution of 1790 in which the Council
feature was dropped.8 ' The Pennsylvania setup thereby became
essentially like that in Massachusetts and in New Hampshire.
Borrowed from Pennsylvania, the concept of a Council of Censors
enjoyed a longer life in Vermont. Assembling first in 1785, one year
beyond the seven stipulated in the Constitution of 1777, the Vermont
Council found numerous infractions of the State's basic instrument,
many of them involving legislative vacation of judicial judgments and
grants of new trials: "The council prepared an address in which the
legislature was severely criticized, and in which there was recom-
mended the calling of a convention to amend the constitution. 8 2 The
78. Whittington v. Polk, 1 HIar. & John. 236, 243-44 (Md. 1802) (Chase, C..).
79. C. HAINES, THE AMERIcAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 77 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as HAINES].
80. Id. at 78. Haines based his appraisal on PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790 AND THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS (1825).
81. 5 THORPE, supra note 5, at 3092-103.
82. HAINES, supra note 79, at 79.
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convention that convened in response to this recommendation ratified
a provision declaring that "[t]he legislative, executive and judiciary
departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the
powers properly belonging to the other." This appears as Section VI
of Chapter II of the Vermont Constitution of 1786.83 The Council of
Censors provision of the earlier constitution was preserved, 84 presum-
ably in substitution for a Council of Revision on the New York model,
as recommended by the Council of Censors itself.s5 A second Council
of Censors, meeting on schedule seven years later, was happy to report
the finding of no acts "unconstitutional or deserving of censure."8' 0 But
it did propose alterations in the constitutional structure, and henceforth
until ultimately abolished in 1869 on its own recommendation it
appears to have made this its function .T The function of reviewing for
unconstitutionality had long since passed to the judiciary. 88
How effective as constitutional enforcement mechanisms were
conventions in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and in Pennsylvania
after 1790, is difficult to judge in the absence of historical evaluations
that have not been uncovered. The number of constitutional revisions
after the original instruments varied with the states, yet it would be
hazardous to judge convention effectiveness in this regard on any such
criterion. With New York, on the other hand, there is much known
of the operation of the Council of Revision that types as the fifth pattern
of enforcement device. Before it was dropped by the New York Con-
stitution of 1821,11 the Council, which unlike the Councils of Censors
could meet uninterruptedly, had returned 169 bills with objections. 0
"Among the vetoes of the council many were based on the ground that
the acts were contrary to the constitution"; 1 however, it is not possible
83. 6 THORPE, supra note 5, at 3755.
84. Id. at 3760-61, VT. CONST. ch. II, § XL (1786).
85. HAINES, supra note 79, at 78. Haines relied on a journal kept by the Council.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS (1792).
86. HAINES, supra note 79, at 80.
87. A chronicle of actions of the Councils of Censors sitting from 1785 to 1836 is
found in PROCEEDINGS OF THE VERMONT HISTORICAL SoCIETY 114 (1898-1902).
88. No effort is here made to date this transition. It took place between 1787 and
1814. See text accompanying note 118 infra to the effect that legislative supremacy was
accepted in the early years. In the year 1814, on the other hand, the Supreme Court of
Vermont held void, as a violation of separation of powers, a legislative direction that a
deposition be read in a trial. Dupy, qui tam v. Wickwire, 2 Vt. 237, 238 (1814).
89. 5 THORPE, supra note 5, at 2639-51.
90. HAINES, supra note 79, at 83-84, relying on data given in A.B. STREET, THE
COUNCIL OF REvISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1859). Thorpe gives a lower figure
of 128. 5 THORPE at 2629 n.a.
91. HAINES, supra note 79, at 84. The figure by Thorpe on the number of
sustained vetoes is 111. 5 THORPE, supra note 5, at 2629 n.a.
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to determine how many of these vetoes were among the 11.8 the legis-
lature did not override by two-thirds vote, although Haines asserts by
negative implication that there were not many in this category.
In a possibly biased summarization Haines concludes that "effort
to limit legislative power . . . by means of a separately constituted
body" failed completely in Pennsylvania, did little better in Vermont,
and was not a successful check in New York.92 To him
[t]he one device to protect the fundamental law, other than the
doctrine of judicial supremacy, to which men turned in the days
of the American Revolution, was such a conspicuous failure that it
merely tended to strengthen the cause of those who favored judi-
cial guardianship of constitutions. It was the council of revision
which was proposed for the federal government in the convention
at Philadelphia and which led to most of the discussion in that
body relative to the function of the judiciary in relation to the
review of legislation.93
Disappointment with the five types of device for implementation
of limitations in the first constitutions of the Republic94 undoubtedly
encouraged thought of employment of the courts. On the face of
things there appeared to be abundant precedent since for centuries
courts had been the agency for interpretation of all manner of legal
documents, public as well as private. On analysis, however, it is clear
that this familiar action of judges was that of courts functioning as the
evolving third branch of government consistent with Montesquieuan
theory of separated powers. The review of the first state constitutions
has disclosed how widely this theory, although not always clearly articu-
lated, became basic to the structure of those fundamental instruments.
This function of courts can very aptly be dubbed that of judicial review,
for its central features are those of interpretation of legislative acts and
determination of the rationality of executive discretion in the applica-
tion of that legislative will. Far different in theory and ramifications
is authority of the judicial branch to exercise power to determine the
consistency of executive and legislative action with constitutional limita-
tions, for here the court is not an equal, co-ordinate division of the
framework of government but one that is "more than equal." The
92. HArNEs, supra note 79, at 86-87.
93. Id. at 87.
94. Madison found none satisfactory in his survey of them. THE FEDERALIST Nos.
48-50 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966). In No. 51 Madison placed reliance on internal structural
relationships, primarily federalism and separation of powers.
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nature of the judicial function in such circumstances is appropriately
described as constitutional review."
It is true that by the late eighteenth century there was some
pseudomorphic precedent for this latter type of review. Yet correctly
understood, Dr. Bonham's Case96 furnishes no technical support; it was
an instance of judicial review in the form of interpretation of the juris-
diction of the Royal College of Physicians under letters patent from
Henry VIII. Coke's language was, however, suggestive of a claim to
judicial authority to determine constitutionality97 and was so construed
by a number of leading colonial lawyers. James Otis relied upon this
construction in Paxton's Case98 and George Mason in Robin v. Hard-
away.9 More in point were the English decisions in Cavendish's
Case'00 and the Case of Monopolies,'0 ' but these do not appear to have
received much attention in the New World.
Some further precedent arose as a product of the principle that
Charters of the American colonies forbade local legislation repugnant
to the laws of Great Britain. From most of the colonies, acts of the
colonial legislatures were transmitted directly to King and Council for
approval or rejection, in what had the earmarks of a legislative review.
However, the Charter of Connecticut of 1662102 and that of Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations of 1663103 were so drafted that a
private party attacking the validity of a colonial act in the court of the
colony could on proper motion seek review by the English Privy Coun-
cil in a proceeding that looked quite judicial in character. Winthrop
v. Lechmere'l4 was a celebrated case involving adverse claims of son
and daughter to real property, situate in Connecticut, left them by
95. An appreciation of the distinction between the two types of court review,
framed in modem context, can be found in Strong, President, Congress, Judiciary: One
is More Equal than the Others, 60 A.B.A.J. 1050, 1203 (1974); Strong, Three Little
Words and What They Didn't Seem to Mean, 59 A.B.A.J. 29 (1973).
96. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
97. The familiar passage is that "it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly
void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant,
or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to
be void." Id. at 652.
98. Quincy 50, 52 & n.5 (Mass. 1761).
99. Jeff. 109, 114 (Va. 1772).
100. In re Cavendish, 123 Eng. Rep. 403 (C.P. 1587).
101. Darcy v. Allein, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
102. 1 THORPE, supra note 5, at 529-36.
103. 6 id. at 3211-22.
104. 1 J. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 34 (1895) [hereinafter cited as
THAYER]. The case was heard by the Privy Council in 1727 and 1728.
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intestacy. John Winthrop claimed full title to this property of his father
whereas daughter Ann, wife of Thomas Lechmere, laid claim to one-
half. In the course of the litigious conflict the General Assembly of
the Colony of Connecticut passed an Act for the Settlement of Intes-
tates' Estates, whereunder children were to take of both real and per-
sonal property in equal portions save that the portion of the eldest son
was to be double that of any other child. Winthrop successfully chal-
lenged this Act in the Privy Council as null and void under the Con-
necticut Charter which was construed to embrace the common law of
England.
After independence but while Connecticut and Rhode Island yet
continued under their respective Charters, a case in each of the two
jurisdictions' °5 carried intimations that the new state courts would
succeed to the authority of the Privy Council in judging the consistency
of legislative acts with superior law. However, the Charters necessarily
being of little relevance as a source of fundamental limitations, the two
courts were at sea for appropriate criteria. In the Symsbury Case the
Connecticut colonial legislature had in 1670 granted a tract of land to
proprietors of the town of Symsbury, only later to grant to the proprie-
tors of Hartford and Windsor portions of the Symsbury lands. The
action over one hundred years later was by the proprietors of Symsbury
for surrender to them of this overlapping acreage. Affirming the judg-
ment of the superior court, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
held for plaintiffs on the ground that they had not given consent to the
attempted transfer of the disputed land, but gave no reason rising any-
where near a constitutional level.
The Rhode Island case of Trevett v. Wheeden grew out of a
conflict between hard money and soft money advocates. The legisla-
ture had by special acts of 1786 required of merchants acceptance of
paper bills issued by the State as equivalent for silver or gold. Trial
was to be without a jury and without opportunity for appeal should deci-
sion go against the defendant. Under these acts one John Wheeden was
indicted for refusal to accept paper money in payment for meat sold
in his market. The superior court of judicature held the issue to be
non-cognizable. Only one of the judges gave reasons for his conclu-
sion; these were, as defendant's counsel had contended in his lengthy
argument, the repugnancy of the denial of jury trial to traditional
105. Symsbury Case, Kirby's Rep. 444 (Conn. 1785); Trevett v. Wheeden, 1
THAYER, supra note 104, at 73 (R.I. Super. Ct. & Gen. Assem. 1786).
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English liberties of which the colonists had arguably been invested by
the Rhode Island Charter and which as a free people after independ-
ence they continued to possess. Greatly offended, the General
Assembly called the legislatively appointed judges on the carpet, requir-
ing them to appear before the two houses in an attempt to justify
their defiance of legislative prerogative. Their response was cast
in terms of separation-of-powers theory, one of the judges quoting
directly from Montesquieu. This defense was found wanting by the
Assembly, whereupbn a motion was made to dismiss the judges from
office. At this point the threatened judges memorialized the General
Assembly for a hearing at which they would be represented by counsel.
Chosen by the judges was James Varnum, said to be the State's ablest
lawyer, who had defended Wheeden.
Varnum's argument was bottomed on the contention that the
judges possessed independence of the legislative power at least to the
extent of entitlement to all the protections of any accused, whether the
accusation be grounded in impeachment or common criminality. Re-
quested by the Assembly to speak after Varnum closed, the Attorney
General gave it as "his private opinion" that the judges' "determination
was conformable to the principles of Constitutional law." Although
never convinced that the judges had rendered satisfactory reasons for
their judgment, the General Assembly in the end discharged the judges
from further attendance and later repealed the laws that had given rise
to the controversy. 10 6
Trevett v. Wheeden reflected the uncertainty attending the thrust
of the earliest judicial involvements under the new state constitutions,
involvements that commenced almost immediately. For while the sub-
stantive action of the Rhode Island court, as with the Symsbury court
in Connecticut, concerned a law not directed at the judiciary, the proce-
dural restrictions of no jury and no appeal combined with the aftermath
of legislative hostility to threaten seriously the superior court's status
as a fully co-ordinate branch of government. In toto the episode
involved not only a judicial claim of power to pass on constitutionality,
but also its less projective authority to function effectively in the role
for which Montesquieu had pressed.
106. The above account is taken from 2 P. CHANDLER, AMERCAN CRIMINAL TRIALS
269-350 (1970 reprint). This is the fullest account of the total controversy comprehend-
ing the originating laws, the decision of the court on challenge of those laws, the
subsequent proceedings before the General Assembly, and the final outcome.
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What is thought to be the first constitutional case to arise in any
of the states newly operating under independently drafted constitutions
exhibits this interface. The Case of Josiah Philips is thus summarized
by Judge Tucker, who was a member of the court:
In May, 1778, an act passed in Virginia, to attaint one Josiah
Philips, unless he should render himself to justice, within a limited
time: he was taken, after the time had expired, and was brought
before the general court to receive sentence of execution pursuant
to the directions of the act. But the court refused to pass the sen-
tence, and he was put upon his trial, according to the ordinary
course of law.. . . This is a decisive proof of the importance of
the separation of the powers of government, and of the independ-
ence of the judiciary; a dependent judiciary might have executed
the law, whilst they execrated the principles upon which it was
founded.10
7
For the court to have ordered execution of Philips on the strength
of the General Assembly's bill of attainder would have been to deny
its own place in the governmental framework, for a bill of attainder not
only declares a policy of attaint but determines those who are to suffer
its consequences. By placing Philips "upon his trial" the court insisted
that it itself perform the judicial function of judgmental application of
the policy in individual situations. Thus the court maintained against
attempted legislative inroad the separation of powers as mandated in
the Virginia Constitution of two years before. The fact that that con-
stitution did not include a prohibition against bills of attainder offered
no obstacle; as Chief Justice Warren was to observe nearly two centur-
ies later, such a prohibition is but a specialized articulation of the
general principle of separation of powers.' 08
A leading analyst of early judicial precedents maintains that:
The courts of New Jersey were pioneers in asserting the principle
of judicial control over legislation. Holmes v. Walton appears
to be the first recorded case where a court definitely invalidated
an act because it was deemed to be in conflict with a provision of
the written constitution of the state.' 0 9
The case arose out of a New Jersey act of 1778 providing that if any
person suspected another of trading with the British he was empowered
107. 1 ST. G. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTAIUES 293 (1803).
108. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
109. HAmrNs, supra note 79, at 92. Haines based his conclusions on the researches
of Austin Scott. Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HisT.
REV. 456 (1899). There is no record of an opinion in the case, but the case is sum-
marized in HawEs. There is agreement that the decision came in 1780.
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to seize the goods and if judicially found to be contraband to retain
them. Either party might demand a trial before a jury of six, from
whose decision there was to be no appeal. Because the Constitution
of 1776 included among its guarantees the right of trial by jury,
presumably of twelve persons, the supreme court refused recognition
to the act. Louis Boudin, whose two-volume work challenges the insti-
tution of constitutional review as it has developed in this country, insists
that, properly analyzed, Holmes v. Walton was an instance of judicial
review.110 Yet even if Professor Haines is correct that this decision
was one of constitutional review, it is to be noted that the constitutional
provision offended is one closely related to traditional judicial process.
There is thus a certain amount of defensiveness in the employment of
constitutional review by the New Jersey court.
This factor of defensiveness in the exercise of constitutional
review reappears in a case from New Hampshire, decided in 1785 or
1786. There is again no opinion extant. Report of the case comes
from William Meigs, writing in the American Law Review, who in turn
relies upon a passage in The Life of William Plumer."' In that
passage, Mr. Plumer, a member of the New Hampshire legislature in
1785, remarks that
"I entered my protest singly and alone, against the bill for the
recovery of small debts in an expeditious way and manner; prin-
cipally on the ground that it was unconstitutional. The courts so
pronounced it, and the succeeding legislature repealed the law."' "2
The objective of the law must have been to by-pass the judiciary, or
at least trial by jury, in its enforcement; as clearly, the basis of judicial
invalidation must have been that in so attempting there had occurred
a violation of the principle of separation of powers that assigns to the
judicial branch the resolution of controversies.
In May of 1787 came the celebrated North Carolina decision in
Bayard v. Singleton,"3 generally agreed to be the strongest case for
constitutional review during the period from Independence to the Fed-
eral Convention for revision of the Articles of Confederation. It was
a suit in ejectment brought by one sympathizing with the Revolution.
110. 1 L. BouDnN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARy App. C, at 531 (1932) (challenging
the Scott research and conclusion).
111. Meigs, The American Doctrine of Judicial Power, and Its Early Origin, 47 AM.
L. Rv. 683 (1913).
112. Id. at 684, quoting W. PLUMER, THE Lime OF WLLIAM PLUMER 59. See also
HAINES, supra note 79, at 149 n.4.
113. 1 N.C. 5 (1787).
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Defendant, on the other hand, claimed title to the house and lot through
a district commissioner of estates confiscated from a Loyalist. Defend-
ant's counsel, one Nash, cited a North Carolina law of 1785 requiring the
courts to dismiss such suits on motion when, as Nash had done here,
defendant filed an affidavit that he held the disputed property under
a sale from a commissioner of confiscated estates. One of plaintiff's
counsel, James Iredell, known from his letters and papers to be favor-
able to judicial power to determine constitutionality, 114 countered,
whereupon long arguments of Nash and Iredell ensued. The court
added "a few observations on our constitution and system of govern-
ment," stressing the division of "the powers of government into
separate and distinct branches . . . and assigning to each, several and
distinct powers, and prescribing their several limits and boundaries;
" 115
All this occurred at the May term of 1786. At May term, 1787,
Nash again moved for dismissal, producing further extended debate by
counsel. It is clear that the court was anxious to avoid a clash with
the legislature, yet determined to safeguard what it conceived to be its
function of determining by traditional judicial process title to property.
Suggested from the bench were two modes by which the confrontation
could be sidestepped. But Nash would not agree and so, "notwith-
standing the great reluctance they might feel against involving them-
selves in a dispute with the Legislature of the State," 1 6 the judges
faced the constitutional issue and found the act of 1785 to be invalid.
With the overruling of Nash's motion the cause was tried at the same
term, with defendant receiving judgment. Analyzed, the case was one
in which the North Carolina court exercised constitutional review to
protect its right to engage in judicial review. Its action was thus of a
defensive character, as is true of the earlier precedents examined. Of
the Bayard decision Louis Boudin, no friend of broad-ranging constitu-
tional review, astutely observed:
Not only did this case not involve the confiscation laws as such,
but it did not even involve the question of trial by jury, which it
is commonly alleged to have involved. For the question was not
whether a trial ought to be with or without a jury, but whether
114. 2 G. McRE, LirFE AND COImpOND NcE OF JA Es IEDELL 145-49 (1857).
HAEs, supra note 79, at 115-18, quotes from the McRee volume sufficiently to disclose
the reasons why Iredell looked to constitutional review for enforcement of constitutional
limitation.
115. 1 N.C. at 5-6.
116. Id. at 6-7.
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there should be a trial at all-that is to say, whether the judges had
a right to hear the case. And one need not be a supporter of the
Judicial Power in any of its formulations in order to believe that
the Judiciary have a right to hear and determine cases.1 17
It will have been noticed that for this first decade there are from
several of the states no precedents for constitutional review in any form.
For Vermont at least we have the explanation that in 1787 "[t]he opin-
ion still prevailed that the Legislature was sovereign; 'no idea was en-
tertained,' said Daniel Chipman, 'that an act of the legislature, however
repugnant to the constitution, could be adjudged void or set aside by
the judiciary.' "I'll Judicial power to challenge legislative acts as ultra
vires of state constitutions did not come easily although eventually it
was to enjoy full acceptance.
For the period from the earliest precedent of 1778 through the
year of the Federal Constitutional Convention, 1787, three cases from
three of the States have been cited by some commentators as exercises
of judicial power beyond either judicial review or defensive constitu-
tional review. None, however, withstands careful analysis. Of these
Commonwealth v. Caton'" is the earliest. Caton and two others had
been condemned for treason by the general court under an act of the
Virginia General Assembly adopted in 1776. The same act had taken
from the Governor the pardoning power, leaving to him only the
authority to suspend execution until the next session of the legislature.
The lower house granted pardon but the Senate failed to concur. By
one interpretation of the Virginia Constitution the pardon was effective;
by another, not. The judges of the court of appeal were of the opinion
that the action by the House of Delegates was inoperative and,
expressly or by implication, found the 1776 statute not unconstitutional.
Pendleton, president of the court, was "happy" that it had not been
necessary to face the issue of judicial power to "declare the nullity of
a law passed in its forms by the legislative power"' 20 but the other judges
declared that such power existed. The assertion of a general power
of constitutional review is thus dictum as Reporter Call seems to con-
cede in his "N.B.'' that has been read as an assertion that the power
was exercised. Boudin would deflate Caton completely; he was con-
117. 1 L. BouDiN, supra note 110, at 66.
118. 3 RECORDS OF THE GovEmRoR AND COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 133
n.1 (1875), quoting CmPMAN, MEMOIRS OF CrTENDEN 100-13.
119. 5-10 Va. 634, 4 Call 5 (1782).
120. Id. at 638, 4 Call at 17.
121. Id. at 639, 4 Call at 20-21.
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vinced that there was no such case at all, it having been dreamed up
by the Reporter to strengthen later claims that judicial power to declare
on constitutionality had been early asserted by the distinguished judges
who sat on the Virginia high court.'22
Rutgers v. Waddington,2 s a 1784 decision of the Mayor's Court
of New York City, and Brattle v. Hinckley,'2 4 the "lost" Massachusetts
decision of 1786 or 1787, involved a type of confiscation law directed
at Loyalists but differing from the North Carolina enactment that pre-
cipitated Bayard v. Singleton. The Massachusetts and New York legis-
lation provided that, in suits by creditor "absentees" brought to recover
on bonds executed before hostilities commenced, the courts were
enjoined from allowing interest for the period of the War. Reliance
upon such legislation was in each instance challenged by plaintiff as
contrary to the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, under which British
creditors were not to be hampered in collection of their just claims.
Faced with conflict between state law and federal treaty the two courts
escaped through strained construction of the former that permitted
award of full interest to those suing. Technically, then, the two deci-
sions constituted the exercise of judicial review. There was in them
an element of constitutional review, non-defensive in character, born of
the view, later to become an accepted derivative of American consti-
tutional law, that treaties of the United States must prevail over state
law. But significantly, there was no claim in either case of state judicial
power to invalidate state legislation for conflict with the state constitu-
tion, absent legislative effort so to invade the judicial provinces as to
threaten the courts in their performance of their constitutionally estab-
lished functions as the third branch of government.125
122. 1 L BouniN, supra note 110, at 531-35.
123. 1 THAYER, supra note 104, at 63-72.
124. HAINES, supra note 79, at 120-21. To Louis Boudin, the Massachusetts case is
"lost" because it never existed! 1 L. BouDiN, supra note 110, at 555-63.
125. A revealing aspect of Rutgers v. Waddington is the court's reference to the
place of the Council of Revision in New York's constitutional framework. After
summarizing the provision for the Council and its function, the following paragraph
appears in the court's opinion:
From this passage of our Constitution, Mr. Attorney seems to regard this
determination of the Council of Revision on the law in question in the light of
a judicial decision, by which this court ought to be guided, for the sake of
uniformity in the dispensation of justice. But surely the respect, which we owe
to this honorable council, ought not to carry us such lengths; it is not to be
supposed, that their assent or objection to a bill can have the force of an ad-
judication; for what in such a case would be the fate of a law which prevailed
against their sentiments? Besides, in the hurry of a session, and especially
flagrante bello, they have neither leisure nor means to weigh the extent and
consequences of a law whose provisions are general, at least not with that
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During the years from the drafting of the Federal Constitution to
the eve of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Marbury v. Madison,1 28 there were further developments in the state
courts and initial decisions in the Federal Supreme Court concerning
the scope of judicial power. -The period started with a major conflict
between legislative and judicial branches in Virginia. In 1778 the Vir-
ginia General Assembly provided for the establishment of district courts;
the judges of the court of appeals, augmented by the election of four
additional for a total of nine, were to preside over these district courts,
"allotting among themselves the districts they shall respectively attend."
But no provision was made for upward adjustment in salary or reduc-
tion in other duties. The judges remonstrated in what is known as
the Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals.127  Of considerable
length, the remonstrance concludes with the following paragraph before
directing the president of the court to deliver the document to the Gover-
nor with the request that he lay it before the General Assembly:
To obviate a possible objection, that the court, while they are
maintaining the independency of the judiciary, are countenancing
encroachments of that branch upon the department of others, and
assuming a right to control the legislature, it may be observed, that
when they decide between an act of the people, and an act of the
legislature, they are within the line of their duty, declaring what
the law is, and not making a new law. And ever disposed to main-
tain harmony with other members of government, so necessary to
promote the happiness of society, they most sincerely wish, that the
present infraction of the constitution may be remedied by the legis-
lature themselves; and thereby all further uneasiness on the
occasion be prevented. But should their wishes be disappointed
by the event, they see no other alternative for a decision between
the legislature and judiciary, than an appeal to the people, whose
servants both are; and for whose sakes both were created, and who
may exercise their original and supreme power, whenever they
think proper. To that tribunal, therefore, the court, in that case,
accuracy and solemnity which must be necessary to render their reasons incon-
trovertible, and their opinions absolute. The institution of this council is suffi-
ciently useful and salutary, without ascribing to their proceedings, effects so
extraordinary; nor is it probable, that the high judicial powers themselves,
would in the seat of judgment always be precluded, even by their own opinion
given in the Council of Revision; for instance, if they had consented to a bill,
general in its provision, and in the administration of justice they discovered
that, according to the letter, it comprehended cases which rendered its opera-
tion unseasonable, mischievous, and contrary to the intention of the legislature,
would they not give relief? Surely it cannot be questioned.
THAYER, supra note 104, at 70-71.
126. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
127. 5-10 Va. 678, 4 Call 135 (1788).
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commit themselves, conscious of perfect integrity, in their inten-
tions, however they may have been mistaken in their judgment. 128
Responding to the remonstrance, the General Assembly in late
1778 amended the earlier act to create a new court of appeals consist-
ing of five judges thereby in effect ousting the contentious judges, but
directing that the creation of the new court not affect any suits then
pending. In turn, the judges asserted "that they are again under an,
indispensable obligation to advert to an act of assembly which they are
constrained to consider as incompatible with their independence" and
"in conformity to these sentiments" they tendered in March of 1789
their resignations as judges of the court of appeals.' 29 "On the 20th
of June, 1789, the five judges of the court of appeals, appointed under
the act of the 22d December, 1788, met according to law, and pro-
ceeded to do business."'130 Their appointments had been by joint ballot
of the two Houses of Assembly, as provided in the constitution. In
October of 1792 the Assembly legislated once again, to reduce "into
one act the several acts concerning the court of appeals," calling for
a court of five chosen as specified by the constitution. This further
legislative action reintroduced unsettlement into the picture, but as no
new judges were chosen by the Assembly, the judges appointed under
the 1788 act concluded after a conference in April of 1793 that they
were to continue "for, as they held their offices under the consti-
tution, the new law could not have taken them away, had it even been
intended" which they concluded was not the case.'- The Reporter
concluded by quoting Judge Mercer as observing "that the legislature,
without intending it, had done all they could to deprive the judges of
their offices; but that it was not in their power to do so, except
for misbehaviour in office, and in the manner prescribed by the
constitution.' ' 2
Clearly, the highest court of Virginia was here on the defensive,
seeking to preserve its basic authority to exercise its historic function
of judicial review free of legislative threat to its independence. In the
case of Kamper v. Hawkins,13 which in time immediately followed the
above events, the court of appeals was more assertive but only to the
point of claiming power to pass on constitutionality in a judicial context.
128. Id. at 682, 4 Call at 146.
129. Id. at 683, 4 Call at 149-50.
130. Id. at 683, 4 Call at 150.
131. Id. at 683, 4 Call at 150-51.
132. Id. at 683, 4 Call at 151.
133. 3-4 Va. 11, 1 Va. Cas. 19 (1793).
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In one of the district courts, with Spencer Roane on the bench, Kamper
moved for an injunction to stay proceedings on a judgment obtained
against him at law by Mary Hawkins. The question of the court's juris-
diction being of "novelty and difficulty," it was "adjourned" to the gen-
eral court. Hawkins's claim was the unconstitutionality of a legislative
act, passed late in 1792, that authorized the district courts to "exercise
the same power of granting injunctions to stay proceedings on any judg-
ment obtained in any of the said district courts, as is now had and exer-
cised by the judge of the high court of chancery in similar cases.
* * .134 Basis for the challenge lay in the fact that provisions of the
constitution appeared to establish common-law courts and the court of
chancery as separate judicial bodies with non-overlapping remedial
jurisdiction. The general court was unanimous that the motion should
be overruled, with four of the five judges asserting the powers of courts
to invalidate legislative acts found contrary to the constitution.
Awarding of new trials by state legislatures, after decision in the
courts, was not uncommon during the period under review and well into
the nineteenth century. In invalidating such action as a violation of
the separation of powers the New Hampshire Superior Court of Judica-
ture in Merrill v. Sherburne3 ' cited in support four unpublished deci-
sions to like effect handed down in that State during the 1790's
although conceding but not citing other unpublished decisions said to
be to the contrary. 3 " Calder v. Bull,137 decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States in 1798, arose out of similar facts. After the pro-
bate court of Hartford had refused to admit a will to probate and appeal
time had expired, the legislature of Connecticut directed that a new
trial be given. At the second hearing the probate court reversed itself.
In vain the heir sought relief in the superior court and the supreme
court of errors; the Charter under which Connecticut was continuing
to operate did not, of course, incorporate the structural concept of
separation of powers. On writ of error the sole inquiry in the Supreme
Court of the United States was, as regarded the limitations in the
Federal Constitution, whether the Connecticut law violated the prohibi-
tion against ex post facto legislation contained in section 10 of article
I. The Court's decision that this prohibition is applicable only to
criminal legislation required affirmance of the Connecticut judgment.
134. Id. at 12, 1 Va. Cas. at 21-22.
135. 1 N.H. 199 (1818).
136. Id. at 216-17. The dates given by the court for the supportive cases are 1791,
1797, and 1799.
137. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
[Vol. 55
BICENTENNIAL BENCHMARK
Among the earliest decisions of the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, antedating the case of Calder v. Bull, is that reported
as Hayburn's Case. 18 Actually it was a combination of two determina-
tions of the Justices on circuit. Involved was early legislation by
Congress seeking to impose upon the circuit courts determination and
certification to the "Secretary at War" of the degree of disability of
Revolutionary veterans authorized to file pension claims in the circuit
courts. But the determination and certification were not to be the end
of the matter; the legislation empowered the Secretary to withhold from
the pension list those certified if he suspected "imposition or mistake."
The issue was one of separation of powers, viewed either as a congres-
sional attempt to transfer judicial power to the Executive branch or as
imposing upon the Judiciary non-judicial duties. The Justices sitting
on circuit for the district of Pennsylvania were divided on the validity
of the legislation, but not so those sitting on circuit for the district of
New York among whom was Chief Justice Jay. To the majority of the
Justices the legislation was unconstitutional; but clearly the exercise of
the power to invalidate was that of defensive constitutional review.
Legislative efforts to impose on judges what they deemed to be non-
judicial functions were not limited to Congress; such were not uncom-
mon in the states. However, no decision of a state court on this issue
has been found for the period under review.
On the other hand, for this fifteen-year period reaching to
Marbury v. Madison there are recorded a number of cases in which
the state courts were faced with the contrasting situation of legislative
effort to deny jury trial in the face of constitutional guarantee. In State
v. , 13 a North Carolina decision of 1794, denial did not result
in invalidation. Involving an action by the Attorney General against
receivers of public monies, two of the three judges finally took the posi-
tion, later taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,140 that there is no consti-
tutional violation in the use of distraint against public officials who fail
to account for public funds. Yet even the two judges were hesitant at
first, while the third stuck to his conclusion of unconstitutionality. In the
same year, in South Carolina, it was held that an ordinance of Charles-
ton empowering the wardens' court to recover fines for violation of a
prohibition on the keeping of a tallow-chandler's shop was unconstitu-
138. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1793).
139. 2 N.C. 28 (1794).
140. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
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tional for lack of jury trial.141 Immediately following the turn of the
century Kentucky courts thrice struck down legislative acts for denial
of jury trial. 4 2 In this line of cases the courts were once again engag-
ing in constitutional review for the protection of procedures necessary
for the exercise of judicial review.
Of the three Kentucky cases the first decided, Stidger v. Rog-
ers,143 is most significant because a secondary basis for invalidation
was violation of the contract clause of the Kentucky Constitution. Al-
though this judicial action came at the end of the fifteen-year period,
other decisions throughout the period do indicate the emergence in sev-
eral states of judicial flirtation with non-defensive constitutional review.
The common prohibition against ex post facto laws, conceptually
analogous to that forbidding legislative impairment of contract in that
in both instances governmental action follows private conduct, was in
mid-period the basis for invalidation of a New Jersey act requiring
acceptance as specie of continental money.144  In Pennsylvania and
then in Maryland the courts asserted authority to resolve issues of
separation of powers not involving any threat to the independence of
the judiciary as a third, co-equal branch of state government. 145  In
neither instance, however, did challenged legislation fall.
A trilogy of cases, two from South Carolina and one from
Pennsylvania, concerned attempted legislative transfer of rights to real
property.14  In each instance the acts were declared to be unconstitu-
tional. For two reasons, however, these exercises of power to invali-
date represent only uncertain beginnings of non-defensive constitutional
review. They can be viewed, and perhaps were judicially intended,
as defensive exercises on the basis that determination of title, as
asserted in Bayard v. Singleton, is a judicial, not a legislative, function.
Secondly, the South Carolina decisions were rested on the Magna Carta
rather than the State's constitution, while no basis was given in the
141. Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston, 1 S.C. 153, 1 Bay 382 (1794).
142. Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 129 (1802); Enderman v. Ashby, 2
Ky. (Sneed) 53 (1801); Stidger v. Rogers, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 52 (1801).
143. 2 Ky. (Sneed) 52 (1801).
144. Taylor v. Reading, cited in State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, 444 (Sup. Ct.
1802) (no original report). Analysis of Parkhurst appears in text accompanying note
148 infra.
145. Whittington v. Polk, 1 Har. & John. 236 (Md. 1802); Respublica v. Duquet, 2
Yeates 492 (Pa. 1799) (technically an issue of delegation of power from the State to
the city of Philadelphia).
146. Austin v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 1 Yeates 260 (Pa. 1793);




Pennsylvania decision which had to be that of Justice Yeates alone
because the other three justices were closely related to the University.
A later act of the South Carolina legislature, authorizing the laying out
of public streets, was challenged by freeholders whose property would
be taken without their consent.147  Again reliance was placed on the
Magna Carta but now with added reference to the constitution of the
State. The four judges were in agreement that there was no constitu-
tional violation in this type of taking for public purposes but split evenly
on the question whether compensation must be paid the private land-
owners affected. The judges did not question their power in this con-
text to exercise non-defensive constitutional review supportive of gov-
ernmental action.
A similar claim of judicial power with respect to an alleged taking
was involved in State v. Parkhurst,148 an 1802 decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court of Judicature. In an information in the nature
of a quo warranto the Attorney General at the relation of one Aaron
Ogden sought to oust Parkhurst from the clerkship of certain local
courts to which he had been given an interim appointment by the then
governor. Ogden held the clerkship by earlier appointment under
legislation providing a five-year term. That period had not expired but
meantime Ogden had been elected to the Senate of the United States
and had taken his seat. A state legislative act of 1801 declared that
when one became a member of Congress his state office stood vacant.
The challenge was to the constitutionality of this act presumably
because it constituted a "taking" of a right from Ogden to the advantage
of Parkhurst. Two of the three Justices found for the State, with Chief
Justice Kirkpatrick to the contrary. The Reporter justifies his report-
ing of the latter's opinion on the ground that on writ of error to the
court of appeals the judgment Was reversed in favor of Parkhurst.
In finding the act of 1801 to be constitutional the Chief Justice
cited as precedent for the power of courts to examine for constitutional-
ity the two New Jersey cases of Holmes v. Walton149 and Taylor v.
Reading,150 previously considered, the force of which in his opinion was
greatly increased by the uniform course of decision in other states, par-
ticularly Virginia and Pennsylvania, and above all, by reported decisions
147. Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C. 16, 2 Bay 38 (1796).
148. 9 N.J.L 427 (Sup. Ct. 1802).
149. HAIES, supra note 79, at 92; see note 109 supra.
150. Cited in State v. Parkhurst, 9 NJ.L. 427, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1802) (no original
report).
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involving the same question in the Supreme Court of the United States.
There is great significance in Chief Justice Kirkpatrick's alignment of
precedent in his assertion of judicial power to pass on the constitu-
tionality of legislative acts, for he made no distinction between defen-
sive and non-defensive constitutional review. Thus as analysis of early
New Jersey cases has shown, Holmes v. Walton involved defensive
review of constitutionality, whereas in Taylor v. Reading the exertion
of the power in no way placed the judiciary in jeopardy. Consistency
in the nature of the power exercised can be reasonably claimed for the
Pennsylvania decisions, but certainly not for the Virginia. Reference
to more than one reported decision of the federal Supreme Court must
be taken as further evidence that Kirkpatrick made no distinction in
the kind of constitutional review exercised. For Hayburn's Case, con-
sidered earlier,1 ' was definitely of a defensive nature, thus suggesting
that the Chief Justice must also have been thinking of Hylton v. United
States' 152 in which the Supreme Court sustained an act of Congress tax-
ing carriages against the assertion that it was unconstitutional because,
although a direct tax, it was not apportioned according to population
as required by the second section of article I of the Federal Constitution.
Why after a quarter century of experience with judicial involve-
ment in the matter there was no recognition of the utterly divergent
ramifications of defensive and non-defensive constitutional review is in
retrospect difficult to fathom. The former is wholly consistent with
maintenance of balance among the three departments of government,
coordinate in their respective spheres by the Montesquieuan theory so
fully embraced as a fundamental principle of political philosophy and
practice. Non-defensive constitutional review, exercised by the third
branch, disrupts this balance to constitute the judiciary "more equal
than the others." The explanation must lie in the fact that once the
courts were determined to be preferable to the other five methods for
enforcement of constitutional limitations there gradually began to
evolve, with or without realization of the consequences, an acceptance
of the use of constitutional review to the full extent assumed with
respect to the operation of the other methods.'
151. Considered in text accompanying note 138 supra.
152. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
153. A reading of 1 L. BOuDIN, supra note 110, passim and especially Appendix C,
conveys the impression that the question of the extent of judicial power early became so
enmeshed in the political partisanship of early periods in American historiography as to




The difficulty with this enlarged role for the judiciary, state and
federal, lay in the structure of state constitutions and of the Constitution
of the United States fashioned in their pattern. That structure was cast
in the mold of the theory of fractionated power taken from Montes-
quieu. Courts were assigned a co-ordinate place in the strtucture, but
for the purpose of engaging in the historic functions drawn from English
judicial practice. As previously described these concerned the exercise
of judicial review, of inestimable importance in the governmental
scheme but not envisioning anything like constitutional review. This
was the problem Chief Justice Marshall faced in Marbury v. Madison,
in his design of an escape from the dilemma in which Jefferson and
Madison had appeared to trap him. No wonder his attempts to justify
judicial power to determine constitutionality are so weak and unper-
suasive; even the great Chief Justice was scarcely a legal magician.
The factual situation was one in which the authority he claimed for the
Court was much more defensive in nature than otherwise. Judicial
power can be eroded by legislative overburdening of a court as well
as by legislative efforts to circumvent it; the factors in the Remon-
strance of the Virginia Judges are sufficient to bring this point home.
Marshall could have come out of the Marbury predicament much
stronger in his claim of the power of judicial invalidation of the latter
portion of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (as he misinterpreted
it) had he limited his assertion to the right of defensive constitutional
review. Admittedly, however, he pitched his claim on far broader
ground, and proceeded to lead the Court in the invalidation of state
legislation under both the contract clause and the commerce clause.
The major cases, all decided between 1810 and 1827, were Fletcher
v. Peck'5 and Dartmouth College v. Woodward'55 under the former,
Gibbons v. Ogden'50 and Brown v. Maryland57 under the latter.
Within this period also came McCulloch v. Maryland,15 destined to be
the most influential of them all, at one and the same time sustaining
the constitutionality of the Second United States Bank and holding
unconstitutional the Maryland tax on the Bank's operations.
But in premising in Marbury judicial authority for exercising non-
defensive as well as defensive constitutional review, Marshall exposed
himself and his assertion to the unanswerable logic of Justice Gibson
154. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
155. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
156. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
157. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
158. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, expressed in Eakin v. Raub.1'
A Pennsylvania act of 1785 limited right of entry to twenty-one years
from the date of accrual of a claimant's title, but saved "to those beyond
the sea," after coming to the United States, ten years in which to make
an entry. By an act of 1815, however, the saving clause was repealed.
Irish claimants, testing by action of ejectment title to land derived by
operation of will, found themselves met by the assertion of title in
defendants through adverse possession. On instructions the jury found
for defendants and plaintiffs appealed. The result turned on the
applicability of the later legislation. For the Court, Chief Justice
Tilghman declared there was no doubt of the judiciary's power to void
an act in violation of the constitution. Clearly, here the court would
have to exercise non-defensive review, entertaining no distinction
between types of constitutional review. However, because "the utmost
deference is due to the opinion of the legislature," invalidation of the
1815 act was avoided by construing it as intended to have only prospec-
tive operation.
This disposition did not satisfy Justice Gibson, who proceeded to
challenge John Marshall's reasoning in support of undifferentiated
reviewing power by courts despite his recognition of the general accept-
ance of Marshallian doctrine. To Gibson, "the powers of the judiciary
are divisable into those that are political and those that are purely
civil."160 From the analysis that follows it is clear that the civil powers
are those comprehended by the concept of judicial review, while the
political powers denominate constitutional review. Under a written
constitution judicial review embraces "just such powers and capacities
as were incident to [the judiciary] at the common law . . .";101 these
powers "are, therefore, commensurate only with the judicial execution
of the municipal law, or, in other words, with the administration of dis-
tributive justice, without extending to anything of a political cast what-
ever."'"6 2 On the other hand, "[tihe constitution of Pennsylvania con-
tains no express grant of political powers to the judiciary."1 3  It is
conceded that the constitution is a law of superior obligation to that of
an act of the legislature, so that in case of collision "the latter would
have to give way."1"4 "But it is a fallacy, to suppose that they can come
159. 12 S. & R. 330 (Pa. 1825).
160. Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 346.




into collision before the judiciary,"'6 5 for
in theory, all the organs of the government are of equal capacity;
or, if not equal, each must be supposed to have superior capacity
only for those things which peculiarly belong to it; and as legisla-
tion peculiarly involves the consideration of those limitations which
are put on the law-making power. . . it follows, that the construc-
tion of the constitution, in this particular, belongs to the legislature,
which ought, therefore, to be taken to have superior capacity to
judge of the constitutionality of its own acts. But suppose all to
be of equal capacity in every respect, why should one exercise a
controlling power over the rest? That the judiciary is of superior
rank, has never been pretended, although it has been said to be
co-ordinate.' e6
In this way Gibson put the question, never satisfactorily answered, how
one of the equal branches of government could enjoy superiority over
its coordinates.
"But," continued Gibson, "in regard to an act of assembly, which
is found to be in collision with the constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States, I take the duty of the judiciary to be exactly the
reverse" by virtue of the supremacy clause in the Federal Constitu-
tion. Gibson thus had no quarrel with what Professor William Van
Alstyne has dubbed vertical constitutional review-the review of state
legislative acts alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States, as contrasted with horizontal constitutional review-re-
view of state legislation by state courts and of federal acts by courts of
the United States.167 Thus Gibson must not have disapproved of Mar-
shall's decisions of 'the 1810-1827 period save for the first half of
McCulloch; his guns were trained on Marbury and all that it comported
for judicial claims, at state as well as federal levels, of authority to exer-
cise constitutional review on the horizontal plane.
Analysis of Framer intent supports Gibson in this fundamental
distinction. As reported by the Committee of Detail on August 6,
article VIII, which was to become article VI, read:
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made i
pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the
165. Id. (emphasis in original).
166. Id. at 350-51.
167. W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.i. 1,
is helpful to a full understanding of the weakness in the Marshall opinion in Marbury, to
an appreciation of Gibson's "rebuttal" to Marshall, and in other respects to the issue of
judicial claims to power to exercise substantive (contrasted with formal) constitutional
review.
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authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the
several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants .... 168
At the same time, article XI, section 3, ultimately to become article
III, section 2, was worded:
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases
arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States
169
Later in August a number of changes were made in the draft; two are
crucial to realization of the correctness of Gibson's position. On the
23d it was successfully moved to rephrase the supremacy clause in
such manner that it would commence:
This Constitution & the laws of the U.S. made in pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made under the authority of the U.S. shall
be the supreme law of the several States and of their citizens and
inhabitants .... 170
Four days later, among a series of actions,
It was moved and seconded to insert the words "this constitu-
tion the" before the word "laws" 2 line 3 sect, II[th] article [sic].
[W]hich passed in the affirmative.' 7'
The temporal sequence in these two actions is convincing that the
inclusion in the federal judicial power of cases arising under the
Constitution was responsive to the rewording of the supremacy clause,
a rewording clearly designed to confer upon the Supreme Court of the
United States power to exercise vertical constitutional review with
respect to state court dispositions of cases involving issues under the
Federal Constitution. Inclusion of the word "constitution" in the
definition of federal judicial power gives a toehold to those searching
for textual basis supporting Court exercise of horizontal constitutional
review but it is clear that such was not the intention of the Framers. 17 2
The support for the broader power that Raoul Berger finds in the rati-
fying conventions 7 3 affords slender ground for the claim that the in-
strument as ratified can bear the desired meaning. To find the broader
power is an act of forced construction, an act of will and not of logic.
168. 2 M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 183 (1911).
169. Id. at 186.
170. Id. at 389 (motion by John Rutlidge of S.C.).
171. Id. at 423. Madison's use, in his Notes for August 23, of what appear to be
Roman numerals is confusing. However, from context it is apparent that the references
with respect to alterations concerning the Judiciary are to the then eleventh article, ulti-
mately to become article III of the completed document. See usage id. at 422.
172. More extended analysis supportive of this conclusion can be found in Strong,
Rx for a Nagging Constitutional Headache, 8 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 246 (1971).
173. R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THm SUPREME CouRT (1969).
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Norris v. Clymer,17  decided twenty-one years after Eakin v.
Raub, is generally read as an abandonment by Gibson, now Chief
Justice, of his earlier views. This reading relies upon the interjection
by the Reporter of remarks of Gibson during his summarization of oral
argument of defendant's counsel. Counsel had just cited Eakin for the
proposition "[t]hat the courts possess the power to declare an act void
is settled . . . though it is said it must be a very clear case.' 1 75 Then
follows the insertion "[Chief Justice.-I have changed that opinion for
two reasons. The late Convention, by their silence, sanctioned the pre-
tensions of the courts to deal freely with the acts of the legislature; and
from experience of the necessity of the case.]"' 17  The first reason given
is free of interpretational difficulties. The "late Convention" is that of
1837-38, which resulted in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838. It
was typical of state constitutional revision of that time and later to make
no alteration in the wording of the judiciary article to authenticate judi-
cial power to engage in constitutional review. 177 There is no denying
that despite the unanswerable logic of Gibson's dissent in 1825 state
and federal courts continued their ever bolder stance in exercising hori-
zontal as well as vertical constitutional review, affirmative as well as
defensive constitutional review-without making among them any dis-
tinction whatsoever.'
7 8
Chief Justice Gibson's second reason is, on the other hand,
enigmatic. It must have been this that created in the mind of Louis
Boudin doubt that Gibson had reversed his field. That doubt he
planned to explore in a separate volume on the early history of the judi-
cial power in Pennsylvania 179 but if that study was ever published it
has not been located. To attempt an understanding it is necessary to
consider the facts, statements of opposing counsel, and the court
opinion by Gibson. The suit was one for specific performance of a con-
tract to purchase land on a groundrent basis. Plaintiffs were trustees
under the will of Joseph Parker Norris who had devised the great part
of his Fair Hill estate in such manner as to provide life estates for his
male offspring with remainders over to their children. These re-
174. 2 Pa. 277 (1846).
175. Id. at 281.
176. Id. (brackets in original).
177. 5 THOnPE, supra note 5, at 3104-17. If any American constitution has ever
included express authorization for judicial exercise of constitutional review, it is a fact
unencountered anywhere in the relevant literature.
178. No effort is here made to muster citation of the many state court decisions
asserting the authority to exercise undifferentiated constitutional review.
179. The statement is found in 1 L. BoumiN, supra note 110, at 405 n.2.
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mainder interests continued in existence at the time the trustees sought
to alienate them under authorization of a private bill enacted by the
Pennsylvania Legislature in 1842. The "property interests" of those
holding remainders were not, however, destroyed; the groundrents
were to be received by the trustees and applied according to the will.
Defendant, refusing to meet his obligation under the contract, claimed
the legislative act to be unconstitutional and therefore plaintiff's title
defective.
Defendant's counsel found invalidity in the Bill of Rights of the
state constitution. "The 9th section declares a man shall not be
deprived of his property but by the judgment of his peers, or the law
of the land. This law interferes with that most sacred right of disposi-
tion: one of the strongest inducements to acquisition."180  In reply,
plaintiff's counsel centered on two propositions in support of the
statute's validity. "I would not contend for the extreme case of taking
one man's property and giving it to another. The evils prohibited were
practical ones, under which the people had suffered, such as at-
tainders."'' l The legislation was thus not of a thrust inconsistent with
the Bill of Rights but conformed to long usage. The second supportive
argument hits pay dirt. "If it [what is here provided] cannot be done,
the city must stand still. This estate on the north, Powelton on the
west, Blackwell and Wharton's estate on the south, hem us completely
in, and for half a century the growth of the city must be stopped to
protect contingent remainders. 1 2
The opinion of Chief Justice Gibson is a short two pages. To him
the legislation is remedial in character, of a type that had long prevailed
in Pennsylvania and elsewhere to the benefit, not the prejudice, of all
concerned. He recognized the law-of-the-land provision of the state
constitution, yet
it cannot be said that -this statute has deprived any man of his
property, or applied it to any other use than his own. The estate
is to remain in the trustees; altered, indeed, as to kind, but still
applicable to the trusts in the will. It is to be let on perpetual or
redeemable ground-rents at the option of the trustees, who are to
give such security as the judges of the Common Pleas may require
for the due investment of such parts of it as may eventually be
turned into money by redemption. Now, as the constitution allows
to the legislature every power which it does not positively prohibit,
180. Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 (1846).




I am at a loss to perceive, in these or any other of its clauses, an
ascription of such sanctity to testamentary directions, as to exclude
the interference of the legislature with regulations merely modal,
for the advancement of interests both private and public. By a due
execution of the powers conferred by this statute, not only will the
welfare of the family, but the extention of the city be promoted.
It would be fraught with incalculable mischief to let a doubt rest
on the power of the legislature and we are entirely clear that the
relief sought by the bill be granted.183
It is altogether clear that Gibson was in Norris reacting to the unusual
situation there presented. He was resorting to non-defensive, horizon-
tal constitutional review in order to remove any doubt regarding the
power of the state legislature to adopt remedial legislation to break the
hold on the city's growth from strict adherence to the Norris will. Here,
indeed, was a case of necessity for relaxation of strictures on expanded
constitutional review that involved not conflict but concert between
co-ordinate branches of state government.
Such a finely honed distinction as this could not, however,
withstand the pressures for judicial exercise of non-defensive constitu-
tional review; in this sense Chief Justice Gibson in Norris recognized
that his position in Eakin represented a lost cause. The Supreme Court
was continuing vertical constitutional review of state decisions under the
commerce and the contract clauses; the litigated issue was the offen-
siveness or inoffensiveness of state laws alleged to be in conflict with
these major provisions of the Federal Constitution. This was also the
very period when, under prodding of counsel, American courts, federal
and state, were fully accepting due process as a direct limitation on
governmental power, thus greatly expanding the scope of both horizon-
tal and vertical constitutional review. There had been conceptual
difficulty in giving such meaning to the inherited form of Chapter 39
of Magna Carta when in the nation of origin it had, by the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, been equated with parliamentary supremacy. To
quote an "unimpeachable source": "Examination of early American
state decisions reveals judicial grappling with this problem, culminating
by the middle of the century in the rejection by most jurisdictions of the
concept of due process as simply regularized legislative process."'184
Gibson had treated it in the new light in Norris; as the mid-century
mark passed judicial reliance on due process accelerated, among the
183. Id. at 285.
184. F. STRoNG, AzmicAN CONSTrrUTioNAL LAW 123 (1950).
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
outstanding decisions being Westervelt v. Gregg,18 Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,'86 Wynehamer v. People,18 7 and
Dred Scott v. Sandford.8 8 In Dred Scott horizontal constitutional
review led to invalidation in the Supreme Court for the first time since
Marbury v. Madison, and now in a non-defensive posture.
Acceptance of this full-scale constitutional review was not without
opposition. Marshall's interpretation of the contract clause as embrac-
ive of executed as well as executory contracts, and of contracts to which
a state was a party in addition to contracts between private individuals,
placed serious limits on the police power of the states. Combined with
these limits were those resulting from his endorsement, though equivo-
cal, of Webster's thesis 8 9 that the commerce clause carried the nega-
tive implication that the states were without power to tax or regulate in-
terstate commerce even though Congress was not acting. The jurisdic-
tional base for Supreme Court review of state judicial action in these
two major categories of constitutional litigation had been provided by
the first Congress in enactment of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789. Vigorous attack on the validity of this section by the Virginia
Court of Appeals had been turned back by the Marshall Court in Mar-
tin v. Hunter's Lessee 9° in 1816. Nor did Mr. Justice Gibson chal-
lenge this vertical form of constitutional review; quite to the contrary,
he fully accepted it as a feature of the American constitutional frame-
work. But despite this, resistance to Court exercise of this power con-
tinued to the eve of the Civil War. There were state court threats of
refusal to obey mandates of the Court; general outcries over particu-
larly disliked decisions; and frequent and determined efforts in Con-
gress to repeal the jurisdictional grant, that of the year 1831 nearly suc-
ceeding.''
At the same time there were mitigating circumstances. Taney's
decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge9 2 in 1837, invoking
the doctrine of strict construction, took part of the sting out of the
contract clause. Six years later Bronson v. Kinzie""' offered some
185. 12 N.Y. 202 (1854).
186. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
187. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
188. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
189. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251-52 (1829).
190. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
191. An account of the stormy aftermath of Martin is to be found in Warren,
Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A History
of the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REv. 161 (1913).
192. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
193. 42 U.S. (I How.) 311 (1843).
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relief through the distinction between remedial and substantive changes
in contract terms, although there invalidating a state law restricting
mortgagee rights on foreclosure. 9 4  Two decisions of the Supreme
Court gave hope at the time for avoidance of much of the adverse effect
on the states of the negative implication theory of the commerce clause.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens95 would allow state regulation where, as
on the facts of that case, the thrust of state action permitted of local
variation. A year before, Nathan v. Louisiana96 had indicated an
avenue of escape by way of narrow construction of the concept of inter-
state commerce. Only later would the consequences of these two
decisions be realized.
Murray's Lessee, 97 disentangling due process from separation of
powers to discover in the former as well protection against summary
seizure of the property of citizens, did not place horizontal constitu-
tional review in a bad light, especially as an atmosphere of defensive-
ness remained by reason of the separation-of-powers element. That
the government procedures were there held constitutional only adds to
the acceptability of the decision; distraint seems passing reasonable
despite its summariness when government is pursuing collectors of its
revenue for full accounting of public monies. Although invalidation
occurred in the two New York decisions, it was limited to property-
remainder interests in Westervelt'98 and liquor in Wynehamer 99 in
existence on the effective date of the challenged legislation. Judicial
invalidation of such extremism suggests a "necessity of the case" as
strongly as validation seemed to Gibson to be of necessity in Norris.20 0
Wynehamer posed no threat to legislative power to legislate prohibition
for the future. Similarly, the policy of the New York law of 1848 "for
the more effectual protection of the property of married women" was
not by Westervelt foreclosed from in futuro operation.21'
194. Boudin, fohn Marshall and Roger B. Taney, 24 GEo. L.. 864, 890-92 (1936),
finds in the Bridge decision more significance than do most commentators as concerns
relief from Marshall's stranglehold reading of the contract clause. Cf. G. GuNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 604-07 (9th ed. 1975).
195. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
196. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73 (1850) (one who buys and sells bills of exchange is not
engaged in interstate commerce).
197. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855), cited supra notes 140 & 186.
198. 12 N.Y. 202 (1854), cited supra note 185.
199. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856), cited supra note 187.
200. 2 Pa. 277 (1846), cited supra note 174.
201. The Wynehamer view of constitutional power/limitation was later followed by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129
(1873), and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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By far the most condemned exercise of due process as a major
facet of expansive constitutional review was Chief Justice Taney's
assertion in Dred Scott20 2 of the unconstitutionality of the eighth section
of the Missouri Compromise. Yet if there be put aside repugnance
to ownership of one human being by another, the facts of the case were
startlingly like those of earlier instances of outright taking of property
from one for the advantage of another. Like the later Emancipation
Proclamation, the constitutionality of which was questioned by some,
this taking was without temporal or reciprocal limitation. Recall that
plaintiff's counsel in Norris declared that he would not support the
constitutionality of "the extreme case" of legislative taking of one man's
property and giving it to another, instances of which had not been
uncommon from colonial times onward. 3
One commentator has said that, up to Dred Scott,
we may draw two conclusions concerning the criticism of the
Supreme Court: first, the court was criticized quite as much for
not declaring congressional acts unconstitutional as for doing so;
second, it seems clear that both Federalist and Republican criticism
during these early years was directed not so much at the possession
of the power of the court to pass on the validity of acts of Congress
as at the effect of its exercise in supporting or invalidating some
particular party measure.204
Even as to the Dred Scott 'decision, although it allegedly made Civil
War inevitable and unquestionably blackened the name of Taney for
a full century, the hostility that was directed to it was more as a mis-
taken exercise of judicial power than as an exercise of horizontal con-
stitutional review. The same must be said of the continuing challenge
to vertical constitutional review as exercised by the Supreme Court.
The basic dissension concerned the form of government of the United
States, a continuation of the issue whether the country's political organ-
ization was to remain a confederation or become a federalism. Be-
cause the vertical type of constitutional review operated as a vehicle
for the effectuation of judicial federalism, opposition to it but reflected
the confederational position. The institution of constitutional review
itself, despite some vicissitudes, had by 1860 experienced evolution to
its full potential with growing acceptability of it as the enforcing
202. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), cited supra note 188.
203. The unlimited transfer of title to land from one party to another, invalidated in
Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C. 101, 1 Bay 252 (1792), was a legislative act of 1712.




mechanism for achieving the original objective of adherence to written
constitutional limitations.
What general satisfaction existed with judicial exercise of expan-
sive constitutional review was not to last, however. By the end of the
century dissatisfaction with Supreme Court decisions had evolved on
two major fronts and in the ensuing thirty-five years had grown to crisis
proportions. The two fronts are familiar to all: state and federal
power under the commerce clause, and state and federal power in the
face of the substantive due process clauses. The first involved a clash
of authority in the federalistic context; in the second, the two levels of
government faced a common obstruction to ameliorative legislation.
Although developments on the two fronts were interrelated in time and
other circumstance, analysis can best proceed first with one and then
the other.
In the administration of the Cooley Compromise"5 by the
Supreme Court the lion's share of decisions found that the state tax or
regulation under challenge concerned matters requiring national uni-
formity; consequently, the states were powerless to act despite Con-
gressional inaction. Only in the matter of the time as of which the state
of destination could tax articles originating in another state dict the
Court loosen the hold resulting from the failure in Cooley to repudiate,
as Taney had urged, the Webster-inspired theory of negative implica-
tion of the grant to Congress of power to regulate commerce among the
states. The exception was Woodruff v. Parham,20 6 decided in -1868,
wherein the Court screwed up its courage to repudiate a dictum of John
Marshall's. In Brown v. Maryland" the great Chief Justice had held
that under the commerce clause as well as the export-import clause
Maryland could not, directly or indirectly, impose the burden of a tax
on imported goods until those goods, having reached their destination,
had been commingled with other property in that jurisdiction. The test
Marshall devised for determining that point is known as the original
package doctrine, which delays the time until after breaking or first
sale. In dictum Marshall had said in closing his opinion for the Court
that "we suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally
to importations from a sister State.
20 8
205. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
206. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868).
207. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
208. Id. at 449.
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Marshall's holding as to technical imports, however, was not
attacked and continued to limit state taxing power. Indeed, only in
this year of the Bicentennial has it been "revised" through a strained
construction that avoids direct repudiation of one of Marshall's leading
decisions.2 09 With respect to regulation by states of destination, no dis-
tinction was made between goods coming from abroad or from another
state; in both instances the original package doctrine was applicable.
2 11
The Leisy v. Hardin211 decision, invalidating Iowa confiscation of liquor
shipped into that State from Illinois, made impossible effective adminis-
tration of state prohibition legislation. In other respects as well, the
states were seriously crippled in their efforts to deal with pressing eco-
nomic and social problems. The classic illustration is Wabash, Saint
Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois,21 2 which held invalid Illinois legisla-
tion against the hated railroad practice of charging more for a shorter
than for a longer haul of freight. The practice was one calling for
national uniformity in policy but as Congress had not seen fit to set that
policy the states were powerless to act.
Only quite obliquely, in Gibbons v. Ogden,213 had Marshall had
a case turning on the time as of which interstate commerce commenced.
Here then was an avenue for mitigation of the rigors of the theory of
negative implication that survived so well the compromise in Cooley.
The appeal of this to the post Civil War Justices was as reasonable as
it was irresistible. The result was confinement of the concept of com-
merce to narrow compass when to give it functional content would sub-
ject to invalidation state sources of revenue and state employment of
their police powers in attempts to resolve the pressing problems of the
times. The classic decisions are Coe v. ErroP114 and Kidd v. Pearson.215
In Coe tax day in New Hampshire found logs stacked on the bank of
209. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). Rather than overrule
Brown v. Maryland, the Court, save for Mr. Justice White, repudiated Low v. Austin, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872), a unanimous decision, with opinion by Mr. Justice Field,
applying the principles mistakenly enunciated by Marshall in Brown over objection of
Roger Taney, then Attorney General of Maryland, who was destined to be his successor
as Chief Justice of the United States. Field is made the villain in the piece; anything to
retain unsullied the sacred name of John Marshall! 423 U.S. at 282-83.
210. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419 (1827) (commerce clause). The Leisy doctrine continues alive and well,
see Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 96 S. Ct. 923 (1976).
211. 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
212. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
213. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
214. 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
215. 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
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a tributary of the Androscoggin River, awaiting the rise in water level
resulting from spring thaw that would make possible their flotation
down the Androscoggin to a mill located at Lewiston, Maine. New
Hampshire's power to levy a property tax on the logs was sustained
against the owner's contention that in a broad sense the logs were al-
ready in interstate commerce. Kidd sustained Iowa's taxation of
liquors manufactured in that State with the intention of sale in other
states; at the production stage interstate commerce had not yet started.
When Congress finally began to legislate with respect to the
economic and social problems with which the states had been grappling
under constitutional difficulty, challenge arose on the ground that the
national legislature was reaching beyond its constitutionally assigned
province. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,s16 the Sherman Anti-
trust Act of 1890 was held constitutionally inapplicable to a merger of
sugar refiners that together controlled ninety-eight percent of refinery
capacity in the United States. For the proposition that "commerce suc-
ceeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it" the supporting precedent
was Kidd v. Pearson which in turn had built on Coe v. Errol. The
concession that Congress had power under the commerce clause when
"the transaction is itself a monopoly of commerce" probably helped to
save from similar fate Sherman Act application to a stock acquisition
designed to eliminate competition between two railroads operating
parallel lines in the Northwest. Even then the decision in Northern
Securities Co. v. United States217 was five to four with none other than
the new appointee of President Theodore Roosevelt among the
dissenters. In an opinion for which trust-buster Roosevelt did not easily
forgive him,21 Justice Holmes expressed grave doubts about constitu-
tionality.
Commerce depends upon population, but Congress could not,
on that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and divorce. If the
act before us is to be carried out according to what seems to me
the logic of the argument for the Government, which I do not
believe that it will be, I can see no part of the conduct of life with
which on similar principles Congress might not interfere.2 19
A year later, in Swift & Co. v. United States,220 the Sherman Act
was saved in its applications beyond instrumentalities of commerce by
216. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
217. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
218. C. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS 370-71 (1944).
219. 193 U.S. at 402-03 (dissent).
220. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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the theory that, if the combination, even though locally effectuated as
in Knight, was formed with the intent of monopolizing interstate com-
merce, then it was an enactment within the power of Congress. The
opinion in that case was by none other than Mr. Justice Holmes. The
two Coronado cases22' of the 1920's illustrate the application of the
Sherman Act to labor before the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In the first of
the two the intent of a local strike adversely to affect interstate
commerce was not proved; in the second, it was. The difference was
crucial; the Sherman Act was found inapplicable in first Coronado,
while applicable in second Coronado.2 22  Ten years later the National
Industrial Recovery Act was invalidated in Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States223 on the basis that the intrastate commerce transactions
of the slaughterhouse operators, who in Brooklyn slaughtered for local
disposition of the poultry, affected interstate commerce only indirectly.
The distinction taken in the Coronado cases was translated, in the
Schechter opinion, as one of differentiation between direct and indirect
effects on interstate commerce of intrastate activities. This distinction
"must be recognized as a fundamental one, essential to the main-
tenance of our constitutional system. Otherwise, as we have said, there
would be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all practical
purposes we should have a completely centralized government.
'224
Schechter was a unanimous decision. As Thomas Reed Powell
observed at the time, "the unanimity of the judgment. . . commands,
if it does not compel, respect. '225 Moreover, the factual pattern was
the most disadvantageous possible from the Government's point of
view. "The Schechters acted only after interstate commerce was over
and their sales were wholly local. The effect of their local practices
on the previous interstate commerce in chickens or on future interstate
commerce in chickens was not demonstrably great. '220  And finally,
221. UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Coronado Coal Co. v.
UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
222. "That the distinction rested on the scope of the Act and not on the constitu-
tional power of Congress was asserted in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 459, 509
(1940). . . ." 1 P. FREUND, A. SUJTHERLAND, M. HoWE & E. BROWN, CONSrruT1ONAL
LAW 224 (3d ed. 1967). The reference is to footnote 27 in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone. Note the doubt implicit in the wording by the casebook editors. The assertion is
unconvincing. The footnote is a later rationalization after the Court, beginning in 1937,
substituted "effect" on for "intent" toward interstate commerce in defining the scope of
the commerce power as buttressed by the necessary and proper clause.
223. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
224. Id. at 548.





the Recovery Act had spent its force and was about to expire with no
New Deal interest in its continuance.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,22 decided in 1936, was something else,
holding unconstitutional the first Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
which had sought to bring economic order out of chaos in an industry
that clearly produced for the interstate market. Although the device
designed to achieve compliance with the Act's regulatory provisions was
a heavy tax on coal at the mine, by agreement the issue of validity was
argued under the commerce clause. Again the Court, although now
split, found only indirect effect on interstate commerce. The Court's
restrictiveness in interpretation of the commerce clause, originating in
a judicial effort to protect the states against the dead hand of negative
implication, was now precipitating a serious crisis in congressional
power to legislate under that clause for national welfare. Meantime,
the contemporaneous decision in United States v. Butler228 had, against
strong dissent, blocked Congress from employment of the taxing and
spending clause in the interest of the general welfare. The year 1936
had brought to a boiling point the question whether the New Deal pro-
gram of President Franklin Roosevelt was to be stymied on the federal-
istic front.
As earlier remarked, dissatisfaction with fully expanded constitu-
tional review emerged on two fronts following termination of the Civil
War, quickening in the final decades of the nineteenth century and
intensifying in the first decades of the present century. Review of the
development under the commerce clause reveals a paradoxical situation
in which the Supreme Court, in a commendable effort to protect state
power when Congress was leaving to the states attempted solution of
the economic and social problems confronting the country, unwittingly
laid the basis for serious limitation on federal power when Congress
undertook nationalizing legislation. With due process, on the other
hand, growing dissatisfaction arose from an expanded conception of the
nature of the property interests protected by that guaranty. Invalida-
tion under fifth amendment due process of the Legal Tender Act of
1869 in Hepburn v. Griswold229 was consistent with the judicial view
of protected property that had evolved by the middle of the nineteenth
century. The central feature of that view, as illustrated in decisions
227. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
228. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
229. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869), overruled as a result of "improvement" in Court
personnel in Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
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that have been noted, 80 was of due process as a protector of property
rights fully vested prior to legislative action. The great expansion
began with the dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873,281 largely
made possible, ironically, by the adoption in 1868 of the fourteenth
amendment.
Designed to provide adequate constitutional base for federal civil
rights acts on behalf of the newly freed Negro, the fourteenth amend-
ment was first invoked on behalf of the New Orleans slaughterers in
their struggle against the near monopoly granted by carpet-bag Louisi-
ana legislators to the Crescent City Livestock & Landing Company.
Having lost in the courts of Louisiana, the embattled slaughterers
turned to Attorney John A. Campbell for their appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Campbell, an Alabamian, had been a Jus-
tice of the High Court in the 1850's who on outbreak of the Civil War
had resigned out of sympathy for the southern cause. In a brilliant
move he urged on the Court as the appropriate interpretation of the priv-
ileges or immunities guarantee of the new amendment the construction
that had been given to the privileges and immunities clause of section 2
of article IV by Justice Bushrod Washington on Circuit.2 2 That unchal-
lenged construction had been an embracive one comprehending "those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free,
independent, and sovereign. ' '213  "The enormous difference in rami-
fication of the two privileges-immunities clauses was glossed over with
the sleight-of-hand of the magician. And the fundamental rights
adumbrated in Corfield v. Coryell were construed to embrace the right
to engage freely in the run of ordinary callings. ' 23 4
Campbell carried four of the nine Justices. In the dissent of Mr.
Justice Field, which had the concurrence of the other three dissenters,
appears this passage:
The privileges and immunities designated [in Corfield v. Coryell]
are those which of right belong to the citizens of all free govern-
230. Discussed in text accompanying notes 197-201 supra.
231. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Dissenting opinions begin id. at 83.
232. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
233. Id. at 551.
234. Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure, Emas.
culation, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 419, 423 (1973). As the title indicates, this article reviews
in detail the rise, dominance, and fall of substantive property due process. Reference
may be made to it for fuller treatment than is given in the present article.
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ments. Clearly among these must be placed the right to pursue
a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint
than such as equally affects all persons. In the discussions in
Congress upon the passage of the Civil Rights Act [of 1866]
repeated reference was made to this language of Mr. Justice
Washington.
23 5
While joining the Field dissent, Mr. Justice Bradley added for himself
the further conviction that:
In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from
adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful employ-
ment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as
property, without due process of law. Their right of choice is a
portion of their liberty; their occupation is their property. Such a
right also deprives those citizens of the equal protection of the laws,
contrary to the last clause of the section. 238
A turn of events flowing from the Court's downward revision in the
protection afforded by the contract clause 23 7 enabled the dissenters in
Slaughter-House to become concurrers when in 1884 the Crescent City
Livestock & Landing Company was before the Court asserting the
invalidity of Louisiana legislative repudiation of the monopoly grant
before the end of its term.233 The majority found no violation of the
contract clause; the Field-Bradley contingent declared that the grant
had been invalid from its inception. In his concurrence Field contin-
ued to relate to the privileges or immunities clause the new-found con-
stitutionally protected right of all to engage in the common callings, to
follow freely the ordinary pursuits of life. Bradley agreed in his
concurring opinion that the new concept had support in the privileges
or immunities clause, but he was no less convinced than he was in
Slaughter-House that it was equally grounded in due process and equal
protection.
Bradley's view was the more prophetic. The move away from
privileges-immunities came first in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,23 9 decided on
equal protection grounds. Invalidated was a San Francisco ordinance
forbidding laundry operations in wooden structures in the absence of
special permit. Fair on its face, it was so administered as to favor
Occidentals to the disadvantage of Orientals pursuing this type of liveli-
235. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97-98 (emphasis in original).
236. Id. at 122.
237. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
238. Butchers' Union v. Crescent City Livestock & Landing Co., 111 U.S. 746
(1884).
239. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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hood. Ultimate resort to due process as the primary focus of the new
constitutional doctrine was foretold in two decisions of the 1890's. In
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota2 40 intrastate
railroad rates set by the State were found to be confiscatory of the
railroad's property and as such violative of due process.241 Seven years
later came Allgeyer v. Louisiana,24 2 technically involving state power
to regulate contracts made beyond its borders but carrying in its opinion
expansive dictum on the reach of substantive due process.
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right
of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his per-
son, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties;
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all con-
tracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying
out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
243
Five years into the present century the notorious decision in Lochner v.
New York244 made it crystal clear that a firm constitutional basis had
been laid for broad protection of economic interests by way of substan-
tive due process.
From 1905 to 1934 the economic philosophy of Lochner was in
the saddle, controlling Supreme Court reasoning and greatly influenc-
ing many supreme courts of the states. Most critics of the period have
pictured it as one of a freewheeling Court invalidating in a broad sweep
federal and state legislation with which it found itself in disagreement.
Careful examination of the Court's decisions reveals, not a capricious
striking out at legislative enactments willy nilly, but a remarkably con-
sistent insistence that they conform to the basic principles of a competi-
tive market economy. Walton Hamilton, able economist before he
became a teacher of constitutional law, pinpointed the dominant phil-
osophy when he wrote that "[ilt was not property upon which they [the
majority justices] sought to confer the legal privilege of shaping the
terms of the bargain. They professed, with little qualification, an eco-
nomic creed"245 to the effect that individual initiative under conditions
240. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
241. Commentators have found puzzling the fact that Justice Bradley dissented. An
explanation is offered in F. STRONG, supra note 184, at 137.
242. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
243. Id. at 589.
244. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
245. Hamilton, Common Right, Due Process and Antitrust, 7 LAw & CONTEMP.
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of free and open competition more fairly and effectively governed eco-
nomic relationships than did intervention by government. The creed
was a blend of Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism and Adam Smith's
free market economy. The very consistency with which the Court ma-
jority adhered to this economic philosophy in their interpretation
of due process exacerbated the political situation, for it did result in
overthrow of much major social legislation deemed by Congress or state
legislatures to be necessary in the public interest.
The Lochner line of decisions did not go unchallenged either
within or without the Court. Holmes's dissent in Lochner itself is one
of the classics in Supreme Court annals. 24 6  He was again in dissent
in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,247 in which his reasoning suggests
some instruction in economics by Mr. Justice Brandeis who did not par-
ticipate because his daughter was a member of the District of Columbia
wage board. Chief Justice Taft also dissented in Adkins, but sepa-
rately. As the Lochner period came to a close Brandeis assumed from
Holmes, who had resigned, the burden of dissent in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann;248 he was there joined by Justice Stone, destined to
become Chief Justice during the first half of the 1940's. Few there
were, save of course for the business interests thereby benefited, who
outside the Court did not strongly disapprove of the judicial hegemony
of Lochner.249
Various proposals for relief accompanied the ever-rising criticism.
As candidate of the Progressive Party in 1912 Theodore Roosevelt
pressed for recall of judicial decisions. His views were well stated in
the introduction he contributed to a volume by W.L. Ransom, 50 one of
his vigorous supporters. 25' The platform of the Bull Moose Party con-
tained the following plank:
The Progressive party demands such restriction of the power of the
courts as provides: 1. That when an act passed under the police
PROB. 24, 31 (1940). Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YAL-E L.i. 1089
(1930), is also helpful in comprehending the economic philosophy underlying Lochner.
246. 198 U.S. at 74-76.
247. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
248. 285 U.S. 262, 282 (1932).
249. HArNEs, supra note 79, at 428-66. This source includes further illustrations,
beyond those given in the text, of conflict within the Court. Also included is considera-
tion of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), in which the
majority invalidated the income tax thus necessitating the sixteenth amendment. Contra
the majority of commentators is Boston, Some Conservative Views Upon the Judiciary
and Judicial Recall, 23 YALE L.J. 511 (1914).
250. W. RANSOM, MAioRm RULE AND THE JuDrkRY (1912). The essence of the
Roosevelt proposal is found at 13-14 of the Introduction.
251. Id. chs. VIII-XIII contain the author's supporting contentions.
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power of the state is held unconstitutional under the state constitu-
tion by the courts, the people, after an ample interval for delibera-
tion, shall have an opportunity to vote on the question whether they
desire the act to become law, notwithstanding such decision; 2.
That every decision of the highest appellate court of a state declar-
ing an act of the legislature unconstitutional shall be subject to the
same review by the supreme court of the United States as is now
accorded to decisions sustaining such legislation.
252
It will be noted that the Roosevelt proposal was directed at state court
exercise of horizontal, non-defensive constitutional review, the very
type against which Gibson had inveighed. In New York especially the
new due process fever had taken such a hold that before as well as after
Lochner the court of appeals of that state had invalidated a number
of state laws intruding upon a regime of laissez faire.253  This develop-
ment culminated in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway, 54 in which the
State's workmen's compensation act was invalidated on the ground that
in its attempt to impose an alien relationship between employer and
employee it effected a taking of the manufacturer's property and as
such was inconsistent with the due process clauses of the New York
and Federal Constitutions.255 Sharing in the ire created by the Ives
decision, the presidential candidate of the Progressive Party proposed
both the review of such decisions by the people as the ultimate sovereign
and the revision of the federal jurisdictional statutes to provide for
Supreme Court review of state court decisions sustaining as well as
denying federal constitutional claims. Only Colorado actually adopted
decisional recall25 but the other proposal met with success in congres-
sional action of 1914.257
In the same year in which Ransom's volume was published another
volume appeared under the authorship of Gilbert Roe,258 with an intro-
duction by Robert M. LaFollette. To critic Roe, recall of judicial deci-
sions would be "absolutely destructive of the constitution."'2 "
252. HAINES, supra note 79, at 484.
253. People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131 (1907) (restrictive hours of labor for
females); People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377 (1885) (manufacture of oleo); In re Jacobs, 98
N.Y. 98 (1885) (production of cigars in tenement houses). In Jacobs the New York
court cited Justice Field in Butchers' Union v. Crescent City Livestock & Landing Co.,
111 U.S. 746 (1884), to the effect that the common callings are open to all as privileges
of citizens of the United States. 98 N.Y. at 107.
254. 201 N.Y. 271 (1911).
255. Contra, State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101
(1911) (decided contemporaneously with Ives).
256. Munroe, Initiative and Referendum, 8 ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 50, 52 (1932).
257. This has been incorporated into 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1970).
258. G. RoE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY (1912).
259. Id. at 219.
[Vol. 55
BICENTENNIAL BENCHMARK
The great vice in -this idea... is that it would be used as a means
of amending the Constitution by a majority vote [of wholly un-
trained laymen] .... The Constitution, therefore, would be im-
mediately reduced to the level of -a statute, since any portion of it
could be amended, or repealed, 'at any time by a mere majority of
the popular vote.260
The needed reform was, rather, the introduction of recall of judges
themselves. This type of recall was inevitably denounced by some as
contrary to the independence of the judiciary yet defended by others
as a necessary solution to the blind adherence of judges to outworn eco-
nomic, political and social dogmas.26 1  Ransom felt recall of judges
neither wise nor necessary but insisted it was not so radical as
opponents claimed, citing article VIII of the Declaration of Rights of
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 as "the first American state-
ment of the 'recall' doctrine."2" 2 With decisional recall it seems always
to have been assumed that the sovereign people would make the
determination. Recall of judges could be effected by the legislative
branch, as was not uncommonly provided in the original state constitu-
tions, or by vote of the electorate. Of the five States having this form
of recall in the Lochner period, the four adopting it during that period
provided that the recall would be directly by the people. 263
In the presidential campaign of 1924 Robert M. LaFollette ran as
an independent, feeling that Calvin Coolidge and John W. Davis
260. Id.
261. Bird, Recall, 13 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 147 (1934).
262. W. RANSOM, supra note 250, at 89. The wording of article VIII was that "in
order to prevent those who are vested with authority from becoming oppressors, the
people have a right, at such periods and in such manner as they shall establish by their
frame of government, to cause their public officers to return to private life .... 3
THORPE, supra note 5, at 1890.
263. Legislative: PA. CONST. art. V, § 15 (1874); 5 THORPE, supra note 5, at 3135.
Popular: ARIz. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1 (1910, as amended 1912); CAL. CoNsT. art. XXIII
(1879, as amended 1911); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 9 (1864, as amended 1912); ORE.
CONST. art. II, § 18 (1859, as amended 1908). For a discussion of the latter four consti-
tutions see C. BEARD & B. SHULTZ, DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE-WIDE INITIATIvE, REFER-
ENDUM AND RECALL 242-73 (1912).
The original Oregon Constitution read almost as did the Pennsylvania Constitution
of 1874, effective to 1968, save that it was the judges of the supreme court who could be
removed by the Governor on joint resolution of the Legislative Assembly, ORE. CONST.
art. VII, § 20 (1859), whereas in Pennsylvania the supreme court judges were excepted
from the recall provision.
The Arizona Constitution of 1910 subjected judicial officers to recall. The opposi-
tion to this of President Taft and Congress forced the State to except the judges as the
price of admission to the Union. Arizona had the last say: as soon as admitted, it
removed the exclusionary clause. The pertinent documents are found in C. BEARD & B.
SHULTZ, supra, at 244-64.
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offered the national electorate little choice. One of his concerns was
the extent to which the Supreme Court was striking down legislation
on the basis of incompatibility with the Court's view of due process.
With the candidates of the two major parties indisposed to take any
remedial steps, the elder LaFollette proposed that the Federal Consti-
tution be amended to read:
No inferior federal judge shall have authority to hold void a
law of Congress on the ground that it is unconstitutional. If the
Supreme Court assumes to decide any law of Congress unconstitu-
tional, or by interpretation undertakes to assert a public policy at
variance with the statutory declaration of Congress, which alone
under our system is authorized to determine the public policies of
government, the Congress may, by reenacting the law, nullify the
action of the Court.
Thereafter the law would remain in full force and effect
precisely the same as though the Court had never held it to be
unconstitutional. 264
In the LaFollette platform appeared the following supporting conten-
tion:
The Constitution specifically vests all legislative power in the
Congress, giving that body power and authority to over-ride the
veto of the president. The federal courts are given no authority un-
der the Constitution to veto acts of Congress. Since the federal
courts have assumed to exercise such veto power, it is essential that
the Constitution shall give to the Congress the right to over-ride
such judicial veto, otherwise the Court will make itself master over
the other co-ordinate branches of the government. The people
themselves must approve or disapprove the present exercise of
legislative power by the federal courts.26
5
Several features strike one at once. The assertions of the Plat-
form plank come close to reviving early views that constitutional review
was a usurpation of power by the judiciary. Roe, for one, had so
argued in 1912. To him the absence on the Constitution of signatures
of many of the delegates and the "protracted struggle" for ratification
made it "obvious that the Constitution would never have been ratified
by the people had they suspected that it gave judges the power now
exercised by them. '216  Not long after 1924 there was to appear the
264. HAINES, supra note 79, at 486. Note that La Follette's proposal was directed at
both constitutional review and judicial review of congressional acts on the part of tho
Supreme Court.
265. C. GILBERT, You TAKES YOUR CHOICE 239 (1924).
266. G. Ron, supra note 258, at 29.
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monumental two-volume study of Louis B3oudin asserting lack of justifi-
cation for constitutional review save for that defensive in character as
illustrated by the opinion in Bayard v. Singleton.281 7 LaFollette's pro-
posal disclosed that concern had now shifted to Supreme Court invali-
dation of congressional legislation and that recall was to be by the
people's representatives rather than by direct popular vote. Charles
Grove Haines offered a similar yet more expansive proposal. In his
view "Congress ought to be given, by constitutional amendment, the
right to reenact the measure thus invalidated by a two-thirds vote of each
house after a general election has transpired, if the measure in any way
restricts or changes materially the power of the states; and by a majority
vote after a general election if the act is one relating primarily to the
powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government."26 The
same volume of The Forum that carried the Haines solution included ad-
vocacy by still another critic of a constitutional amendment that would
"deprive the Court of its power to declare void or refuse to enforce
any act of Congress whatever. '269 Senator Owen of Oklahoma intro-
duced in Congress an amendment forbidding any federal judge to
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional and declaring vacant the
judgeship of any who had the temerity to act in the teeth of this pro-
hibition.270  This proposal went beyond the judicial recall plan; under
it, one offense and the offender was out of judicial office with no oppor-
tunity to justify his action to the people.
Professor Felix Frankfurter of Harvard Law School supported the
candidacy of Robert LaFollette. In his celebrated article on the Red
Terror of Judicial Reform, published in The New Republic,271 Frank-
furter did not espouse any of the various proposals for relief that others
were advocating; he did not embrace LaFollette's recommendation for
wholesale nullification by Congress of Court decisions adverse to acts
of Congress. He urged the Progressives not "to fall back upon
mechanical contrivances when dealing with a process where mechanics
can play but a very small part." Rather, he focused on due process
as the seat of the trouble. He believed that informed examination of
267. 1 L. BOUDIN, supra note 110, passim.
268. 71 THE FoRTJM 842 (1924).
269. Id. at 567-70.
270. Culp, A Survey of the Proposals to Limit Or Deny the Power of Judicial Review
By the Supreme Court of the United States-II, 4 IND. L.J 474, 487 (1929) (quoting
the exact wording of the proposal made during the second session of the 64th Congress).
The first section of Professor Culp's survey appears id. at 386.
271. 40 NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1924, at 110.
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the work of the Court "will probably lead to the conclusion that no
nine men are wise enough and good enough to be entrusted with the
power which the unlimited provisions of the due process clauses con-
fer." His conclusion: "The due process clauses ought to go."
The number and variety of restrictions advanced for narrowing or
eliminating Court exercise of the power to invalidate under due process
were near legion, as can be seen from literature of the time.
22
Included were proposals for requiring more than a majority vote for
invalidation; favorite requisites were two-thirds or even complete una-
nimity. There was nothing new about these as concerned the Su-
preme Court of the United States; many limitations of this type had
been proposed in the nineteenth century in conflict over vertical Court
review of state decisions. 3  A new wrinkle appeared in the middle
of the Lochner period in the form of amendment of three state constitu-
tions to put a stop to bare majority holdings of unconstitutionality.
Ohio was first, incorporating into its major constitutional revision of
1912, under the influence of Theodore Roosevelt's castigation of consti-
tutional review, a provision that "[n]o laws shall be held unconstitutional
and void by the Supreme Court without the concurrence of all but one
of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the court of
appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void." Amendments of
the Nebraska and North Dakota constitutions were much less compli-
cated. Nebraska's required the concurrence of five out of seven of the
supreme court justices with respect to any legislative act held invalid,
which would include congressional enactments as would Ohio's; on the
other hand, the North Dakota provision, calling for concurrence of four
out of five judges for invalidation, was specifically limited to "any legis-
lative enactment or law of North Dakota.
274
Franklin Roosevelt interpreted his landslide victory in the 1936
presidential election as a mandate from the American people to find
the means for effecting the economic recovery of the nation. The most
272. Culp, supra note 270, includes in his review coverage of the agitation for
reform that marked the first three decades of the present century.
273. Detail may be found in Warren, supra note 191.
274. Fite & Rubinstein, Curbing the Supreme Court--State Experiences and Federal
Proposals, 35 MICH. L. REv. 762 (1937), discuss the three state provisions after
providing background on some of the federal proposals, including one of Senator Borah's
that would have required for unconstitutionality the vote of seven of the nine Justices of
the Supreme Court in any case reaching the Court via its appellate jurisdiction. The
Senator was advancing a curb that presumably would not require constitutional amend-




apparent obstacle to New Deal legislation was of course the Court's
interpretation of the commerce clause. Looming in the background,
nevertheless, was the question of the position of the Court on due
process. Nebbia v. New York,2  decided in 1934, had appeared to
remove from constitutional dimension the requirement of legislative
adherence to Lochner economics. "So far as the requirement of due
process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restric-
tion, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably
be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose."27 6 Yet the sustainment of the New
York minimum price control law had been by a scant 5 to 4; the Loch-
ner decision of 1905 had not been categorically repudiated; involving
as it did the chaotic performance of market forces in milk production,
the statutory program was not inconsistent with competitive theory; and
some passages in the Roberts opinion seemed responsive to limitation
of the majority position to situations where the forces of private com-
petition were not achieving an orderly market.
Moreover, even if Nebbia could be relied upon for loosening the
grip of Lochnerian principles, decisions of 1935, 1936, and early 1937
were not reassuring. Two decisions during 1936, although not unani-
mous, served notice that the Court's basic validation of New York's milk
control legislation did not mean the state was free of all due process
and equal protection limitation.2 77 In that same year came the disturb-
ing decision in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,27 s in which a
5 to 4 Court split in effect confirmed the earlier decision of Adkins
v. Children's Hospital2 71 invalidating minimum wage legislation for
women. Even in the fullness of Lochner's time there had been no
question of legislative power, federal or state, to enact minimum wage
laws for women provided they were based on "value of service"; the
issue was the validity of a statute keyed to "cost of living." The New
York Court of Appeals had construed the New York law as requiring
that the minimum wages fixed be sufficient to meet the minimum cost
of living although, in an effort to circumvent the Adkins ruling, the stat-
ute had been so drawn as to incorporate as well the standard of "value
of service."
275. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
276. Id. at 537.
277. Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936); Mayflower
Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936).
278. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
279. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), cited supra note 247.
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
This construction, said the Supreme Court, was binding on it, and
that was the end of the matter. Sandwiching Morehead in time were
two decisions striking down a federal and a state attempt to accomplish
major reallocation of property rights in the interest of the disadvan-
taged.2 °0 Both opinions were by Brandeis and both were unanimous.
In the later of the two, Mr. Justice Brandeis was moved to observe
that "[o]ur law reports present no more glaring instance of the taking of
one man's property and giving it to another." 28' Thus there was no
assurance that essential features of important legislation of the New Deal
might not run afoul of due process as well as of the commerce clause.
The expected move by the "mandated" President came swiftly
after entrance upon his second term. Under amendment XX of the
Constitution, effective February 6, 1933, presidential terms commence
on January 20 rather than March 4; the Roosevelt proposal was made
public on February 5, 1937. For the top of the judicial hierarchy it
called for appointment of additional Justices of the Supreme Court to
a maximum of fifteen for those sitting Justices not resigning or retiring
at age seventy.28 2 The reason given was the necessity of having more
and younger Justices to carry the Court's increasing workload as mani-
fested by the great percentage of denials of certiorari. It soon
developed that the President, famed for his political sagacity, had
blundered. Age was not the problem, and to attempt to justify the pro-
posal on the rising percentage of denials of certiorari disclosed abysmal
ignorance of the workings of the Court. Brandeis, then eighty years of
age, was angered on both counts and made his irritation known. Hur-
riedly retreating from this fakery, the President came clean in his cele-
brated fireside chat with the American people on March 9.
Citing then recent invalidations under the commerce and due
process clauses, the popular President declared that:
In the last 4 years the sound rule of giving statutes the benefit of
all reasonable doubt has been cast aside. The Court has been act-
ing not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making body. ...
The Court in addition to the proper use of its judicial functions
has improperly set itself up as a third House of the Congress-a
superlegislature, as one of the Justices has called it-reading into
the Constitution words and implications which are not there, and
which were never intended to be there.
280. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
281. 300 U.S. at 79.
282. S. 1392, H.R. 4417, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
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We have, therefore, reached the point as a nation where we
must take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the
Court from itself. We must find a way to take an appeal from
the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We want a Supreme
Court which will do justice under the Constitution-not over it. In
our courts we want a government of laws and not of men.
I want-as all Americans want-an independent judiciary as
proposed by the framers of the Constitution. That means a
Supreme Court that will enforce the Constitution as written-that
will refuse to amend the Constitution by the arbitrary exercise of
judicial power-amendment by judicial say-so. It does not mean
a judiciary so independent that it can deny the existence of facts
universally recognized.
How, then, could we proceed to perform the mandate given
US? . . 283
After outlining his proposal in detail, the President insisted that
the Bill proposed was clearly constitutional, a point few disputed, thus
making it possible to "secure results by legislation within the Constitu-
tion." Continuing, he informed his listeners of his hope "that thereby
the difficult process of constitutional amendment may be rendered un-
necessary." Opponents of the Bill would, he knew, contend that solu-
tion of the problem lay in constitutional amendment. He therefore pro-
ceeded "to examine that process."
There are many types of amendment proposed. Each one is
radically different from the other. There is no substantial group
within the Congress or outside it who are agreed on any single
amendment.
It would take months or years to get substantial agreement
upon the type and language of an amendment. It would take
months and years thereafter to get a two-thirds majority in favor
of that amendment in both Houses of the Congress.
Then would come the long course of ratification by three-
fourths of the States. No amendment which any powerful eco-
nomic interests or the leaders of any powerful political party have
had reason to oppose has ever been ratified within anything like
a reasonable time. And 13 States which contain only 5 percent
of the voting population can block ratification even though the 35
States with 95 percent of the population are in favor of it.
And remember one thing more. Even if an amendment were
passed, and even if in the years to come it were to be ratified, its
meaning would depend upon the kind of Justices who would be
283. 81 CoNG. Rc. A470-71 (1937).
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sitting on the Supreme Court bench. An amendment like the rest
of the Constitution is what the Justices say it is rather than what
its framers or you might hope it is.
2 84
After 168 days of constitutional crisis28 5 the President's Bill went
down to defeat. Contributing to that defeat, to a degree difficult to
ascertain, was the decision of the Supreme Court handed down on April
12 holding constitutional as a valid exercise of commerce power the
National Labor Relations Act. A bare majority in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.28 6 declared that the fact the employees were
engaged in production was not determinative; what was decisive was
the physical impact on commerce among the states that can flow from
labor strife. Thus the connecting link between local activities and
interstate commerce was no longer defined as demonstrated intent to
affect the latter but rather as presence of actual impact. Once that step
had been taken it was analogically possible, although significantly dif-
ferent, to find the link in competitive effect, as was done in sustaining
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the second Agricultural Adjustment
Act.2 7  Sustainment of the latter in Wickard v. Filburn is of especial
moment because there Mr. Justice Jackson for the Court explained the
difference between viewing the commerce clause from the standpoint
of state power and from that of national power.2 88
284. Id. at A471-72.
285. Alsop & Catledge, The 168 Days, 210 SAT. EVE. Posr, Sept. 18, 1937, at 8;
id., Sept. 25, 1937, at 20; id., Oct. 16, 1937, at 20.
286. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Thomas Reed Powell somewhere remarked that "a switch
in time saved nine."
287. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Agricultural Adjustment Act).
288. He explained:
For nearly a century, however, decisions of this Court under the Com-
merce Clause dealt rarely with questions of what Congress might do in the
exercise of its granted power under the Clause, and almost entirely with the
permissibility of state activity which it was claimed discriminated against or
burdened interstate commerce. During this period there was perhaps little
occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce power, and the influence
of the Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting almost
wholly from its operation as a restraint upon the powers of the states. In
discussion and decision the point of reference, instead of being what was
"necessary and proper" to the exercise by Congress of its granted power, was
often some concept of sovereignty thought to be implicit in the status of
statehood. Certain activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and "min-
ing" were occasionally said to be within the province of state governments and
beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Itwas not until 1887, with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act,
that the interstate commerce power began to exert positive influence in Ameri-
can law and life. This first important federal resort to the commerce power
was followed in 1890 by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and, thereafter, mainly
after 1903, by many others. These statutes ushered in new phases of adjudica-
tion, which required the Court to approach the interpretation of the Commerce
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On the other hand, Wickard did not, as many insist, completely
unhinge former limitations on congressional power under the commerce
clause. There remained the question whether Congress could consti-
tutionally regulate any and all local activity on the basis of broad
non-competitive economic interrelationship with interstate commerce.
Such power had been denied to Congress in the Schechter case. As
Thomas Reed Powell had conceded:
If interstate commerce was promoted by increasing the buying
power of the Schechter Shochtim, it would be promoted equally by
increasing the buying power of any or every one else. To the buy-
ing power argument, there pretty clearly is no stopping place ...
All the economics of the buying power argument is disputable,
quite possibly too disputable to have one view accepted by a court
as a sufficient reason for turning us all at once into a well-nigh
unitary rather than a federal system of government.289
The buying-power thesis of Keynesian economics, although warmly
welcomed by the New Deal, did not achieve Court acceptance in
commerce cases until after Roosevelt's extended presidency.290 Al-
though parentage was not admitted by the Court, that acceptance came
in Katzenbach v. McClung.2 1 There was some dependence on the
mere physical obstruction of interstate commerce that had grounded the
companion decision in Heart of Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. United States,
292
and Wickard v. Filburn was cited for its proposition that "'even if
appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as com-
merce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.' . . .
But the economic effect in Wickard had been of a different kind, born
of competitive interrelationships. Here the economic effect had to be
spelled out in terms of general, overall impact. Decisive in the Court's
mind was the finding of the lower court that forty-six percent of the
meat served at Ollie's Barbecue, and a "substantial portion" of other
food served, had moved in interstate commerce. It followed that the
refusal to serve Negroes was adversely affecting the flow of goods
Clause in the light of an actual exercise by Congress of its power thereunder.
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (footnotes omitted).
289. Powell, supra note 225, at 17.
290. However, "the economics of buying power" had been accepted in support of
federal taxing-spending powers in 1937. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). This
was of course early enough for argumentative use by New Deal lawyers.
291. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
292. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
293. 379 U.S. at 302, citing 317 U.S. at 125.
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across state lines, despite the finding of the lower court that a require-
ment to serve Negroes would cause a substantial reduction in business.
Five years later this fancy concept was pressed to the breaking
point in Daniel v. Paul94 when the Lake Nixon Club located in the
back Arkansas hills was found to have purchased one paddle boat from
an Oklahoma concern, to be leasing fifteen other such boats from the
same company, and to own a juke box manufactured outside Arkansas
that played records manufactured beyond the State's borders. For Mr.
Justice Black it went "too far" to stretch "the Commerce Clause so as
to give the Federal Government complete control over every little
remote country place of recreation in every nook and cranny of every
precinct and county in every one of the 50 States.1
2 15
In these two decisions the Court took giant steps toward releasing
the commerce clause, implemented by the necessary and proper clause,
from any viable limitation of congressional power. This is evident from
the fact that there had been much debate on the question whether the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be predicated upon the commerce
clause, as implemented by the necessary and proper clause, or should
be rested on section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, as implemented
by section 5. Among others, Professors Gunther and Wechsler had
entered the intellectual fray. The latter had no difficulty with basing
the legislation on the grants to Congress in the original Constitution.
He saw "nothing fictive in the proposition that the practices to which
the measure is directed may occur in or affect 'the commerce that con-
cerns more States than one' or, even more plainly, may occur, as the
Taft-Hartley Act requires, in an industry which affects such com-
merce.""96  On the other hand, Professor Gunther had "basic difficul-
ties with the proposal in light of our constitutional structure. . . ." His
carefully reasoned elaboration is convincing:
Where immediate regulations of intrastate conduct have been
imposed, a demonstrable economic effect on interstate commerce,
business, or trade has normally been required. That kind of
showing has been made, for example, with regard to the control
of 'local' affairs in the labor relations and agricultural production
fields. The commerce clause 'hook' has been put to some rather
294. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
295. Id. at 315 (dissent).
296. The Wechsler view was submitted by letter to the chairman of the Senate
Commerce Committee during its hearing on the bill that became the Act of 1964. The
paragraph from which the quotation is taken is conveniently found in G. GUNTHER,
supra note 194, at 219.
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strained uses in the past, I know; but the substantive content of
the commerce clause would have to be drained beyond any point
yet reached to justify the simplistic argument that all intrastate
activity may be subjected to any kind of national regulation merely
because some formal crossing of an interstate boundary once took
place, without regard to the relationship between the aim of the
regulation and interstate trade. The aim of the proposed anti-
discrimination legislation, I take it, is quite unrelated to any
concern with national commerce in any substantive sense.
I would much prefer to see the Government channel its
resources of ingenuity and advocacy into the development of a
viable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the provision
with a natural linkage to the race problem. That would seem to
me a considerably less demeaning task than the construction of an
artificial commerce facade. .-..297
The language of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act offered the Court
a choice, the opinion of the Court elected the commerce route, and
those concurring were satisfied although Justice Douglas would have
preferred the fourteenth amendment basis.
The crusade of the 1960's against racial discrimination did not, of
course, stop with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That major legislation
was followed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, with the lesson learned
to shift constitutional undergirding to the War Amendments. The gen-
eral framework and many of the major provisions of this legislation sur-
vived challenge by South Carolina and other states in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach.298  Inasmuch as racial discriminations in voting were
the evil attacked, decision was rested on sections 1 and 2 of the fifteenth
amendment. Despite the drastic medicine prescribed by Congress for
eradication of effective denial of the franchise to the Negro, the Court
was unanimous save for Mr. Justice Black's strenuous objection to the
requirement of section 5 of the Act that a state within the formula pro-
scribing literacy tests or devices must secure the approval of the United
States Attorney General or the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia before in any way altering its constitution or laws pertain-
ing to voting rights. To Justice Black, compelling the covered states
"to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our
constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction
297. Id. at 218. The Gunther letter was addressed to the Department of Justice
prior to the Hearings.
298. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost
meaningless."2 99
The question of the validity of one major section of the 1965
Voting Rights Act was reserved for resolution in Katzenbach v.
Morgan.00 Section 4(e) forbade denial of the franchise to Puerto
Ricans educated in Spanish. A majority of the Court sustained the pro-
vision under sections 1 and 5 of the fourteenth amendment, thus pro-
hibiting enforcement of New York law requiring as a condition of
voting the ability to read and write the English language. Justices
Harlan and Stewart were in vigorous dissent, unable to fathom by what
authority Congress could make its own independent judgment on the
substantive content of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. They
reasoned that
[w]hen recognized state violations of federal constitutional
standards have occurred, Congress is of course empowered by § 5
to take appropriate remedial measures to redress and prevent the
wrongs. . . . But it is a judicial question whether the condition
with which Congress has thus sought to deal is in truth an infringe-
ment of the Constitution, something that is the necessary pre-
requisite to bringing the § 5 power into play at all.30 :-
In short, the two Justices demanded to know how the majority's asser-
tion of congressional power to read the Constitution differently than
does the Court on its own could be squared with the Court's declaration
in Cooper v. Aaron302 that Marbury v. Madison "declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispen-
sable feature of our constitutional system. ' 30 3 Reconciliation is pos-
sible, but this- no whit diminishes the possible reach of the doctrine of
Morgan. True, that decision could not quite avoid the necessity of
constitutional amendment for reduction of voting age for state elections,
but Oregon v. Mitchell 304 must not be misread as blighting the growth
potentialities of Morgan. A state's control of the franchise by which
it maintains its polity is surely the last bastion that should fall in the
demise of federalism.
299. Id. at 358.
300. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
301. Id. at 666.
302. 358 U.s. 1 (1958).
303. Id. at 18.
304. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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Racial discrimination was also dealt telling blows in two major
decisions of the 1960's involving provisions of the post Civil War civil
rights statutes. With two dissents, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.305
accorded broad interpretation to 42 U.S.C. section 1982, derived from
the 1866 Act, and then found the section as so construed to be within
congressional power under the thirteenth amendment. It was even
possible for the majority, speaking through Justice Stewart, to cite the
Civil Rights Cases306 of 1883 for authority. Whether or not section
1 of that amendment does go beyond abolition of slavery, the enforc-
ing section, section 2, "clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery
in the United States.' "307 An inclusive interpretation of "badges and
incidents" could embrace just about every manifestation of discrimina-
tion against blacks.
Probably more significant, however, is United States v. Guest30 8
in which the Government was successful in criminal action under 18
U.S.C. section 241, deriving from the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Highly
significant was the fact that two-thirds of the Court, while in technical
concurrence with Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court, nevertheless
moved far toward reading out of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment
any requirement of state action when Congress is legislating under sec-
tion 5. Indeed, Justices Clark, Black, and Fortas seem in their concur-
rence to have gone all the way; "there now can be no doubt that the
specific language of § 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing
all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with
Fourteenth Amendment rights."30 9 Brennan, Warren, and Douglas, in
their separate concurrence, held back somewhat. Speaking for himself
and the other two, Justice Brennan could
find no principle of federalism nor word of the Constitution that
denies Congress power to determine that in order adequately to
protect the right to equal utilization of state facilities, it is also
appropriate to punish other individuals-not state officers them-
selves and not acting in concert with state officers-who engage in
the same brutal conduct for the same misguided purpose. 310
Yet even this diminution in the limitational effect of the concept of state
305. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
306. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
307. 392 U.S. at 439, quoting 109 U.S. at 20.
308. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
309. Id. at 762.
310. Id. at 784.
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action greatly enhances congressional power under section 5. In com-
bination, United States v. Guest and Katzenbach v. Morgan mount
enormous authority in Congress to legislate for the vast area of civil
relations to the same embracive extent available to it in the field of
commercial relations. By 1970 divided government in the federalistic
sense of its original conception had faded as the bloom on the flower;
through the process of amendment by Court decision constitutional
federalism had all but given way to congressional federalism.
Contemporaneously with the breakthrough for the congressional
power over interstate commerce, due process experienced a collapse
in substance. Just two weeks before the Jones & Laughlin decision"'
the Court in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish1 2 had sustained the
minimum wage statute of the State of Washington. In view of the low
wage levels then obtaining it could probably have been demonstrated
that even a "cost of living" standard would not deprive the em-
ployer of "property" because of the favorable effect of increased
wages on productivity. But eschewing a resolution of the question on
economic terms, the Court majority through Chief Justice Hughes
waxed highly emotional, condemning those "unscrupulous and over-
reaching employers" unwilling to pay a minimum wage "fairly fixed in
order to meet the very necessities of existence. ,, Continuing
his castigation, the Chief Justice observed that
[w]hat these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon
to pay. The bare cost of living must be met. We may take judi-
cial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose dur-
ing the recent period of depression and still continue to an alarming
extent despite the degree of economic recovery which has been
achieved.. . . The community is not bound to provide what is
in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.31 4
Like Jones & Laughlin, Parrish must have aided the opponents of the
Roosevelt Court plan; the Court was rendering the Bill unnecessary.
Significant as was the minimum-wage decision, the next year
brought Court action that sucked all strength out of due process as a
protector of property-type interests. In United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,31 5 the Court dispatched the assertion of a manufacturer
311. 301 U.S. 1 (1937), cited and discussed in note 286 and accompanying text
supra.
312. 300 U.s. 379 (1937).
313. Id. at 398.
314. Id. at 399.
315. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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of filled milk that the prohibition by Congress of the movement of this
article in interstate commerce was violative of due process. Re-
ports of committees of the two houses had "concluded, as the stat-
ute itself declares, that the use of filled milk as a substitute for
pure milk is generally injurious to health and facilitates fraud on the
public.1
316
Even in the absence of such aids the existence of facts supporting
the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or gen-
erally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowl-
edge and experience of the legislators. 31 7
The full extent of the deflation of property due process is seen
when even this subliminal test was rejected by Roosevelt's first appoin-
tee to the Court. It is clear from context that Mr. Justice Black would
have applied no restriction whatever to legislative power in such cir-
cumstances. Actually, however, the distinction was inconsequential;
under either view invalidation of economic legislation was at an end.
It is unnecessary to recite the numerous decisions in support. Two are
of especial interest. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri' 8 sustained
legislation requiring employers on pain of criminal sanction to allow
their employees four hours off on election days without diminution in
wages. This was too much for Justice Jackson to stomach: "[Tlhere
must be some limit to the power to shift the whole voting burden from
the voter to someone else who happens to stand in some economic
relationship to him."3 19  Ferguson v. Skrupa320 sustained a Kansas law
restricting to licensed attorneys the "business of debt adjusting."
"Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert
316. Id. at 149. This first Carolene decision was on demurrer to the indictment.
After conviction the company again challenged the legislative prohibition as violative of
due process. Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944). Sustaining the
law, the Court now based its justification on the avoidance of consumer confusion
between filled milk and condensed or evaporated milk; the bases of fraud and injury to
health had been effectively refuted by company argument. The new basis advanced by
the Court precipitated the question of the constitutionality of Court validation of
governmental product favoritism. This issue the Court skirted by denying that the
action of Congress involved a prohibition of one article "merely because it competes with
another such article which it resembles." Id. at 31.
317. 304 U.S. at 152.
318. 342U.S. 421 (1952).
319. Id. at427 (dissent).
320. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Spencer, Lord Keynes or some other is no concern of ours." '' At long
last the three principals in the constitutional drama of due process are
identified by name.
First reaction to these striking developments was the understand-
able one that the impactful life of the due process clauses was over,
that in effect they had been "retired" from the Constitution as Professor
Frankfurter had urged decades earlier or that they were to be relegated
to limbo by one or another restriction on the exercise of consti-
tutional review as had been urged by other of the Court's critics. But
Franklin Roosevelt had not proposed an end to constitutional review
under the due process clauses, only "new blood" for their interpreta-
tion, a subtle yet portentous fact quickly appreciated by the more
sophisticated. The difficulty was not with the clauses but with their
interpreters. Indeed it is to the very sentence from first Carolene,
quoted two paragraphs back, 22 that there was appended the famous
footnote 4:
4There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369-370; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legisla-
tion. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73; on restraints upon
the dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interfer-
ences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California,
supra 369; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 373-378; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see
Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohi-
bition of peaceable assembly, see Delonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religions, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska,
321. Id. at 732.
322. Quoted in text accompanying note 317 supra.
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262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. [284], or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon,
supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra; whether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Com-
pare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; South Carolina
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n.2, and cases cited.323
The change in judicial attitude toward due process is highlighted
by the two flag salute decisions that followed closely in time. With only
Justice Stone in dissent, the Court in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis3 24 sustained, as against protestations of Jehovah's Witness
parents, compulsory flag salute by all school children in the school
district. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared:
The religious liberty which the Constitution protects has never
excluded legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal
loyalties of particular sects. Judicial nullification cannot be justi-
fied by attributing to the framers of the Bill of Rights views for
which there is no historic warrant.325
Later in his opinion he observed:
It is not our province to choose among competing considera-
tions in the subtle process of securing effective loyalty to the
traditional ideals of democracy, while respecting at the same time
individual idiosyncrasies among a people so diversified in racial
origins and religious allegiances. So to hold would in effect make
us the school board of the country. That authority has not been
given to this Court, nor should we assume it.326
Within three years, however, after public recantation by Justices
Black and Douglas327 and a Rutledge-for-Byrnes switch on the Court,
Gobitis bit the dust in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.8' In a strong opinion by Justice Jackson a basic distinction
was made between the fourteenth amendment when alone operative
as contrasted with the situation where it finds its wellspring in the first
amendment:
Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when
the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The
323. 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
324. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
325. Id. at 594.
326. Id. at 598.
327. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623 (1942) (dissent).
328. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well
include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose
all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis"
for adopting. ,But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly,
and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and imme-
diate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect. It
is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment
which bears directly upon the State it is the more specific limiting
principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this case. 20
In a long dissent, Justice Frankfurter stood steadfast in his views. It
has ever since been a part of anecdotal comment about Court personali-
ties that this quick and ungloved rejection of those views by most
members of the Court hurt him deeply and remained a painful scar
throughout his time on the Bench.
Barnette constituted a major step in entrenchment of the double
standard in constitutional jurisprudence. There were many who found
it to their liking, but by no means all. Those of the latter view found
that criticism of extended invocation of the first amendment, whether
directly or through the fourteenth amendment, itself now drew attack.
Thus Eugene7 Rostow, in finding in this new judicial philosophy a recon-
ciliation of constitutional review with democracy, exhibited little pa-
tience with doubting Thomases.330 Familiar is Learned Hand's cele-
brated address in commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in which he insisted that the
price of judicial immunity is that the courts "should not have the last
word in those basic conflicts of 'right and wrong-between whose end-
less jar justice resides.' "331 It was his considered judgment that courts
could satisfactorily umpire written constitutional provisions distributing
the powers of government but not those general principles that Ameri-
can constitutions always include in order "to insure the just exercise of
those powers." This view of one of this century's ablest jurists Rostow
refers to as "Judge Learned Hand's monkish rule of complete absti-
nence. . . ." This observation is made in the course of condemnation
of another's studied analysis of the proper function of the Court with
respect to freedom of expression.3 32 In the eyes of Professor Rostow,
329. Id. at 639.
330. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAIv. L. REv. 193
(1952).
331. L. HANiD, THE SPnurT OF LIERTY 164 (3d ed. 1960).




Elliot Richardson's offense is the long quotation from the Hand address
which includes the above excerpt from it. That quotation is introduced
in support of Richardson's own conclusion that
the intervention of courts inevitably encourages the impression
that they constitute the first line of defense where civil liberties are
concerned. This confusion of wisdom and constitutionality can
only result-who is to say we are not already witnessing it?-in
a progressive sapping of self-discipline in respecting minorities.
The result of this process, in turn, is suspicion, intolerance, bigotry,
and discrimination which the sporadic forays of the judiciary are
helpless to check.
338
The Richardson suggestion that the reconstructed Court was
demonstrating inability to distinguish between the wisdom and constitu-
tionality of governmental action in the civil rights domain put the shoe
on the other foot. Had not the objective of the Roosevelt Court
Reform Bill been, as the President said, to rescue the Constitution from
the Court? Stated otherwise, had not the constitutional crisis of 1937
turned on the issue whether the Court could be made to function, in
the role ultimately conceded to it, as the agency for enforcement of
limitations on governmental power to be found in the written Constitu-
tion and to be construed with all the detachment the nature of man
will permit? Justices Chase and Iredell had very early debated the
matter in Calder v. Bull. 334  Chase was sorely tempted to invalidate
the Connecticut legislative act that, like the North Carolina law in
Bayard v. Singleton, constituted an invasion of the state's judicial
province even though it did not violate the Federal Constitution once
the ex post facto prohibition was viewed as limited to criminal legisla-
tion.
Chase's celebrated declaration includes the passage to the effect
that:
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary
to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be con-
sidered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.... A law that
punished a citizen for an innocent action .... [A] law that destroys,
or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes
a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from
A. and gives it to B.: It is against all reason and justice, for a people
to entrust a Legislature with sucH powers; and, therefore, it can-
not be presumed that they have done it.
335
333. Id. at 52.
334. 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798).
335. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
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The response of Iredell was that if Congress or a state legislature were
to pass a law within constitutional limits,
the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in
their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The
ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standards: the
ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all
that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that
the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed
an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with
the abstract principles of natural justice.
3 36
Admittedly, Lochner and its progeny had read into the Constitu-
tion the mixed bag of economic and sociological theories of Adam
Smith and Herbert Spencer, while E.C. Knight had fathered a roughly
contemporaneous refusal to read into the Constitution an expansive
reach of congressional commerce power. Supposedly, however, the
reform effort culminating in the Roosevelt Court Bill of 1937 was
designed to put an end to such deviations from the manifest Constitu-
tion, not to redirect their course into channels more acceptable to the
Court's critics. As for the status of the states under the new federalism
it was Justices Black and Douglas, surprisingly, who first resisted the
onrush of congressional authority. Dissenting in New York v. United
States,337 they asserted that
[t]he notion that the sovereign position of the States must find
its protection in the will of a transient majority of Congress is
foreign to and a negation of our constitutional system. There will
often be vital regional interests represented by no majority in Con-
gress. The Constitution was designed to keep the balance be-
tween the States and the Nation outside the field of legislative
controversy.3
38
With respect to substantive limitation of governmental power Mr.
Justice Frankfurter was the first member of the Court to express con-
cern over the temptation to read "liberal" values into due process. The
Justice, who had dissented in Barnette in a futile effort to hold the line
in the flag-salute situation, had asserted, three years before New York
v. United States, that "[a]s a member of this Court I am not justified
in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter
how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their
disregard."33
336. Id. at 399.
337. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
338. Id. at 594.




Speaking extra-judicially, Chief Judge Irving Lehman of the New
York Court of Appeals was much more vigorous in a contemporaneous
condemnation of the re-budding judicial freedom in constitutional inter-
pretation:
There are some, indeed, who say that the law of this land,
as pronounced and administered by the highest court of this land,
in January, 1937, was very different from the law of the land, pro-
nounced and administered by the same Court in January, 1941;
or even, some say, in January, 1938. If history could prove that
these changes in the law have come through decrees of legislative
bodies in the exercise of their unrestrained will, or by judges who
determine what is the law in accordance with their own judgment
and benevolent will instead of "by the artificial reason and judg-
ment of law," then what we call law is, indeed, only a fiction, and
what we call liberty is not an inalienable right but is a privilege
which may be granted or withheld by the will and in accordance
with the judgment of those who control the government or
administer the courts. Judicial despotism, though benevolent, is
hardly to be preferred to a despotism of the majority in the State,
and the tyranny of a majority, unrestrained by law, may threaten
the fundamental rights of individuals no less than the despotism of
a single man. 3
40
Professor Edward S. Corwin could well have been thinking of Justice
Frankfurter and Chief Judge Lehman when a few years later he
commented as follows:
The fundamental elements of American Constitutional Law
reduce, therefore, to a single element, Judicial Review, and this has
gradually emancipated itself from all documentary and doctrinal
restraints, and even from the restraint which was originally implicit
in common law jurisdictions in the judicial function as such-the
principle of stare decisis. But now the result of this self-achieved
emancipation has been to extend and at the same time to obliterate
the frontier between Constitutional Law and policy; and without
a definite boundary to defend, Judicial Review itself becomes an
instrument of policy, and thereby exposes itself more and more to
political criticism.
341
Familiar is the clash between Justices Black and Frankfurter in
Adamson v. California,3" a major decision that soon followed the two
340. Address before the New York Bar Association, quoted by Wilkinson, Some
Aspects of the Constitutional Guarantees of Civil Liberty, 11 FoRDHIA L REv. 50, 59-
60 (1942).
341. Corwin, The Dissolving Structure of Our Constitutional Law, 20 WASH. L. REV.
& ST. B.J. 185, 196 (1945).
342. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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just considered. There the opinion of the Court, sustaining California
law permitting consideration of an accused's failure to testify, was
dwarfed by the concurring opinion of Frankfurter and the dissenting
opinion of Black. Frankfurter, who twenty-three years earlier was for
doing away with the due process clauses, was now defending the Palko-
Twining doctrine of selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
fourteenth amendment due process, inclusion or exclusion to turn on
whether the guarantee be "'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty.' IM Black, on the other hand, "would not reaffirm the
Twining decision. I think that decision and the 'natural law' theory of
the Constitution upon which it relies degrade the constitutional safe-
guards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously appropriate for this
Court a broad power which we are not authorized by the Constitution
to exercise. '' 1 4  The debate resumed in Rochin v. California45 in the
early 1950's. Writing the Court's majority opinion, Frankfurter had
overturned as a violation of due process a state court conviction resting
on evidence produced by forced stomach pumping of the accused.
"This is conduct that shocks the conscience."'34 0 Defending the Adam-
son approach Frankfurter insisted that when due process is responsive
to "considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling tradi-
tions of the legal profession" it "is not to be derided as a resort to a
revival of 'natural law.' ,,7 Black's retort included the inquiry as to
"what avenues of investigation are open to discover 'canons' of conduct
so universally favored that this Court should write them into the
Constitution?" '48
The late Alexander Bickel re-posed this question a dozen years
after Justice Black had put the query. The response of Professor
Bickel was this:
The function of the Justices . . .is to immerse themselves in the
tradition of our society and of kindred societies that have gone
before, in history and in the sediment of history which is law, and,
as Judge Hand once suggested, in the thought and the vision of the
philosophers and the poets. The Justices will then be fit to extract
"fundamental presuppositions" from their deepest selves, but in
fact from the evolving morality of our tradition.
3 49
343. Id. at 65, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
344. 332 U.S. at 70 (dissent).
345. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
346. Id. at 172.
347. Id. at 171.
348. Id. at 176 (concurrence).
349. A. BIcKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANcH 236 (1962).
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On this basis, Bickel continued,
I would assert that the rightness of the Court's decision in the
School Segregation Cases can be demonstrated... I would deny,
however, that any similar demonstration can be or was mounted-
could have been mounted even by a Brandeis-to show that a stat-
ute setting maximum hours or minimum wages violates fundamental
presuppositions of our society. 350
With due respect, Bickel's conclusion regarding Lochner can be
disputed. Save for Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers, the
universally accepted bellwether of this nation's founders, there has not
been a more fully entertained philosophy than that of laissez faire at
the end of the nineteenth century. True, it was not the product of
Bickel's philosophers and poets; it was a socio-economic philosophy
blended from the sociology of Spencer and the economics of Smith, an
admitted departure from the Constitution conceived as a vehicle of
intended powers and limitations. But of its dominance in American
thought there is no question, 351 and by this "so universally favored"
concept the Court of the early twentieth century was lured into
imbedding it in the due process clauses. 52 It must be granted that
Court decisions based upon laissez faire philosophy outlasted the con-
cept's general acceptance. Nevertheless, there is room to question
Holmes's assertion that already in 1905 it was "an economic theory
which a large part of the country does not entertain." Only a decade
before he had observed in a letter to Lady Pollock that "you English
never quite do justice to" H. Spencer; at least this was true of those
English with whom he had talked. Granted that Spencer was dull,
wrote with an ugly style, and took as his ideals those of "a lower middle
class British Philistine. And yet after all abatements I doubt if any
writer of English except Darwin has done so much to affect our whole
way of thinking about the universe. 13 53  Could so much change in
viewpoint have occurred so rapidly?
350. Id. at 237-38.
351. C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 332 (1947); R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL
DARWiNiSM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1955).
352. As Curtis put it, supra note 351, at 332,
The Court was importing into a silent and receptive Constitution the phil-
osophy which they had drawn from their own contemporary, or juvenile,
sources. Inescapably and not.wholly consciously, and so they mistakenly saw
it in the Constitution itself. Suppose that instead of Spencer the Justices had
been brought up on Henry George, or on Demarest Lloyd, or Edward Bellamy,
or, to come down a few years, on Thorstein Veblen. We complain only be-
cause the Justices were listening to a different drummer.
353. Id. It must be realized that laissez faire theory, far from negativistic, consti-
tuted a positive philosophy of control by social rather than governmental forces.
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And then there was the reinforcing impact of acceptance of Adam
Smith's rejection of mercantilism for economic control through market
forces. State antitrust laws, followed by congressional enactment of the
Sherman Antitrust Act just fifteen years before Lochner, represented
full commitment to a policy of competitive capitalism. These were the
years when every contract in restraint of competition was illegal;
dilution through introduction of the rule of reason was yet to come.
Taking these considerations into account it seems more accurate to
credit Holmes with insight into the future that was to follow than with
accuracy of observation with respect to the then present. Be this as
it may, the issue precipitated by Lochner, bias against its policy aside,
was and remains whether, if there is to be any toleration of Court "dis-
covery" of policy that is not to be found in the basic instrument, amend-
ment by judicial decision ought to be limited to instances in which con-
sensus on the alteration of the Constitution is near crystal clear.
A passage in Professor Bickel's posthumously published volume
provides a transition to the following decade, one that witnessed inten-
sified conflict among the Justices over the ultimate issue of the proper
function of the Court in constitutional adjudication. After condemna-
tory comment on the Lochner period, when the Court was "grinding out
annual answers to social and economic questions on the basis of per-
sonal convictions of what was wise-derived, as it happens, from the
laissez-faire philosophy of Herbert Spencer,"354 Professor Bickel con-
tinues:
None has reread Herbert Spencer into the Constitution since, but
in the 1960s a majority of the justices, under Earl Warren, again
began to dictate answers to social and sometimes economic prob-
lems. The problems were different-not regulation of economic
enterprise, not labor relations, but the structure of politics, educa-
tional policy, the morals and mores of the society. And the
answers were differently derived, not from Spencer's Social Statics,
but from fashionable notions of progress. Again, it may take time
before the realization comes that this will not do.3 55
The first of these decisions again found Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in dissent, his Barnette wound reopened by the majority's rejection of
the position he had taken in Colegrove v. Green.3 5 6 His retirement
from the Bench came soon thereafter, his illness said to have been
354. A. BICKEL, THE MoRALrY OF CONSENT 26 (1975).
355. Id. at 27.
356. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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aggravated by the repudiating decision of Baker v. Carr.6 7  To him
representation was a complex of political dynamics far different from
the less complicated issue of voting rights. "The present case . . is,
in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different
label, '3 58 that label being the equal protection clause on which the
majority decision was predicated. "What is actually asked of the Court
in this case is to choose among competing bases of representation-
ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy-
in order to establish an appropriate frame of government for the State
of Tennessee and thereby for all the States of the Union." 359 The mak-
ing of such a choice involves the Court in fashioning, not interpreting,
constitutional limitations.
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's
"judicial Power" not only presages the futility of judicial interven-
tion in the essentially political conflict of forces by which the
relation between population and representation has time out of
mind been and now is determined. It may well impair the Court's
position as the ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land"
in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in
popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce. The Court's
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ulti-
mately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.
Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detach-
ment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and
by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces
in political settlements.
360
Contrary to Mr. Justice Stewart's assurance in Baker that the Court
was concerned only with crazy-quilt malapportionment, 61 the product
of long years of legislative inaction, the six decisions of June 15,
1964,362 made it clear that the judicial objective was firm adherence
to the principle of equally populated voting districts. The principle
applied to both houses of a bicameral state legislature; the federal
analogy was irrelevant. Immaterial were the causes of existing mal-
apportionment; even a currently expressed preference of the majority
357. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
358. Id. at 297 (dissent).
359. Id. at 300.
360. Id. at 267.
361. Id. at 265-66 (concurrence).
362. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assem. of Colo., 377 U.S. 712 (1964).
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of the voters of a state for a regional pattern of representation for one
house was verboten. Despite Frankfurter's insight into the nature and
complexity of the concept of representation, the equal protection
clause was deemed applicable because the "rights allegedly impaired
are individual and personal in nature."30 3  This postulated, it was
possible for Chief Justice Warren, as spokesman for the Court, to make
the profound observation that "[liegislators represent people, not trees
or acres."3 4 Aided then by superficial analysis offered by some that
"equal" means "equal, 3 6 5 the Chief Justice found it easy to reach the
proposition that any differences in district populations produced de-
basement of those votes cast in districts of relatively larger numbers of
persons.
There is no agreement on the "original understanding" of the
equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in all of the 1964
reapportionment decisions on the basis of a thorough inquiry into the
intended reach of the clause. Professor William Van Alstyne under-
took his own investigation "to determine whether the legislative history
on which Mr. Justice Harlan relied supports the original understanding
he found in it,"366 concluding that that history does not.
The application of the Equal Protection Clause to practices of state
legislative malapportionment is unexceptionable in terms of the in-
conclusive legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the decision
in Reynolds v. Sims should have been foreclosed solely on the
strength of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 67
But this conclusion is not shared by others,6 8 and the Court majority
offered no rebuttal to the Harlan analysis. "The recent study of
Professor William Van Alstyne . . . badly shakes up some of the
Harlan history and gives a somewhat different total picture, but the
weight of the whole history remains with Harlan.
'3 69
363. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 561.
364. Id. at 562.
365. Cf. R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW & POLInCS OF EQUAL REPREsEN-
TATION 139 (1965): "Perhaps it is just too easy to say that 'equal' means 'equal' when
individual rights are involved." How true!
366. W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 33, 37 n.10.
367. Id. at 85.
368. R. DIxoN, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLrrICS 283-84 (1968); R. McKAY, supra note 365, at 141; Frank & Munro, The
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421.
369. Frank & Munro, supra note 368, at 475. C. MILLER, Tn SuPRgE CoURT
[Vol. 55
BICENTENNIAL BENCHMARK
Beyond the doubt that the original understanding of the equal
protection clause had any relevancy for malapportionment lies the fact-
that Court interpretation of the clause up to 1964 offered no precedent
for the action of the majority. The familiar meaning of the clause,
incorporated into hundreds of decisions, was that of a requirement that
legislative classifications be meaningful in themselves and related to the
objective of the legislation under constitutional scrutiny. Under "old
equal protection" that relationship need be only rational; with the
coming of "new equal protection" the relationship was required to be
tighter. But in either instance the equal protection concept allowed
legislatures freedom in choice of objectives. In thrust it was essentially
procedural as contrasted with the substantive character of the restraints
of due process. Only in one context had the Court given substantive
content to equal protection; first with respect to racial covenants and
then as to school segregation, choice of objective had been ruled out
for the states. 7" In correlative decisions concerning the District of
Columbia, equal protection had been equated with due process to reach
identical results.17 ' Nowhere is the significance of this development
more sharply revealed than in the opinion in the Boiling case, which
immediately followed Brown I. "Segregation in public education is not
reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it
imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the
Due Process Clause. '3 72  This one context was unique; concerned with
what the Civil War and the fourteenth amendment were all about, it
supplied no precedent for the constitutional stance taken by the
majority in Reynolds and associated decisions that population alone was
relevant to representation in the face of historical recognition of areal,
demographic, economic, local and other factors as also relevant. It was
AND THE USES OF HISTORY 135-38 (1969) concludes his consideration of this aspect of
Reynolds by observing that
the framers of the fourteenth amendment were not really concerned with
[apportionment]. Their amendment was about Negro rights. Everything else
said at the time was in effect obiter dictum. If the Supreme Court had cared
to use it, the principle of an adaptable Constitution would have aided in over-
coming the historical argument of Justice Harlan. Instead, the Court ignored
the entire issue, leaving the impression that Justice Harlan's history, though
powerless, was both right and relevant.
Id. at 138.
370. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Delaware, Kansas, South
Carolina and Virginia); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racial covenants)
(Michigan and Missouri).
371. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
372. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. at 500.
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this result-oriented action of the majority that provoked Mr. Justice
Stewart, Justice Clark concurring, to the powerful dissent he entered
in two of the six decisions:
373
To put the matter plainly, there is nothing in all the history
of this Court's decisions which supports this constitutional rule.
The Court's draconian pronouncement, which makes unconstitu-
tional the legislatures of most of the 50 States, finds no support in
the words of the Constitution, in any prior decision of this Court,
or in the 175-year political history of our Federal Union. With
all respect, I am convinced these decisions mark a long step back-
ward into that unhappy era when a majority of the members of
this Court were thought by many to have convinced themselves and
each other that the demands of the Constitution were to be
measured not by what it says, but by their own notions of wise
political theory. The rule announced today is at odds with long-
established principles of constitutional adjudication under the
Equal Protection Clause, and it stifles values of local individuality
and initiative vital to the character of the Federal Union which it
was the genius of our Constitution to create.
What the Court has done is to convert a particular political
philosophy into a constitutional rule, binding upon each of the 50
States, from Maine to Hawaii, from Alaska to Texas, without
regard and without respect for the many individualized and differ-
entiated characteristics of each State, characteristics stemming
from each State's distinct history, distinct geography, distinct distri-
bution of population, and distinct political heritage. My own
understanding of the various theories of representative government
is that no one theory has ever commanded unanimous assent
among political scientists, historians, or others who have considered
the problem. But even if it were thought that the rule announced
today by the Court is, as a matter of political theory, the most
desirable general rule which can be devised as a basis for the make-
up of the representative assembly of a typical State, I could not
join in the fabrication of a constitutional mandate which imports
and forever freezes one theory of political thought into our Consti-
tution, and forever denies to every State any opportunity for
enlightened and progressive innovation in the design of its demo-
cratic institutions, so as to accommodate within a system of
representative government the interest and aspi'rations of diverse
groups of people, without subjecting any group or class to absolute
domination by a geographically concentrated or highly organized
majority.3
7 4
373. Justice Stewart's dissent in the Colorado and New York cases appears at 377
U.S. 744-65.
374. Id. at 746-49.
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Professor, now Dean, Auerbach was allotted eighty-seven pages
in the Supreme Court Review of 19 6 4 7' for "defending the principle
espoused by the Court" against vigorous attacks by Dean, now Profes-
sor, Phil Neal, Alfred de Grazia, Jerold Israel, Robert Dixon and
others. 76  Whatever is to be said in support of or opposition to the
assertion that only representation based on "one man, one vote" is con-
sistent with political democracy, the constitutional issue is that of
whether it was the Court's business to read the requirement into the
equal protection clause. Professor Archibald Cox found justification
from the following analysis:
The power of the ruling in Reynolds v. Sims-its claim to be law-
rests upon the accuracy of the Court's -perception of what it took
to be the dominant theme of American political development, and
upon the Court's ability, by expressing the theme, to command a
national consensus.
377
He continued, but with a cautionary observation:
Out of such a coup de main great legal principles may occasionally
be created. As a staple diet, however, political perceptions without
roots in objective standards are an inadequate basis for law, and
to accept them would give judges unacceptably dangerous power.
Such a course is even self-defeating.
378
Reynolds was thus an even bolder exercise of raw judicial power than
was Lochner, for it involved the Court in bringing a consensus to a head
rather than reacting to one of evident existence. The Court proved
to be correct in its perception of the extent to which egalitarian phil-
osophy had undercut traditional notions of legitimate representational
considerations, yet, as Professor Cox states, evolution of a pattern of
judicial action of such dimension would accord the Court "unacceptably
dangerous power."
Another proffered justification of Reynolds might provide the
needed constriction on its potentiality. That justification has lain in
375. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote--One Vote, One
Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
376. A. DE GRAZrA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1962); R.
DIXON, supra note 368, at 269-78, 289; Israel, On Charting A Course Through the
Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. RV. 107 (1962);
Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 252. Among the
"others" are Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The
Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 711, 764-73 (1962); McCloskey, Foreword:
The Reapportionment Case, 76 HAiv. L. REV. 54, 73-74 (1962).
377. Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 98 (1966).
378. Id. at 98-99.
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the conviction that existing malapportionment measured by population
variances endangered American democracy; that in consequence the
political malignancy must be removed; and that, undeniably, no political
institution was willing to undertake the necessary surgery. But if that
be justification, the judicial operation cannot be successful unless the
Court also eradicates gerrymandering in districts of equal population, a
radical procedure that it has been unwilling to pursue save for cases
in which the gerrymandering discloses racial manipulation.37 0  The
Court is on the horns of a dilemma; use of computers makes possible
such an infinite number of patterns for "gerrymanders vastly more
subtle and devastating than those of the past"3 80 as to defy judicial
resources for diagnosis and therapy, while failure to remove the other
half of the total malignancy leaves in doubt the success of this venture
into judicially enforced egalitarianism. 8 1
The "egalitarian revolution," as Professor Kurland dubbed it in his
critical comments on the success of "The Reform Club, 1964,
' '382
registered further advance in Reitman v. Mulkey.A3a Readily conced-
ing that Mr. Justice White's opinion for the majority, in which Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas concurred, "utterly failed to justify its decision," Professors
Karst and Horowitz nevertheless concluded a thorough analysis of it in
a paean of praise for the result:
Granting the lack of that "comprehensive completeness for candor"
for which we all yearn, granting the reshaping of precedent, grant-
ing the disingenuousness in the "deference" to the California Court
-granting all that, the vital fact is that in holding Proposition 14
unconstitutional the Court made one of its most significant contri-
butions to date to the principle of substantive equal protection. In
that sense Reitman v. Mulkey is a great decision. After all, how
many great decisions have come equipped with great opinions? 38
4
These are indeed portentous words, placing top priority on "right"
results regardless of admitted inability to relate them to a written consti-
379. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
380. T. O'RouRxE, REAPPORTIONMENT: Lw, POLrICS, CoMPUTERs 3 (1972).
381. Id.; A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 151-61
(1970); cf. Smith, The Failure of Apportionment; The Elfect of Reapportionment on the
Election of Blacks to Legislative Bodies, 18 How. L.J. 639 (1975) (contending that
population-based reapportionment has been successful but that racially based apportion-
ment has been a failure).
382. Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HAv. L. REv. 143, 145, 149-57 (1964).
383. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
384. Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39, 80.
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tutional base. It is all so simple: "The public has come to expect the
Court to intervene against gross abuses. And so the Court must inter-
vene." 5 The judicial function in constitutional adjudication is visual-
ized as that of a reading into the fundamental instrument a content
supposedly demanded by the political philosophy of the day. Thus the
rule is far different from that insisted upon as proper when it was an
economic philosophy that was dominant at an earlier time. Bluntly put,
the end is conceived to justify the means. This was too much for Mr.
Justice Black who with Justices Clark and Stewart joined the dissent
of Mr. Justice Harlan. Yet the break between Black and Douglas pre-
dated Reitman; it appeared in Griswold v. Connecticut3 s8 and intensi-
fied in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.38 7
Writing for the Court in Griswold Mr. Justice Douglas rejected
outright "[o]vertones of some arguments suggest[ing] that Loch-
ner v. New York . . . should be our guide. 3 8 The "invitation" was
declined because "[w]e do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates di-
rectly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's
role in one aspect of that relation." 3 9 But one may ask by what author-
ity Justice Douglas distinguishes between the two situations? Anticipat-
ing the question, the Justice explains that, although the right of associa-
tion is not mentioned in the original Constitution or the Bill of Rights,
there are Court decisions finding constitutional base for it. For prece-
dent he cites not only cases in which association-related concepts had
been read from the first amendment into fourteenth amendment due
process, but also Meyer v. Nebraska3 90 and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters391 which were pure substantive due process decisions of the 1920's.
Unabashedly, he "converts" these two decisions into first amendment
declarations. Aided by this judicial sleight-of-hand we are assured that
the cited cases "suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. 392 The guarantees named are the
385. Id. at 79.
386. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
387. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
388. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 481-82.
389. Id.
390. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
391. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
392. 381 U.S. at 484.
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first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, which together "create
zones of privacy.
393
Mr. Justice Douglas well knew that, were he to flirt with the
seductive implications of Lochner, Mr. Justice Black would have no
part in any invalidation of the Connecticut law prohibiting dissemina-
tion of contraceptive information or devices, even to married couples.
It was clear by 1965 that Black's grand strategy was to confine substan-
tive due process by holding its content to the provisions of the Bill of
Rights. This explains Douglas's cleverly devised theory of penumbras
formed by emanations from particular provisions thereof, a theory he
was probably justified in believing would be acceptable to Black. The
tactic was alluring enough, but the wary Black was not to be trapped
by a catchword. "I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitu-
tional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or more constitutional
provisions. I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am never-
theless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it
unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision."30 14 Justice
Black was no more satisfied with the views of those concurring; to him
their bases for invalidation were predicated on the reasoning of
Lochner, which had supposedly been consigned to outer darkness and
had the gates of justice firmly closed against it. For Black, consistency
was the mark of proper constitutional construction. "That formula,
based on subjective considerations of 'natural justice,' is no less danger-
ous when used to enforce this Court's views about personal rights than
those about economic rights. I had thought that we had laid that
formula, as a means for striking down state legislation, to rest once and
for all . . . . 395 He made no effort to put a new face on Meyer or
Pierce; they were of the Lochner vintage and no amount of fancy rein-
terpretation could justify them. Although these comments on the two
decisions are made apropos his challenge of the reasoning of the con-
currers, they are equally pertinent to Mr. Justice Douglas's effort some-
how to free them of the Lochner taint. In sum, Mr. Justice Black
expressed his position as follows:
I realize that many good and able men have eloquently
spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the
duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times.
The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to
393. Id.
394. Id. at 509-10 (dissent).
395. Id. at 522.
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time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those
changes. For myself, I must with all deference reject that
philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change
and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people's
elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their
selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good
for our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it
is good enough for me.396
In the following year Mr. Justice Black was again dissenting from
an opinion for the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas, this time invalidating
Virginia's imposition of a poll tax as a denial of equal protection.3 97
Heavy emphasis is placed by Black on the reach of the Court's power
to exercise constitutional review. Two passages stand out. In the first
he gives as a further reason for his dissent a belief that the Court
seems to be using the old "natural-law-due-process formula" to
justify striking down state laws as violations of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. I have heretofore had many occasions to express my
strong belief that there is no constitutional support whatever for
this Court to use the Due Process Clause as though it provided a
blank check to alter the meaning of the Constitution as written so
as to add to it substantive constitutional changes which a majority
of the Court at any given time believes are needed to meet present-
day problems. Nor is there in my opinion any more constitutional
support for this Court to use the Equal Protection Clause, as it has
today, to write into the Constitution its notions of what it thinks is
good governmental policy. If basic changes as to the respective
powers of the state and national governments are needed, I prefer
to let those changes be made by amendment as Article V of the
Constitution provides. For a majority of this Court to undertake
that task, whether purporting to do so under the Due Process or
the Equal Protection Clause amounts, in my judgment, to an exer-
cise of power the Constitution makers with foresight and wisdom
refused to give the Judicial Branch of the Government.398
Shortly thereafter, the Justice returns to his now dominant theme:
The Court's justification for consulting its own notions rather
than following the original meaning of the Constitution, as I would,
apparently is based on the belief of the majority of the Court that
for this Court to be bound by the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion is an intolerable and debilitating evil; that our Constitution
should not be "shackled to the political theory of a particular era,"
and that to save the country from the original Constitution the
396. Id.
397. Harper v. Virginia Dd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
398. Id. at 675-76.
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Court must have constant power to renew it and keep it abreast
of this Court's more enlightened theories of what is best for our
society. It seems to me that this is an attack not only on the great
value of our Constitution itself but also on the concept of a written
constitution which is to survive through the years as originally
written unless changed through the amendment process which the
Framers wisely provided. Moreover, when a "political theory"
embodied in our Constitution becomes outdated, it seems to me
that a majority of the nine members of this Court are not only with-
out constitutional power but are far less qualified to choose a new
constitutional political theory than the people of this country pro-
ceeding in the manner provided by Article V.399
Mr. Justice Douglas denies the charge that he is reading into the
Constitution policy that the instrument's language cannot bear. "Our
conclusion, like that in Reynolds v. Sims, is founded not on what we
think governmental policy should be, but on what the Equal Protection
Clause requires. 400 Yet Douglas's explanation that the invalidation lies
in the fact that "[n]otions of what constitutes equal treatment for pur-
poses of the Equal Protection Clause do change," 40 and that "the
Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a par-
ticular era"402 does not support his denial. The Justice fails to heed
his own counsel offered earlier in his Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture
before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. "The prin-
ciple of full disclosure has as much place in government as it does in
the market place. A judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why
it does it will breed understanding. And confidence based on under-
standing is more enduring than confidence based on awe."40 3  His
admirers, or at least some of them, are more candid. Witness Professor
Karst in his tribute to the Justice for returning to the "Natural-Law-
Due-Process Formula."
Despite Justice Douglas's protestations to the contrary, this
process of growth [in the employment of the doctrine of invidious
399. Id. at 677-78. In footnote 7 of the Black dissent, dropped at the middle of the
paragraph just reproduced, the Justice seeks to reconcile his vote in Brown v. Board
of Educ., cited supra note 370, with the position he takes in Harper. "In my judgment
the holding in Brown against racial discrimination was compelled by the purpose of the
Framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments"; for Black it was not
a matter of using the equal protection clause "to keep the Constitution up to date." 383
U.S. at 677-78 n.7. Conspicuously absent is any attempt on the Justice's part to square
his position in the Reapportionment Cases with his position in Harper.
400. 383 U.S. at 670.
401. Id. at 669 (emphasis in original).
402. Id.
403. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLuM. L. Rav. 735, 754 (1949).
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discrimination "to make the judiciary into an instrument of positive
egalitarian social change"] has been and properly continues to be
a process in which the present generation of Justices has sought to
fill the "moral adjurations" of due process and equal protection
from their own collective bosom.40 4
Associating himself with Professor Cox with specific reference to
Harper, Professor Karst had in the same article earlier observed to the
following effect:
Professor Archibald Cox has remarked of the Harper opinion
that, apart from its reliance on Reynolds v. Sims, "it expressly or
impliedly repudiates every conventional guide to legal judgment,"
including the constitutional text, the intention of the framers, a long
history of use of the poll tax as a condition on voting, and explicit
judicial precedent upholding the condition's validity. Such a
repudiation would, for most lawyers and certainly for Justice Black,
signify the illegitimacy of what the Court was doing in the Harper
case. Professor Cox, however, is unwilling to draw that conclu-
sion: "The question, what is best for the country," he says, "makes
special claims in constitutional litigation." Justice Douglas, more
than any other Justice in the past generation, has sought to trans-
late his answers to that question into constitutional law.40 5
On one fundamental aspect of constitutional process there has to
be complete agreement; this is that alterations must from time to time
be made in the fundamental law. "Thomas Jefferson, the apostle of
American democracy used to. argue that the constitution of every state
should be revised at least once 'every nineteen or twenty years,' so as
to allow each generation to determine for itself its fundamental law."406
The Framers of the Federal Constitution incorporated in that instru-
ment a method of amendment and it is resort to this formal process
on which Mr. Justice Black insisted when change is deemed needed.
The alternative is to concede the amending power to the Court, an end
Mr. Justice Douglas was actually promoting and that scholars like Pro-
404. Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natu-
ral-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716, 738-39 (1969). The bracketed
words are taken from id. at 718. The phrase "moral adjurations" is assuredly taken from
Learned Hand's 1942 address before the Massachusetts Bar Assocation, reprinted in L.
HAND, supra note 331, where it is quoted in part. As Professor Karst is frank to point
out, Justice Douglas did not heed Hand's recommendation that the courts get out of the
business of pouring into due process and equal protection their own conceptions of
appropriate substantive content.
405. Karst, supra note 404, at 720. The Cox article is cited supra note 377. The
Karst excerpts are from pages 95 and 97 of that article. Earlier, at page 93, Professor
Cox had observed: "The kind of propertied-nonpropertied distinction which Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections rejects is too familiar a part of American history for anyone
seriously to suggest that the decision gives effect to any intention of the framers."
406. J. D-ALEY, supra note 63, at 116.
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fessors Cox and Karst are openly advocating despite their antipathy for
the consequences that ensued the first time the Court clearly indulged
the idea of amendment by Court decision. During the Lochner reign,
as opposition to its philosophy grew, the great majority of the proposed
"cures" required constitutional amendment; this was true, for instance,
of Professor Frankfurter's recommendation that the due process clauses
be removed from the Constitution. Yet amendment there was none,
indicating one or more problems with it. The dilemmic mood of the
time was suggested by one writer to be "that the machinery for consti-
tutional amendment is vexatious, cumbersome, and long; and that there
is great difficulty in framing an apt amendment. '4 °T
As for difficulty with the machinery of amendment, the evidence
indicates that when there is widespread support alterations in the Con-
stitution are quickly made. It is when consensus has not solidified, as
was true of the child labor amendment and of the Bricker amendment,
that the amendatory process is to proponents "vexatious, cumbersome,
and long."40 8 The deeper problem was that of drafting amendatory lan-
guage that could win overall agreement. For as earlier observed, the
thinking of this century was rapidly becoming inhospitable to the faith
of the late eighteenth century, persisting well into the nineteenth, that
governing political principles could be articulated in broad generaliza-
tions acceptable for inclusion as constitutional provisions.
Recalled from earlier consideration of the Roosevelt Court Reform
Bill of 1937 will be the President's desire to avoid resort to the amend-
ment process. His reasons were similar to those given back in 1913;
yet significantly he commenced by stressing the difficulty of "framing
an apt amendment." "There is no substantial group within the Con-
gress or outside it who are agreed on any single amendment." 40 9 The
disarming frankness of this opening concession reveals that the diffi-
culty lay, not truly in temporal delays as such but in ability to achieve
consensus on the principles curative amendments should embody.
Detectable in the Roosevelt solution was a "disbelief in the possi-
bilities of articulation of broad political principles which the concept of
formal amendment necessarily presupposes; distinct preference is
hinted for ad hoc disposition of concrete problems of intergovernmental
407. Palfrey, The Constitution and the Courts, 26 HAxv. L. Rav. 507, 508 (1913).
408. F. STRONG, supra note 184, at 333-34.
409. This assertion is to be found in the Roosevelt message to the Nation, March 9,
1937, reproduced supra at text accompanying notes 283-84.
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and other basic political relationships."41 0  Critics of the Court had
openly conceded as much in calling for Court reform.' 'One of the
most lasting impacts of the debate over the Court Bill lay in its
trenchant rejection of solution through the formal amendment
process.
412
For many, especially those of more liberal persuasion, disenchant-
ment with Article V gave way to outright distrust when three decades
later Senator Dirksen nearly won in his crusade to recall Reynolds v.
Sims through the convening of a national constitutional convention on
application of two-thirds of the legislatures of the states, the alternative
route to constitutional change that the Framers had included in Article
V. Typical of the excited and frantic alarums that appeared in popu-
lar media were Theodore Sorensen's "The Quiet Campaign to Re-
write the Constitution" 413 and Senator Joseph Tydings's "They Want
to Tamper with the Constitution.1 41 4  The fear was that were a
National Constitutional Convention to convene, it would not only
authorize representation in one house of a bicameral legislature on
other than a population basis but also would set about to undo much
of the Bill of Rights. The situation was examined in a calmer, scholarly
manner by Professor Robert Dixon. Writing with respect to the Dirk-
sen effort to push through Congress a reapportionment amendment, the
failure of which inspired the Senator to attempt to sneak the same result
via state legislative call for a National Constitutional Convention, Pro-
fessor Dixon took account of drafting difficulties, especially when use
is made of the amendatory process to recall an unpopular Court deci-
sion.415 At the same time he put the "much larger question":
Is article V irrelevant to the grander issues of constitutional form
and policy which we call constitutional law? The unique American
process of judicial [i.e., constitutional] review, so foreign to our
English or continental forebears, is for us a traditional and valued
process. Few now fail to perceive and admit that it is a major form
of American policy-making. But is it not a condition of the exer-
410. F. STRONG, supra note 184, at 334.
411. E.g., Fuchs, A Postscript-The Schechter Case, 20 ST. Louis L. REv. 297, 304
(1935).
412. Revision of state constitutions continues to be attempted, with mixed results. A
recent review, with emphasis on successful alteration in Virginia, is provided by Howard,
Constitutional Revision: Virginia and the Nation, 9 U. RicI. L. REv. 1 (1974).
413. 50 SAT. REv., July 15, 1967, at 17.
414. SAT. EvE. PosT, June 17, 1967, at 10, 14.
415. Dixon, Article V: The Comotose Article of Our Living Constitution?, 66
MicH. L. R v. 931, 933-36 (1968).
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cise of such great power that it be deemed to be honorably subject
-to the process of constitutional amendment? 41 6
Striking indication of the current low esteem of formal amendment
has appeared in eschewal of repudiation of the abortion decision on the
part of presidential aspirants and party platform draftsmen. In media
commentary, lay reaction, and the judgment of some highly reputable
scholars, there is evidence that the equal rights amendment suffers
from this malaise. 17 Professor Tucker Dean of Cornell probes deeply
for an explanation for the greatly altered attitude toward Article V:
There was a time when political scientists were attracted to the
idea of redrafting the Constitution. William Yandell Elliot made
a name for himself in the thirties with his book The Need for Con-
stitutional Reform, and much more recently an article, "Amending
the Constitution through a Convention," by John D. Feerick, 60
A.B.A.J. 285 (1974), posed the issue. The practical political dif-
ficulty, naturally, has been the unwillingness of large segments of
the population to reexamine basic political compromises embod-
ied in the Constitution. Powerful interests now rely on these com-
promises. And a reexamination could open the door to all sorts
of terrifying and untried ideas. Most lawyers would probably prefer
to muddle through and hope. 418
Far preferable to those who paradoxically fear reconsideration of politi-
cal fundamentals through a direct representational mechanism is the
common-law process of law making, elevated to employment at the
constitutional level.
Professor Harry Jones has recently demonstrated the "persist-
ence of common-law ways" in constitutional adjudication as well as else-
where in the domain of judicial process. 419  We need "not mourn for
the common-law tradition. It is alive and well and living, among other
places, in American constitutional law."420 More specifically:
Constitutional adjudication in the United States exhibits every
phenomenon of common-law method: the factual distinguishing
and reconciliation of cases, the discounting of past overbroad state-
ments as mere dicta, and all the other elements that, taken to-
416. Id. at 947-48.
417. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HAxv. Civ. Riorlrs-
Civ. LiB. L. REv. 234 (1971); Furay, The Equal Rights Amendment, 1 HUMAN RIGITs,
no. 2, at 63 (1971); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some Problems of Con-
struction, id. at 243 (1971); cf. Forrester, The Feminists-Why Have They Not Yet
Succeeded?, 61 A.B.A.J. 333 (1975).
418. Dean, zSome Reflections on the Unification of American Law, 3 CORNELL L.F.,
Spring 1976, at 9, 11.
419. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REv. 443, 459 (1975).
420. Id. at 463.
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gether, constitute the common-law institution of precedent. To be
sure, we have the warning of Justice Brandeis -that stare decisis is
"not a universal, inexorable command" in constitutional cases, and
the Supreme Court, particularly in this century, has not hesitated
to overrule constitutional precedents that the Justices, or a majority
of them, consider outmoded or socially unsound. But, as we have
seen, stare decisis is not, and in the United States never has been,
a rule of absolute obligation. Precedents are but generally binding,
even in private-law cases, and the reservation of an undefined
power to overrule is an integral part of the common-law precedent
cluster.
421
Appended to the penultimate sentence of this paragraph is a
citation to Mr. Douglas's address on Stare Decisis to which reference
has already been made. 422  There is no citation to a specific portion
of this address of 1949, yet Professor Jones's reference to the overrul-
ing of constitutional precedents the Court has deemed "outmoded or
socially unsound" suggests that he had in mind the following paragraph:
From age to age the problem of constitutional adjudication is
the same. It is to keep the power of government unrestrained by
the social or economic theories that one set of judges may enter-
tain. It is to keep one age unfettered by the fears or limited
vision of another. There is in that connection one tenet of faith
which has crystallized more and more as a result of our long experi-
ence as a nation. It is this: If the social and economic problems
of state and nation can be kept under political management of the
people, there is likely to be long-run stability. It is when a judi-
ciary with life tenure seeks to write its social and economic creed
into the Charter that instability is created. For then the nation
lacks the adaptability to master the sudden storms of an era. It
must be remembered that the process of constitutional amendment
is a long and slow one.
423
This paragraph places in quite different perspective the relationship
that should obtain between amendment by organic process and amend-
ment by judicial say-so. At first reading, one wonders whether this is
the same Justice Douglas who later wrote the opinions in Griswold and
Harper, for in 1949 his thesis was that the judiciary should not "write
its social and economic creed into the Charter" and that the exorcising
of illicitly introduced constitutional dogma is the office of the cumber-
some "process of constitutional amendment." Quickly, however, the
mist of perplexity rises. Justice Douglas was in his address looking
421. Id. at 462.
422. Douglas, supra note 403.
423. Id. at 754.
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back on the Lochner episode; to him as a leader of the double-standard
advocates on and off the Court, exercise of judicial power to amend
the Constitution in the interest of values deemed by him vital to a
democratic society is quite another matter. As with Senator Ashurst
so with Justice Douglas: consistency is the mark of a small mind. We
are left with the clear view that at appropriate times and on appropri-
ate occasions, amendment by Court decision is the dynamic method of
adjustment of the Charter for protection of "proper" values judged to
be of fundamental dimension.
There remains for consideration that portion of the 1970's that is
now history, thus rounding out the bicentenary period of American con-
stitutionalism. Far greater significance attaches to this partial decade,
however, than that it brings the account to a close. For the Court is, in
personnel, in transition. The so-called Warren Court is at an end; by
1972 President Nixon had named four members to the High Court, and
by 1975 his anointed successor had named a fifth Justice.
The decisive decisions prior to 1976 were Perez v. United
States,424 Roe v. Wade,425 San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,4 26 and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.427 Writing the opin-
ion for the Court in Perez, Mr. Justice Douglas asserted that the basis
for decision was the category of "those activities affecting commerce,"
thus suggesting analogy to Wickard v. Filburn of the 1940's and Kat-
zenbach v. McClung of the 1960's. But in those decisions, expansive as
they were in identifying a competitive or Keynesian effect on com-
merce among the states,4 28 a finding to that effect was constitutionally
controlling. In Perez, by contrast, such finding is assumed, not made.
Rather, the judicial finding stressed was that Perez in his wholly intra-
state extortionist activities was "clearly a member of the class which
engages in 'extortionate credit transactions' as defined by Congress 4 20
in Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. As Justice Douglas
recognizes in his opinion, citing from McClung, this determination must
be made, but such is subsidiary to a finding of the effect on interstate
commerce of the class of activities as a whole. Ascertainment of con-
stitutionality is a two-step process; both types of finding are essential
424. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
425. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
426. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
427. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
428. Analysis of these decisions appears in text accompanying notes 287-95 supra.
429. 402 U.S. at 153 (emphasis in original).
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to validity. In McClung the Court found that discrimination against
Negroes at Ollie's Barbecue had in toto the effect of reducing the flow
of food into Alabama from other states. Congressional and executive
studies, cited by Douglas, suggest that funds derived from local extor-
tions do involve interstate flow, yet the opinion never makes clear the
constitutional necessity of a finding to this effect.
As remarked by Robert Stem, Perez "upheld the application of
the loan shark statute to a purely intrastate extortionate credit trans-
action without requiring the government to demonstrate any interstate
nexus." 430 In his appraisal of Perez Mr. Stern describes himself as "a
lawyer who fought for a realistic interpretation [of the commerce
clause] which would recognize that in commercial matters the United
States was one nation. .. ;431 he was indeed one of the Government's
major attorneys in the days of the New Deal.432 The title of the recent
Stem article is itself significant. To its author the Court has in effect
adopted a new base for justification of congressional power under the
commerce clause; Congress may constitutionally act provided the facts
present a national problem. After 184 years the Court has bottomed
federal power on the Randolph Resolution, modified by delegates to
the Federal Convention to provide that "the national legislature ought
. . . to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union,
and also in those to which the states are separately incompetent.1433
Mr. Stem finds this "hardly a novel or radical concept" because he had
convinced himself as attorney for the Government that "[t]his was the
standard pursuant to which the enumeration of the powers of Congress
was drafted." '434
This is unacceptable intellectual bootstrap. Granted that this
Randolph Resolution was voted to be the guide to the Committee of
Detail in fixing the bounds of congressional power vis h. vis the states,
what were proposed by the Framers and ratified were delegations of
legislative power to Congress, one being over commerce among the
states. Those delegations therefore constitute the outer bounds of the
committee's determination of that which the states were deemed to be
430. Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, 15 Aiz. L. REv. 271, 273 (1973).
431. Id. at 284.
432. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L.
Rav. 1335 (1934), was a much-cited presentation asserting the validity of New Deal
legislation under the commerce clause reinforced by the necessary and proper clause.
433. As paraphrased by Stem, supra note 430, at 285 n.79. Cf. the wording in
Stern, supra note 432, at 1339.
434. Stem, supra note 430, at 285 & n.79.
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separately incompetent to handle. It is standing reasoning on its head
then to tolerate enlargement beyond all recognition of the interstate com-
merce and omnibus clauses, as a bottom for the claim that there is
nothing novel about holding that Congress possesses power to legislate
in any matter in which the states are separately incompetent. Were
such involuted interpretation acceptable, courts and commentators have
spent for nothing much blood, sweat and tears in locating the reach of
congressional power through interpretation of the separate, specific
delegations. No, the concept of congressional power deriving directly
from the Randolph Resolution is new constitutional doctrine, and it is
radical. Certainly the Court had not before openly flirted with this con-
ception of the division of legislative power between nation and states.
Despite the new dimension in commerce power introduced by
Perez there was only one dissent, and that by Mr. Justice Stewart.
The new Chief Justice and new Associate Justice Blackmun, both
Nixon appointees, were in accord with the holdovers from the Warren
era. Although one swallow does not make a spring, this unexpected
lineup in a decision surprising even to Mr. Stern creates wonderment
as to whether appointment of Justices with the avowed purpose of intro-
ducing elements of conservatism into Court philosophy makes any dif-
ference in outcome as respects the crucial issue of genuine versus spuri-
ous constitutional interpretation. Can it be that in this context
differences in prior political persuasion have little significance, that the
power resident at the top level of the judicial hierarchy, reinforced by
life tenure, induces great temptation on the part of all appointees to
employ constitutional review in the interest of those results that seem
"right" irrespective of the limits set by what continues to be in great
part a constitution of the late eighteenth century? An affirmative
response comes quickly from analysis of two further decisive decisions
of the immediate past.
There is merit in considering Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar out
of chronological order because it, like Perez, is a commerce clause case.
By the time of Goldfarb two additional Nixon appointees had had a
full three years of acclimatization on the High Court. Appropriately,
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. But Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun were among those joining
in the position that commerce among the states was involved, and Chief
Justice Burger wrote the opinion. Again quoting an "unimpeachable
source,"
435
435. Strong, Court vs. Constitution: Disparate Distortions of the Indirect Limita-
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The primary constitutional prop was the concept of stream of
commerce, first formulated in Swift & Co. v. United States,436
raised to full decisional level in Stafford v. Wallace,437 and occa-
sionally invoked thereafter. 438  Title examination being, in the
Court's view, commercially necessary in real estate transactions, it
followed that "a title examination is an integral part of an interstate
transaction" 439 where mortgage money flows across state lines.
"The fact that there was no showing that home buyers were dis-
couraged by the challenged activities does not mean that interstate
commerce was not affected. Otherwise, the magnitude of the
effect would control, and our cases have shown that, once an effect
is shown, no specific magnitude need be proved. '440  This state-
ment contains a classic non sequitur. It is quite correct that the
Court's cases hold that once some effect is demonstrated the mag-
nitude is immaterial. 44  But here the Chief Justice has just stated
for the Court that there has been shown no effect on interstate
commerce.
The deceptive reasoning in the Goldfarb opinion is in contrast with that
in Perez although constitutionality is found in both instances. In the
latter, effect on interstate commerce, although unsupported by a finding
of nexus, was apparently assumed from governmental studies suggest-
ing the presence of a connection; whereas in Goldfarb the Court "con-
clude[d] that interstate commerce has been sufficiently affected" while
at the same time finding "that there was no showing that home buyers
were discouraged by the challenged activities .. 442
Technically, Goldfarb brought within the Sherman Act only mini-
mum fees charged for title examination. However, there is every rea-
son to believe that the decision reaches far beyond its strict holding.
A subsequent sentence in the opinion says as much, although leaving
to bar associations the uncertain possibility of some freedom. "Of
course, there may be legal services that involve interstate commerce
tlions in the American Constitutional Framework, 54 N.C.L. REv. 125, 138 (1976)
(footnotes renumbered).
436. 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) [cited supra note 220].
437. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
438. The concept was a thread in the reasoning of Mr. Justice Rutledge for the
Court in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948); it was the basis of the Court's reasoning in United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218 (1947). Both cases are cited in Goldfarb, as is Swift.
439. 421 U.S. at 784.
440. Id. at 785.
441. E.g., United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). The
proposition dates from the early decisions on the reach of the Wagner and the Fair
Labor Standards Acts. On its facts, Mabee v. White Plains Publish. Co., 327 U.S. 178
(1946), is most striking.
442. 421 U.S. at 785.
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in other fashions, just as there may be legal services that have no nexus
with interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act."44 In this posture Goldfarb has broken the back of minimum fee
scheduling, just as Perez has federalized intrastate crime. There are
few to resent the results; price riggers and extortionists are hardly pub-
lic favorites. The larger consequence, however, would appear to be
the final demise of federalism as a mechanism designed by the
Framers for effectuation of indirect constitutional limitations on federal
power for the protection of individual interests. The states will be for-
tunate to survive as polities against federal inroad on their own
independence. Fry v. United States,444 building on the earlier decision
in Maryland v. Wirtz,145 forecast federal omnipotence in this aspect
as well. The tide has been turned back for the present by the
Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery. 4 0 Not only
did the Court invalidate congressional extension of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act to the great bulk of state personnel; the earlier in-
clusion by Congress of personnel of state hospitals and schools was
overthrown by express overruling of Maryland v. Wirtz. Yet the
result was achieved by the slimmest of margins, with Mr. Justice Black-
mun, the swing Justice, teetering between the clashing positions. And
if the blistering dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and White, is convincing this momentous braking action was
effected only through the exercise of "raw judicial power. '4
47
Sandwiched in time between Perez and Goldfarb were the
momentous decisions in Roe v. Wade448 and San Antonio School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez.49 The year for each was 1973, by which time all
four of the Nixon appointees were in full participation in constitutional
adjudication. In each, the positions taken by the four were decisive of
the outcome.
In Roe three were among the majority, with one of them, Mr. Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing the opinion of the Court from which the fourth
Nixon appointee, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Justice White was
the only other dissenter. Yet Roe, in insulating the first trimester of
pregnancy from governmental intervention, permitting regulation in the
443. Id.
444. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
445. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
446. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
447. Id. at 2487.
448. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
449. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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second only for protection of maternal health, but allowing proscription
of abortion in the third except when necessary for preservation of life,
is a classic illustration of constitutional amendment by judicial say-so.
Amazingly, the Court remembers Holmes's admonition in his Lochner
dissent, only to disregard it in the act of substituting for that of the state
legislatures its own judgment as to how the complex interests involved
in the abortion quagmire should be resolved.
In his posthumously published volume Alexander Bickel describes
the result in Roe as possibly "a wise model statute. '450 But the drafting
of model statutes is no part of the judicial business, regardless of the
wisdom of the product, unless the Court is to abandon its traditional
interpretive function for that of constitution maker. Mr. Justice Stew-
art recognized this critical fact in his decision to concur. The Con-
necticut law struck down in Griswold violated no specific provision
of the Constitution; he had therefore dissented on the understanding
that Ferguson v. Skrupa451' "purported to sound the death knell for the
doctrine of substantive due process. ' 452 But it was now apparent to
him that Griswold had revived the doctrine "and I now accept it as
such."4 53  Mr. Justice White saw in the majority opinion this same
revival but could not embrace it.
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to
support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and
announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and,
with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right
with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion
statutes. . . . As -an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court per-
haps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view its
judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power
of judicial [i.e., constitutional] review that the Constitution extends
to this Court.
454
Joining in this appraisal, Mr. Justice Rehnquist added on his own that
"[t]o reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently com-
pletely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment."4 55
In his vigorous criticism of the decision in Roe, Professor John Ely
declares that
450. A. Bxcnnt, supra note 354, at 27.
451. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
452. This statement is found in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 167.
453. Id. at 168.
454. Id. at 221-22 (dissent).
455. Id. at 174 (dissent).
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[w]hat is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is
not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers'
thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value
derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's govern-
mental structure. Nor is it explainable in terms of the unusual
political impotence of the group judicially protected vis-A-vis the
interest that legislatively prevailed over it.4 5
6
This intellectual fright flows from Ely's conviction that even though
"[a] neutral and durable principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy
forever. . . . If it lacks connection with any value the Constitution
marks as special, it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has
no business imposing it."'457  In a word, Ely is concerned to remain
within the framework Marshall is generally taken to have posited in
Marbury v. Madison, namely the authority of the Court to interpret pro-
visions of the written Constitution, whether the constitutional review be
defensive or otherwise, but not to go beyond the instrument.
It is a mark of the times, however, that there are constitutional
commentators who have abandoned worship at the Marshall shrine to
embrace what Professor Thomas Grey dubs "non-interpretive" modes
of constitutional construction or what Professor Louis Henkin calls "con-
stitutional modernization by the judiciary."'4 8  To many this departure
precipitates much concern even if bounded by serious efforts to hold
to the spirit of the fundamental law. But what can give grave concern
is judicial resort to amendment by decision when there does not exist
a consensus that can substitute for that required by the formal amend-
ment process. A consensus does not exist on the legitimacy of early
abortion;4"0 Roe is thus more extreme in its exercise of judicial author-
ity than was Lochner where at the time, however detestable it came
to be later, the socio-economic theory of Smith and Spencer held sway
in American thought. Griswold can be given footing by resort to the
ingrained hostility toward governmental snooping long evident in the
456. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.
920, 935-36 (1973).
457. Id. at 949.
458. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975);
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974). Of like view are
Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L.
REv. 765 (1973).
459. In his trenchant criticism of the Blackmun opinion in Roe, Professor Richard
Epstein states: "Our society remains as divided today as before on the questions when
abortions should be made criminal and when they should be permitted." Epstein,




spirit of the American people. Reynolds can possibly be explained by
the surge of egalitarianism that swept the country in the 1960's, or as
essential to the vitality of the representational process. Nothing compar-
able can be called up to ground a fundamental right of personal
autonomy, "the freedom to live one's life without governmental
interference."
Perceptive scholars have sensed that in the background of the
reasoning in Roe lies the philosophy of John Stuart Mill as expressed
in his volume On Liberty. In this work, which has recently been
incisively examined by Ms. Gertrude Himmelfarb, 460 Mill posited that
Stone very simple principle" governs the dealings of society and govern-
ment with the individual. This principle is that "the individual is
sovereign," his "independence absolute," save when "harm to others"
is involved.46' In an excellent review of the Himmelfarb study Profes-
sor George Carey comments that Mill's insistence on this one absolute
principle as a guide to individual-societal relationships induces an
insatiable demand for liberty [that] knows scarcely any bounds,
certainly not those of tradition, moderation, prudence, common
sense, decency, civility, or any higher law. It also breaks with the
tradition of the Western world with its complete denigration of
authority which perforce, must be viewed illegitimate. It erodes
and finally destroys any sense of perspective .... 462
Ms. Himmelfarb notes in the introduction to her volume that in
modern context the principle of absoluteness of individual autonomy
is invoked to support legalization of homosexuality, of pornography, of
obscenity, of birth control, and of hallucinatory drugs.4 68 To add an
illustration of very recent date the principle would resolve the question
at issue in the tragic case of Karen Quinlan.464 On these and related
460. G. HIMMELFARB, ON LIBERTY AND LmERALISM: THE CASE OF JOHN STUART
MILL (1974).
461. J. MILL, ON LiBERTY 21-22 (3d ed. 1864).
462. Carey, New Insights Into Mill's 'On Liberty,' Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1974, at
12, col. 3.
463. G. HiMMELFARB, supra note 460, at xii.
464. Paul W. Armstrong, Esq., attorney for Joseph Quinlan, Karen Quinlan's
adoptive father, in his closing argument in the trial court stated in poignant language the
case for "the right to die":
At present, Karen lies in St. Clare's Hospital no more than 60 or 70 pounds
of flesh and bone, a poor and tragic creature whose life is no more than a
patterned series of the most primitive nervous reflexes, while in this courtroom
it is seriously proposed, in the face of the most compelling contrary medical tes-
timony, that her now disunified and unperceiving body be constrained to func-
tion against all its natural impulses.
Could anything be more degrading to a human being, a human being who
has come to this earth full of love and promise? ... Can anything be more
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matters there exists anything but consensus. The societal ramifications
of Roe, if it is destined to spawn a progeny of derivative decisions,
boggle the mind. The resulting crippling of governmental control over
the moral aspects of civil relations would cause the maligned Lochner
syndrome to fade into comparative insignificance. The response must
be in the negative to the query of Professor Paul Brest: "If the consti-
tution does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, does it enact John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty? '465 On principle, one has no more justifica-
tion than the other.
It is significant that Professor Laurence Tribe in his second effort
to find a satisfactory explanation of the Roe decision falls back on "the
right of the judiciary to intervene when moral consensus is in flux, to
permit a new moral consensus to evolve. '460 Professor Henkin appears
to go as far, if not further, in his acceptance of Roe.407 Treating it
and Griswold as having common grounding in a newer conception of
freedom from official regulation, as contrasted with the more familiar
view of the right to privacy as a freedom from official intrusion, he has
expressed no difficulty with Roe either for its specific holding or as a
harbinger of a "zone of prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immunity
from regulation, in addition to that established by the first amend-
ment. '468 "The Court's creation of an additional zone of individual
autonomy to include some (perhaps all) it has recently put into it, and
more to come, does not, I think, clearly exceed the bounds of proper
judicial innovation."4 69
degrading, than to be offered up as a living sacrifice to the materialistic and
misguided belief that death can somehow be cheated, if only we find the right
combination of wires and gauges, transistors and tubes? . . .
Plaintiff submits the State cannot, without demonstrating a contrary in-
terest both compelling and secular, interfere with the free exercise of the Quin-
lans' religious beliefs, with their personal decisions, or with their sovereignty
over their own bodies. The right to privacy includes individual and familial
decisions to terminate the futile use of extraordinary medical measures.
IN THE MA=rER OF KAREN QuINLAN 534, 535-36 (1975). This volume contains the
documents, briefs and transcript of proceedings in the superior court of New Jersey.
Judge Muir's opinion denying relief is also included, id. at 540-68. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey reversed. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
A second volume, 2 IN THE MArER OF KAREN QUINLAN (1976), contains the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court's decision and complete briefs and oral arguments on appeal.
465. P. BRats, PROCESSES OF CoNSITUTIONAL DCISIONMAKINO 798 (1975).
466. The descriptive language is that of G. GUNTHER, supra note 194, at 652. The
reference is to Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. Civ. RIrrS-Crv. Lil, L. REV.
269, 317-21 (1975).
467. Henkin, supra note 458.
468. Id. at 1425.
469. Id. at 1427.
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Professor Henkin's position is not surprising; it had been antici-
pated in an article of his published just a decade prior to Roe, wherein
he had advanced the proposition that obscenity in our contemporary
morality classifies as a sin and that governmental proscription of
obscenity and sexual misconduct is not a permissible function of a gov-
ernment of limited powers in a secular society.4170 In the following
passage, Henkin echoed Mill's tenets:
Civilized societies, including ours, have increased the area of
government responsibility to protect one against his neighbor. The
authority of government to protect us from ourselves is less clearly
recognized today, except when injury to ourselves may in turn have
undesirable social consequences; although, we have suggested, one
may justify-within the limits of the "rational"-governmental ef-
forts to prevent suicide, or compel health measures, "for the indi-
vidual's own good." When we deal not with physical injury to our-
selves but with "sin," respectable and authoritative voices are
increasingly heard that there exists "a realm of private morality and
immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business." Should not the Supreme Court today, or tomorrow, con-
sider whether under the Constitution some morality, at least, may
be not the law's business and not appropriate support for legislation
consistent with due process of law?471
At the same time, Professor Henkin recognized, as he must, that
the right of the state to legislate in the field of morals, to deprive
the citizen of liberty or property for the sake of accepted notions
of morality, is deeply part of our law; some will argue that it is
beyond question or need for justification. It asks much of the
Supreme Court to tell legislators, and communal groups behind
them, that what has long been deemed the law's business is no
longer, that even large majorities or a "general consensus" cannot
have their morality written into official law. And a reluctant Court
can find support in history, and some among the philosophers. 472
The view that the Court can properly act to take the leadership
in developing societal consensus, even to the point of redirecting it,
places the Court in a position of supremacy at odds with traditional con-
ceptions. According such creativity to the Court in the exercise of
constitutional review would implicate a complete break with inherited
constitutional design. It would mean the endowment of the Court with
policymaking authority undreamed by, and wholly alien to the prin-
470. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUm. L.
REv. 391 (1963).
471. Id. at 407.
472. Id. at 413.
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ciples of, those who turned to the courts for the effective vindication
of written constitutional limitations. Yet Professors Henkin and Tribe
are not alone in their approval of this new and far reaching conception
of the role to be played by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In a sensitive tribute to Mr. Justice Louis Brandeis, on the occasion of
the fiftieth anniversary of his appointment to the High Court, Professor
Louis Jaffe had earlier questioned whether his idol had not, albeit with
some reluctance, embraced the conception in embryo.
Nowhere in the Constitution is there mention of "fundamental
rights." . . . [There being "no catalogue,"] [i]s it improper, as
Dean Acheson implies, for the judge to consult his own understand-
ing of "the ethos of democracy"? Is the judge to look beyond the
Court for something like a consensus? How does one isolate and
discover a consensus on a question so abstruse as the existence of
a fundamental right? . . . There may be a profound ambiguity
in the public conscience; it may profess to entertain a traditional
ideal but be reluctant to act upon it. In such a situation might
we not say that the judge will be free to follow either the traditional
ideal or the existing practice, depending on the reaction of his ovn
conscience? And in many cases will it not be true that there has
been no general thinking on the issue? May it not be that the judi-
cial decision itself catalyzes public consideration and brings opinion
into line with the Court's view? What indeed is the relevant pub-
lic? Do we look for guidance to our leaders? To our great moral
and political leaders of the past only or to leaders of thought today
as well, and, if the latter, are not the judges among those leaders
at least ex officio?47 3
473. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80
HARv. L REV. 986, 994-95 (1967). Professor Jaffe notes, in opening his article, that
Dean Acheson, another of Brandeis's former law clerks, was sharply critical of Warren
Court activism, quoting from D. ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 69 (1965) to make the
point. In drawing his own conclusion that Brandeis's opinions show traces of "the
propriety and inevitability of at least a personal element in the decision of disputed
constitutional issues," id. at 1001, Professor Jaffe makes no reference to the Brandeis
opinion for the Court in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 150
(1932). To place this case in context it is necessary to refer to an episode in the Court's
history either forgotten by, or never known to, most constitutional commentators. At
the opening of the 1930's, the majority of the Court invoked due process in its territorial
aspect to invalidate double taxation of intangibles by the states. Power to tax was
"assigned" to the state of the owner's domicile. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minne-
sota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930). Along with Holmes, Brandeis dissented. But two years later
Brandeis led the Court in restricting to that state in which the contract was made power
to apply its workmen's compensation policy. The state of the injury was forced to yield
under an interpretation of the full faith and credit clause which Justice Stone, although
concurring, declared was contrary to precedent and flew in the face of the fact that the
state of injury possessed an interest "at least as valid" as that of the state of the contract.
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, supra. Brandeis's flirtation with what was
deemed "best for the country" is clear. Bradford was distinguished out of existence in
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And Professor Cox in his latest volume displays evidence of
intellectual kinship wiih those espousing acceptance of the Court as
national leader and philosopher to the extent of consensus builder.
Constitutional adjudication depends, I think, upon a delicate,
symbiotic relation. The Court must know us better than we know
ourselves. Its opinions may, as I have said, sometimes be the voice
of the spirit, reminding us of our better selves. In such cases the
Court. . .provides a stimulus and quickens moral education. But
while the dpinions of the Court can help to shape our national
understanding of ourselves, the roots of its decisions must be
already in the nation. The aspirations voiced by the Court must
be those the community is willing not only to avow but in the end
to live by. For the power of the great constitutional decisions rests
upon the accuracy of the Court's perception of this kind of common
will and upon the Court's ability, by expressing its perception, ulti-
mately to command a consensus.
474
Yet in these Lectures at Oxford University there is an indication that
the former Special Prosecutor stops short of full acceptance of Mill's
philosophy carried to its logical end in current context. Critical of the
opinion for the Court in Roe for failure to predicate decision on stable
principle rather than on current medical and other evidence, he himself
cannot articulate a reasoned principle for Roe "unless it be that a State
cannot interfere with individual decisions relating to sex, procreation,
and family with only a moral or philosophical State justification: a prin-
ciple which I cannot accept or believe will be accepted by the American
people."4m
In light of all that Roe signifies there is immense significance
in the fact that three-fourths of the Nixon appointees are to be
found in the majority. Flirting with a reading of J.S. Mill into the Con-
stitution, in the present state of the reception accorded On Liberty, is
scarcely what would be expected of Justices selected for strict construc-
tion. One may be entitled, with due respect, to wonder whether the
three Justices fully grasped the implication of their association with
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, whose propensities for consti-
tutional revision to fit their own policy preferences make their position
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accid. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). Farmers
Loan & Trust was repudiated in Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939). It cannot be
denied that for any Justice the temptation beckons to "improve" upon the written
Constitution according to his personal perceptions.
474. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF ThE SUPREME COURT IN AMERicAN GOVERNMENT 117-
18 (1976).
475. Id. at 113.
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in Roe quite understandable. The able intellects of the newer Justices
create a presumption that they did comprehend the consequences of
their action. If so, revolutionary change in constitutional theory can
be markedly immune from alteration in personnel on the Court, in itself
a consideration of momentous import. However, continued evolution
in constitutional furtherance of personal autonomy against governmen-
tal intrusion received a setback in two decisions of the Court on March
29 of this bicentenary year. Both decisions involved the constitutional-
ity of state prohibition of homosexual relations between consenting
adults. A Virginia statute survived constitutional challenge before a
three-judge federal court;4 76 a similar North Carolina law had been
allowed to stand by the State's highest court.4 77  In the latter certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court;478 in the former the lower court was
affirmed on appeal without argument or opinion. 70
With the aid of Justice Stewart, concurring in result, the four
Nixon appointees were the majority in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 80 the decision sustaining against equal protection
attack the Texas system of financing public primary and secondary
schools. Professor Cox well describes the challenge to constitutionality
as the "most ambitious effort to use the Constitution to reform on-going
State programmes by imposing new affirmative duties .... 481 Mr.
Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court, rejecting the reasoning
of the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest482 which had inval-
idated an analogous pattern of California financing as violative of the
equal protection provision of that State's constitution. A battery of
amici briefs on each side of the issue attests the great importance of
the case. Serrano requires state-wide equalization of financial support
as among local school districts of high and low tax base. In refusing
to follow Serrano the Supreme Court has erected a major barricade to
the onrush of newer, far reaching conceptions of the equality content
of the equal protection guaranty.
476. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975).
477. State v. Enslin, 25 N.C. App. 662, 214 S.E.2d 318, cert. denied and appeal dis-
missed, 288 N.C. 245, 217 S.E.2d 669 (1975).
478. Enslin v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 1492 (1976) (cert. denied).
479. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 96 S. Ct. 1489
(1976) (lower court affirmed; Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., would have allowed
oral argument).
480. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
481. A. Cox, supra note 474, at 92.
482. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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Something of what that added content could portend was disclosed
by Mr. Justice Douglas in Douglas v. California,48 3 decided just a
decade earlier. Indeed, the Justice's step in there blending equal pro-
tection with due process to invalidate California denial to indigent crim-
inal defendants of appointed counsel on first appeal looked suspiciously
like a trial balloon to test judicial receptivity to a conception of the guar-
anty as including affirmative governmental obligation to eliminate
inequalities in wealth. Joined by Justice Stewart, Justice Harlan
thought the unnecessary involvement of equal protection had that
appearance and did his best to deflate it. Drawing the deadly aim of
which he was capable, he insisted that
the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States "an
affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in
economic circumstances." To so construe it would be to read into
the Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to
many of our basic concepts of the proper relations between govern-
ment and society. The State may have a moral obligation to elimi-
nate the evils of poverty, but it is not required by the Equal'
Protection Clause to give to some whatever others can afford.
4s4
The majority of the Warren Court let the matter pass. The heady air
of equality with which the balloon was inflated may have helped to
float, the next year, the decisions in the Reapportionment Cases. The
lineup of the Justices tempts speculation. And Mr. Justice Stewart may
have thought back on the Douglas debate when reaching in Rodriguez
his decision to tip the balance to validity.
The idea of equality has an ancient heritage and the search for
its meaning resembles the quest for the Holy Grail.48 5 It has been said
that "[o]riginally .. . equality was a concept borrowed from mathe-
matics and . . .meant identity. ' 48 6 In a pagan framework this per-
spective led to a conception of equality of quantity, an equation of num-
bers, whereas Christian philosophy emphasized qualitative equality,
thus recognizing dissimilarities in humans while stressing the unity of
mankind in the spiritual sphere.48 7 When in the Declaration of
Independence Jefferson declared that "all men are created equal" he
483. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
484. Id. at 362.
485. Among the notable searchers are G. ABERNETHY, THE IDEA OF EQuALrrY (1959
ed.); R. HARRIs, THE QuEsr FOR EQUALITY (1960); R. SOKOL, THE PUZZLE OF EQUAL=TY
(1967).
486. R. SOKOL, supra note 485, at 48.
487. Sister Ferguson, The Philosophy of Equality, 68 CTH. U. PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDiEs 197-98 (1943).
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was not denying differences in personal attributes but asserting their
equivalency with respect to the unalienable rights with which men were
endowed by their Creator. The first fruits of this declaration lay in
achievement of equality before the law. "Liberty and equality were
the twin themes of the American Revolution. 488  Yet many of those
who carried the Revolution to victory were owners of slaves. "It was
the Abolitionists, therefore, who revitalized doctrines of equality and
natural rights under a literal interpretation of the Declaration of
Independence..". .1489 Even so, the concept of equality was that of
levelling only in the legal sense-all men are free of subjugation by
others, an equality before the law that finally embraced the Negro with
the white.490
Adoption of the fourteenth amendment supplied the idea of
equality with a constitutional base in the equal protection clause.
Incorporating the concept that had evolved, the clause opened an era
of constitutional protection for economic and political rights against
governmental discrimination. Equality of opportunity was theoretically
vouchsafed to all as former privileges were dethroned. "Once loosed,
the idea of Equality is not easily cabined," it has been observed. 491
Equality of opportunity can be frustrated by inequalities in the social
structure; differential environments can make a sham of the presumed
equivalency in starting point. The heart of the problem can then be
found in disparities in income and wealth that preclude meaningful
equality in opportunity. The inadequacy in the conception of equality
as that of sameness in legal contemplation is captured in the ridicule
that attends the observation that "the law punishes equally the rich and
poor for stealing bread." The seat of the inequity is the societal struc-
ture that tolerates gross inequality in income and wealth,492 and atten-
tion turns to methods of rectifying the evil. Equality in result is the
rising cry. A familiar proposal for solution is adoption of some variant
of socialism. 49 3  Recently, the issue has been debated in more philo-
sophical terms by John Rawls and Robert Nozik. Rawls's volume, A
Theory of Justice, advances as its basic principle of justice that "[a]ll
social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and
488. R. H-Rms, supra note 485, at 14.
489. Id. at 17-18.
490. Id. at 18-23.
491. A. Cox, THE WARREN CoURT 6 (1968).
492. R. TAWNEY, EQUALiny chs. 2 & 3 (1964 ed.).
493. A suggestive volume is D. JAY, SOCILISM iN THE NEw Socn ry (1962).
Chapter 25 provides the specifics of his program for achieving a "fairer" taxing scheme.
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the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage
of the least favored."49 4 Rawls would cede to the state an enormous
power in order to achieve this essential condition. In short, in the
words of Professor Bernard Schwartz, "Equality of result has received
its philosophical foundation in John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. '495
In rebuttal to Rawls, Robert Nozik in Anarchy, State and Utopia "has
reargued the case for the classical liberal, virtually laissez-faire, con-
ception of the state, justice, and the good life."4 96  Whereas Rawls
sacrifices liberty for equality, Nozik prizes liberty over equality; only
a state charged solely with conventional police functions is justifiable.
A stronger state would use its coercive power to redistribute property
which to Nozik lies at the heart of private right. Only a "night watch-
man" state is therefore compatible with individual liberty. It follows
that to Nozik the "minimal" state is the only morally acceptable state.497
From the chasmy divergency in political philosophy that these two
influential volumes manifest, it is apparent that deeply conflicting
forces in society were stirring behind the constitutional overlay in Rod-
riguez. In immediate terms the slim majority will withstand the
counter-pressures; because Mr. Justice Stevens replaces Justice Doug-
las even his association with the minority views would not bring
overruling in a subsequent case of similar factual pattern. But for the
longer run one wonders. Judicial thrusts at wealth levelling in the
name of equal protection would assuredly have explosive reverbera-
tions; this political thicket could not but feature briars far more thorny
than those in reapportionment. Yet as the great disparities in wealth
and income now obtaining in this country disclose no signs of shrink-
ing,498 pressure and temptation may combine to induce a majority of the
Court to sidetrack Rodriguez on its own specific facts and try its hand
at wealth levelling. Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has provided a powerful induce-
ment: "Commission after commission on crime, race, violence or chil-
dren has recommended some sort of income redistribution as the only
494. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUsTIcE 303 (1971).
495. Schwartz, The Ends of Law in a Changing World, 61 A.B.A.J. 1238, 1240
(1975). Professor Max Rheinstein also comments on the Rawls volume in Book
Review, 73 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1515 (1973).
496. Quinn & Lidji, Book Review, 5 HuMAN RIrGHrs 119 (1975).
497. Kateb, The Night Watchman State, AM. SCHOLAR, Winter, 1975-76. This is a
much more readable review of the Nozik volume.
498. TIME, Jan. 15, 1973, at 69. Indeed, the disparities may even be increasing.
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way to solve our toughest social problems. I am convinced that nothing
else can begin to work without it."499
Reliable statistics demonstrate that the nation faces a spiraling
crime rate threatening our prized open societyr 00 Crimes against
property must be directly relevant to increasing discontent over eco-
nomic imbalance; crimes against the person must be in part psychologi-
cal onsets of frustration born of the presence of abject poverty in the
midst of lavish luxury. Present attitudes reflect the teaching of history
that the "haves" will willingly do little by way of rectification, and
efforts by and on behalf of the "have nots" to effect positive change,
while achieving some gains, are woefully inadequate to the total task.
The situation resembles the most acceptable explanation of the Warren
Court's reaction to widespread malapportionment. Those in legislative
power by virtue of malapportionment would not yield; urbanites, disad-
vantaged on a population basis in the exercise of the franchise, were
helpless to force change through the political processes. Ergo, the
franchise being the most fundamental of all civil rights, something had
to be done and the Court stepped in.
Any serious effort by the Court to exercise its power to press for
equality of result in terms of mandated reallocation of economic
resources would clearly present major problems of judicial enforce-
ment. It will be recalled that one reason for Justice Frankfurter's
opposition to the Court undertaking to umpire in "broad issues of politi-
cal organization" was his belief that the judicial process was ill fitted to
the task. Especially out of the question for him was reapportionment
by judicial decree. In this judgment he proved to be mistaken; within
a decade from the implementing decision in Reynolds the lower federal
courts under Supreme Court guidance had effectuated the objec-
tive of population equality. On the other hand, the Court's hesi-
tancy to tackle other than racial gerrymandering within districts of
equalized population °10 suggests that the majority at least sees limits
to its ability to fashion judicially manageable standards for this second
form of gerrymandering. The complexity of the problem is com-
pounded by the infinite number of patterns that use of the computer
can produce within the constitutional framework of the Court's deci-
sions. There also comes to mind comparison of the relative ease of
499. Address, "Juvenile Justice: Love-Hate Story," summarized in 9 TRIAL, July-
Aug., 1973, at 58.
500. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1974 ed., 1975 Supp.).
501. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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judicial enforcement of desegregation with the seemingly insoluble
task of achieving integration by judicial means.
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi,02 has understandably
received attention for its favorable reception to use of the injunction
in a class action to remedy disparity in municipal services between black
and white citizens. From the record made in the district court, a panel
of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found major favoritism
toward the white district of the town with respect to street paving, street
lights, sanitary sewers, storm drainage, water pressure, fire hydrants,
and traffic control signs. Finding clear violation of the equal protection
clause, the court of appeals panel put aside the contention that "the
correction of this problem is not a judicial function" and granted relief
in the following terms:
We feel that issuing a specific order outlining exactly how the
equalization of municipal services should.occur is neither necessary
nor proper in the context of this case. We do require, however,
that the Town of Shaw, itself, submit a plan for the Court's
approval detailing how it proposes to cure the results of the long
history of discrimination which the record reveals.
0 3
On rehearing en banc the panel's decision was affirmed. However,
the trial judge, who had dismissed the action, enjoyed the support of
three dissenting circuit judges. Two of the three put their views pithily
in these remarks:
In remitting Mr. Hawkins and the members of his class to a
solution at the ballot box, rather than dangling the carrot of reform
by judicial injunction before them, the district court followed the
course of wisdom and practicality. Hard reality fore-ordains that
no plan can be devised which will solve the complex variables of
"equalizing" municipal services. This court's broad-brush ap-
proach to this case guarantees such a fruitless result. . . . Shaw's
resources are finite. Its daily needs must be met by public servants
who must anticipate long-range requirements, both for the handful
of classes of projects specifically dealt with and also for that wide
spectrum of services and facilities that aren't even mentioned.
50 4
The fact that Hawkins involved racial discrimination might be
thought to explain majority acceptance there of affirmative relief.5" 5
502. 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969), rev'd, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
aff'd en bane, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
503. 437 F.2d at 1293.
504. 461 F.2d at 1185.
505. However, Anderson, Toward the Equalization of Municipal Services: Varia-
tions on a Theme by Hawkins, 50 J. URBAN L. 177 (1972), contends that wealth as a
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But similar judicial action had been taken in the enforcement of
Supreme Court standards for relief of malapportionment. "The task
[was] utterly unlike any previously thought appropriate for a court, but
has been performed with apparent success by a number of State and
federal judges."5 06 Some courts even took into their own hands the
redistricting for congressional or state legislative representation.
Another district court within the Fifth Circuit extended relief to
class action plaintiffs challenging the failure of the Mental Health Board
of Alabama to provide anything like adequate rehabilitation in state
institutions for the mentally i1507 and mentally retarded.508  Having
found a constitutional "right to appropriate care for people civilly con-
fined to public mental institutions," the trial court decreed in the second
Wyatt decision (1) that defendants "implement fully and with dispatch
each of the standards set forth in Appendix A attached hereto and
incorporated as a part of this decree"; (2) that a "human rights com-
mittee for [one named institution] be and is hereby designated and
appointed [by the court]"; (3) that defendants forthwith employ on
a permanent basis "a professionally qualified and experienced adminis-
trator" for one of the institutions; and (4) that defendants within six
months prepare a "comprehensive and precise" report "reflecting in
detail the progress on the implementation of this order." 00  The
appendix, requiring twelve pages in the reporter, must be read to be
believed; illustrative of the details is item 38.i.(3):
Thermostatically controlled hot water shall be provided in adequate
quantities and maintained at the required temperature for resident
use (110°F at the fixture) and for mechanical dishwashing and
laundry use (180'F at the equipment). Thermostatically con-
trolled hot water valves shall be equipped with a double valve sys-
tem that provides both auditory and visual signals of valve
failures. 510
With respect to the financing required by the decreed standards
the district court declared that should the state legislature or the Mental
Health Board fail to satisfy the well-defined constitutional obligations
involved, "it will be necessary for the Court to take affirmative steps,
including appointing a master, to ensure that proper funding is realized
suspect classification can be spelled out of Hawkins independent of race. Wealth
levelling was argued in the district court but abandoned on appeal, 437 F.2d at 1287 n.1.
506. A. Cox, supra note 474, at 19.
507. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
508. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
509. Id. at 394-95.
510. Id. at 405.
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.... "I" The Court had in mind not alone a reallocation of state ap-
propriations, but also sale of lands owned by the Mental Health Board.
If the court contemplated direct action by the master in revising the
State's budget and selling land, there would be involved a greater
inroad on state authority than the Supreme Court approved in the
Prince Edward County dilemma when it declared not only that the fed-
eral court was empowered to reopen the schools but also that it "may,
if necessary to prevent further racial discrimination, require the Super-
visors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds
adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination
a public school system in Prince Edward County like that operated in
other counties in Virginia."512  At least there the action to be taken
was left with local authorities.
Because of the position it had taken in its intervening decision in
Donaldson v. O'Conner,513 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed on the existence of federal judicial power to "order state mental
institutions to provide minimum levels of psychiatric care and treatment
to persons civilly committed to the institutions."51 4 However, the court
of appeals found difficult to stomach the boldness and reach of the
lower court's decree. "The serious constitutional questions presented
. . . should not be adjudicated unnecessarily and prematurely."5 5
The reviewing court expressed preference for "the remedy ordered by
this court in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw . . . . This approach should
hasten the day when the district court can be reasonably assured that
appellees' constitutional rights are no longer being violated, and when
ultimate control over the institutions in question can be returned to the
state."' 15 6 The only Supreme Court involvement in this line of litigation
has been denial of certiorari in Burnham v. Department of Public
Health of the State of Georgia,51 7 in which the same court of appeals
reversed the decision of a third trial court of the circuit that had found
no constitutional right. Reversal was of course based on the Donaldson
and Wyatt holdings.
511. Id. at 394.
512. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
513. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
514. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974). The quotation is
taken from the opening paragraph of the opinion, expressed there as the question to be
decided. The question is answered in the affirmative, id. at 1313-14.
515. Id. at 1318.
516. Id. at 1319.
517. 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057
(1975).
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The last decade thus discloses an enormous extension in judicial
enforcement procedures. The reading to be made of this may be that
the Court will tolerate whatever inroads on traditional state and local
independence it deems essential to achieve the substantive extensions
in personal autonomy and economic equality judicially decreed in the
name of due process or equal protection. Yet as one columnist has
recently asked:
How much governance can the court offer, especially when it has
declined to create mechanisms beyond the conventional court struc-
ture to do this job?
How much governance is acceptable, whatever its thrust and
quality, from an institution that is, finally, answerable to no one
but itself for its decisions? 518
As if responding to these questions the Court, split 5 to 3 with
Justice Stevens not participating, has recently reversed' 19 the Third
Circuit's affirmance5 20 of a district court order directing for that court's
approval the draft of "a comprehensive program for improving the
handling of citizen complaints alleging police misconduct, in conformity
with the views expressed in the Opinion of this Court filed this date."'5 21
On a voluminous record the trial court found that although violations
of the legal and constitutional rights of Philadelphia citizens "are com-
mitted by only a small percentage of the members of the police force
. . . , [n]evertheless, such violations do occur, entirely too frequent-
ly"; that while there was no evidence of "conscious departmental policy
of racial bias. . . presence of racial prejudice on the part of an individ-
ual police officer . . . is unlikely to be reflected adversely in the per-
formance ratings accorded him by his superiors"; and that "[e]xisting
procedures for handling civilian complaints and for enforcement of po-
lice discipline related to civilian complaints is [sic] totally inade-
quate.15 22 On these findings of fact and on the assertion as matter of
law that the federal court has the legal power to supervise the function-
ing of the police department, the district judge had demanded a revision
of the Police Manual to his satisfaction.
518. Patrick Owens, The Court's Increasing Role, Newsday, reprinted in Durham
(North Carolina) Morning Herald, Sept. 12, 1975. A. Cox, supra note 474, at 96, finds
it easy to sympathize with the Supreme Court's hesitancy, in litigation over school
finance, to involve itself in the "kind of morass" illustrated by the enforcement cases of
the Fifth Circuit.
519. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
520. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974).
521. Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability & Responsibili-




It is difficult to foresee what this decision signifies in terms of
Court restriction on affirmative relief when substantive constitutional
violation is found. There are considerations peculiar to the litigation
that look both ways. If the Supreme Court decision does project
retrenchment, it is especially noteworthy by reason of the fact that little
if any additional expenditure was required by the decree of the district
court. The rub comes when, as in the Hawkins and Wyatt situations,
federal court decrees require the outlay of large sums of governmental
funds in order to meet constitutional standards. Indirectly if not
directly, this means resort to local or state taxing power for the produc-
tion of increased revenues. For the Court to approve direct federal
court exercise of that power would involve -a complete break with both
federalistic and separation-of-powers traditions. It is a question
whether the body politic could withstand such a wrench in the
traditional constitutional fabric. However, it would not be necessary
for the federal courts to assume the taxing power, or even to mandate
its exercise by state or local officials. By their forcing of greater
expenditures in the interests of lower-income groups, local and state
legislative units would of necessity have to levy heavier taxes if services
to the upper-income groups were not to be curtailed. With tax "take"
at current levels the new impositions would have to employ steeply pro-
gressive rate structures, thus achieving the objective of major wealth
levelling.
The last thirty-five years have witnessed the increasing boldness
with which majorities have both read out of the Constitution what was
there in the way of federalistic limitation on congressional power and
read into the document what is not there but that in their way of thinking
should be. The dual process has at times borne resemblance to Loch-
ner reasoning in the sense that the powers or limitations found had
some basis in contemporaneous political and social consensus. The
process could be tolerated as a substitute for formal amendment of the
Constitution, a process rapidly losing favor from the time of its rejection
as a satisfactory solution to the constitutional crisis of 1937. But as the
curtain falls on two hundred years of evolution in constitutional
processes, and this in the face of Nixon appointment of supposedly strict
constructionists, the Court is often not averse to imposing its policy
preferences with respect to complex problems precipitating clashing
views quite the antithesis of consensus.
This ultimate in assertion of judicial supremacy suggests, even in
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the face of Rodriguez and, by one view, National League of Cities,
that the judicial function in constitutional adjudication may well be
metamorphosing from that of constitutional enforcer to that of constitu-
tion maker. Judged by conventional views of the role allocated to the
Supreme Court in the American governmental scheme, such further
evolution necessarily raises the issue of judicial usurpation. It was one
thing for the judiciary to lay claim to power to exercise constitutional
review as well as judicial review; it is quite another now to employ con-
stitutional review not so much in enforcement of written constitutional
provisions formally adopted by the sovereign people as in creative con-
stitutional revision on the strength of its own conclusions of what is best
for the country at given times. In effect, what the Court is proposing
is that with respect to constitutional review it. indulge in the same
breadth of creativity long accepted in its exercise of judicial review.
Those who hail evidence of metamorphosis are either insensitive to its
implications or they are purposely advocating abandonment of the
American political experiment in democratic government.
Were the Court, as they seemed to assume, offering only advisory
opinions few would gainsay the value of its judgments for thorough con-
sideration of the more intractable problems facing the nation as it enters
the third hundred years of its existence. Analytically, this is the contri-
bution the courts have for centuries made in the development of the
common law through their exercise of judicial review. The legislative
and executive branches are not bound by the judicial judgment, which
by majority vote can be overturned if unacceptable to the people's
representatives. But exercised at the constitutional level, that judg-
ment is binding on all; if it is to be undone, a heavy burden is laid
on elected representatives, federal and state, to wend their way through
a formal amendment process that has lost much of its dynamics. Critics
of Lochner saw this antithesis to the nation's commitment to a frame-
work of balanced government of three coordinate branches with
popular sovereignty as the cornerstone. Even granted that the Court's
policy making is today for better ends than was true forty to seventy
years ago, there is no whit of difference in the principle involved. This
fact explains, by the way, why Lochner is such an irritation to those
who embrace non-interpretive constitutionalism. It must be explained
away while holding to its principle.
Familiar is Learned Hand's celebrated statement:
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I
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assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the
stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically,
some part in the direction of public affairs. Of course, I know how
illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything; but
nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in the sense
that we are all engaged in a common venture.
5 23
In his latest book Archibald Cox quotes this passage and then expresses
reactions to the contrary:
I should be no less irked than Judge Hand if the Supreme
Court were to void an ordinance adopted in the open town meeting
in the New England town in which I live-a meeting in which all
citizens can participate-but I should have little feeling about a
statute enacted by the Massachusetts legislature in the normal
political pattern, and none about a law made in that normal pattern
by the Congress of the United States. Perhaps my sense of the
matter is distorted by years of advocacy in constitutional cases, but
it appears to me that modern government is simply too large and
too remote, and too few issues are fought out in elections, for a
citizen to feel much more sense of participation in the legislative
process than the judicial. Nor does the Supreme Court's interven-
tion lessen my sense that we are all engaged in a common
adventure.524
It is distressing to find a man of the character of Professor Cox
preferring judicial oligarchy to representative government. Yet one
can sympathize; it is not a hazardous guess to estimate that many enter-
tain similar feelings. Even more productive of dissatisfaction with
government than its enormity and remoteness are two further considera-
tions. One is widespread loss of confidence in the quality of officialdom.
Almost daily disclosures of unethical conduct and outright criminality are
convincing that the lesson of Watergate has not been learned, or perhaps
to be more accurate, accepted. A second consideration is that there
seems to be in neither legislative halls nor executive offices that demon-
stration of capacious leadership so desperately needed. Against this
unhappy picture stands an institution believed to be untouched by the
weaknesses of other departments. It is no wonder that there obtains a
feeling of quiet confidence in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Yet history warns us to be wary of abandoning government by elected
representatives of the governed. Indeed, it seems incredible that any-
one would be seriously considering abandonment of this nation's great
political inheritance for rule by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, notwith-
523. L. HAND, Tim BELL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958).
524. A. Cox, supra note 474, at 116.
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standing the aura of appeal that this solution may seem to have in these
troubled times.52 5
Earl Warren repeatedly stated that the Reapportionment Cases
were the most momentous decisions of his years as Chief Justice of the
United States. To him, then, they outranked in ramification Brown 1
and Brown 11,526 the basic decisions calling for an end to de jure segre-
gation in American education. Because the latter are of such extreme
importance it must be that Chief Justice Warren saw in malapportion-
ment an evil even more serious to the national polity than educational
separation of the races. That evil was, in his judgment, the threat of
malapportionment to the effective exercise of the franchise, the right
that is conceived to underlie all other rights of the individual. It is
irrelevant that many did not think and continue to doubt that near-
wooden adherence to population count-the sixth-grade arithmetic
Justice Stewart thought it-offers a manageable yet viable solution.
What counted was the conviction that the evil must be exorcised.
Viewed in this light the Reapportionment Cases are justified because
the Court stepped in to prevent what appeared to the Warren-led
majority to be a serious breakdown in representative democracy. They
can thus be thought of as constituting the exercise of constitutional
525. My colleague Professor Arnold Loewy has made incisive comments apropos
reliance on platonic guardians. Loewy, Abortive Reasons and Obscene Standards: A
Comment on the Abortion and Obscenity Cases, 52 N.C.L. REv. 223, 229-34 (1973).
Yet some judges enjoying distinctive reputations cannot resist the temptation to claim
judicial supremacy to be consistent with democratic theory. Thus in the late 1960's
Judge J. Skelly Wright of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit persuaded himself that barnacles on the political processes are such as to
make judicial supremacy little less democratic. Wright, The Role of the Court in a
Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint? 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9-11
(1968). More recently Chief Justice Donald Wright of the Supreme Court of California
defended constitutional review against the charge that it is anti-democratic. He instanced
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880 (1972), invalidating the death penalty
under the California Constitution "in accordance with contemporary standards of de-
cency." Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CALIF. L.
REv. 1262, 1273 (1972). However, the decision did not prove to reflect the existence in
California of consensus on this issue. It was overturned by constitutional amendment
on initiative petition. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 27. Currently, on the other hand, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist has extra-judicially rejected that conception of constitutional review
that embraces "contemporary, fashionable notions of what a living Constitution should
contain." Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. Rnv. 693, 699
(1976). But those following Mr. Justice Brennan's views in his dissent in National
League of Cities v. Usery, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 446-47 and infra
in text accompanying note 541, will find it difficult to reconcile the judicial with the
extra-judicial thesis of Justice Rehnquist.
526. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (implementa-
tion with "all deliberate speed").
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review in a new pattern of defensiveness that, like the defensive consti-
tutional review that first involved the courts in departing from their
historic role in governmental structure, can be reconciled with the
American heritage of policy determination by the governed.
On reflection, United States v. Nixon527 carries overtones of defen-
sive Court action in both the original connotation and that implicit in
Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny. In requiring production of the sub-
poenaed presidential tapes the Court was at the same time protecting
the integrity of the federal judiciary's criminal process52 8 and squelch-
ing mounting claims of a revolutionary presidency that to many threat-
ened the American governmental framework.529 The decision was
heralded by many as saving the Constitution, a short-hand way of
expressing the view that the Court had saved popular sovereignty from
creeping authoritarianism. Exaction of the death penalty, while op-
posed as vengeful inhumanity at least in the absence of positive evi-
dence of deterrence, does not so threaten the political or social fabric
of the nation. There exists, therefore, no basis for constitutional invali-
dation on a theory of defensiveness in the connotation that can be
drawn from the Reapportionment Cases and certainly none from the
historic meaning of defensive constitutional review. 30 For this reason
the decisions of the Supreme Court in the five death-penalty cases, con-
cluding the 1975 Term,53' afford significant indication of the direction
in which the judicial winds are now blowing.
On first reaction, these five decisions appear to mark a rejection
of further resort to constitutional amendment by Court decision. Three
Justices assert and four Justices implicitly accept the assertion that
the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be
imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless
of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure fol-
lowed in reaching the decision to impose it. 532
527. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
528. The historic decision is analyzed as one of traditional defensive constitutional
review in Strong, President, Congress, Judiciary: One is More Equal Than the Others,
60 A.B.AJ. 1050 (1974). Its more far-reaching extent is considered id. at 1203.
529. A. SCHLESINGER, TiM IMPERIAL PRESMENCY 208-77 (1973).
530. The historic limitation of the eighth amendment concerns the method by which
the legislative-executive branches may inflict death, and requires that punishment be
reasonably proportioned to the crime. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
531. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976) (affirmed); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S.
Ct. 2950 (1976) (affirmed); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976) (affirmed);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976) (reversed); Roberts v. Louisiana,
96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976) (reversed). All five decisions were announced July 2, 1976.
532. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. at 2932.
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Only Justices Brennan and Marshall were responsive to the vigorous
contentions of opponents of the death penalty, led by Anthony Amster-
dam, that the time had come for outlawing this form of punishment lock,
stock and barrel. Yet reflection advises caution in judging the import
of these decisions. Only a minority, albeit of but one, would accord
Congress and state legislatures constitutional latitude to decree death
for those committing what society deems the most heinous offenses
against it, subject only to prohibition of arbitrariness in imposition of
the extreme penalty. The position taken by Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens effectively blocks legislative resort to the death penalty
unless this ultimate in punishment is proportionate to the baseness of
the crime.
The constitutional line thus drawn inescapably places on the Court
the burden of final judgment in all instances of attempted resort to the
death penalty. Where, as in the five cases, the offense is murder the
Court will be forced by the doctrine of constitutional fact to review
each imposition to determine whether the circumstances fall within or
afoul of the new constitutional boundary lines. 33 Otherwise, the Court
will not fulfill its claimed function of final exclusive enforcer of consti-
tutional limitations. The situation could well generate a quagmire
reminiscent of that in the obscenity area. Where extremely deviant
criminal behavior other than murder is involved, the Court is faced
with determination of whether the death penalty is justified by the rule
of proportionality. The opinion of Justice Stewart, for himself and
Justices Powell and Stevens, recognizes this in part by stating in a foot-
note that:
We do not address here the question whether the taking of
the criminal's life is a proportionate sanction where no victim has
been deprived of life-for example, when capital punishment is
imposed for rape, kidnapping, or armed robbery that does not re-
sult in the death of any human being.53
4
In setting forth the Georgia statute Justice Stewart necessarily quotes
the provision that "ihe death penalty may be imposed for the offenses
of aircraft hijacking or treason, in any case '" 35 but makes in his opinion
no comparable reference to the question it raises. It will require sub-
sequent Court adjudication to disclose the actual extent to which capital
533. The doctrine of constitutional fact is extensively examined in Strong, The
Persistent Doctrine of Constitutional Fact, 48 N.C.L. REV. 223 (1968).
534. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. at 2932 n.35.
535. Id. at 2921 n.9.
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punishment has passed constitutional muster. The societal "right" to
it may turn out to be more the exception than the rule.
To the position of partial invalidation of the death penalty taken
by Justices Powell, Stevens, and Stewart, as well as to that of total
invalidity espoused by Justices Brennan and Marshall, four members of
the Court took exception. Speaking for himself, the Chief Justice, and
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, Mr. Justice White declared with
respect to the plurality view:
The plurality claims that it has not forgotten what the past has
taught about the limits of judicial [i.e., constitutional] review; but
I fear -that it has again surrendered to the temptation to make policy
for and to attempt to govern the country through a misuse of the
powers given this Court under the Constitution.
536
The Brennan-Marshall reliance on supposedly evolving moral standards
of decency, advanced in Furman v. Georgia5 37 as basis for complete
invalidation of capital punishment, the group of four found completely
undercut by the massive re-enactment of the death penalty for the most
gross forms of criminal violence.138  This had the effect of forcing the
two into a position of insistence on a reading of the eighth amendment
to fit their own personal views as to what the Constitution should
forbid.539
Three of the four in the same group of Justices dissented from the
decision of the previous day in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth.54 There the basic determination of Roe v. Wade was
reaffirmed, strengthened by the holding that neither spouse nor parent
can constitutionally be given the power to veto the election of abortion
by the wife-daughter and her physician during the first twelve weeks
of pregnancy. True, the decision was close, with the newest Justice
agreeing with the majority as to the power of the spouse but with the
minority as regards that of the parent. But Mr. Justice Blackmun had
deserted the group to join the opposing side; indeed, he had been the
author of the bizarre prevailing opinion in Roe in which Mr. Justice
Holmes's warning against amendment by judicial say-so had been quoted
536. Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. CL at 3020.
537. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
538. 96 S. Ct. at 3015-3017.
539. In dissent Justice Brennan stuck to his "moral precepts" thesis, whereas Justice
Marshall, conceding the impact of extensive public reaction to his earlier reasoning,
moved to other grounds in support of his continuing judgment that capital punishment
is invalid. Their respective opinions are found at 96 S. Ct. 2971 & 2979.
540. 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
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only to be flouted. What of the remaining three? Just a week earlier
two of them, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with the latter
writing for the Court, had been in the majority in National League of
Cities v. Usery, a decision that was castigated by Mr. Justice Brennan,
in a dissent in which Mr. Justice White joined, as an exercise of "raw
judicial power" in order to "erect a mirror of its [their] own conception
of a desirable constitutional structure." 541
On this analysis, of all the present Justices only Justice White
emerges free of recent Brotherly accusation of yielding to temptation to
remodel the Constitution to reflect his own personal convictions. 42
Mr. Justice White's position must be the consequence of unusual sensi-
tivity to the nagging doubt, never fully dispelled, as to the consistency
between constitutional review and representative democracy. 43  In
closing his remarks iat he cornerstone-laying ceremonies for the new
Kansas Supreme Court Building, held July 5, 1976, Justice White re-
flected some of his own uncertainty concerning the justification for
judicial exercise of embracive constitutional review:
It is constantly asked how this could be in a land such as
ours, as wedded to concepts of representative government as we
are. Judicial officers in the main are not representative in the poli-
tical sense, but are supposedly independent and may not be dis-
charged on short notice. Yet there is built into our system the
requirement that they perform important law-making tasks. The
answers to this question have been many and varied and apparently
have been convincing enough to fend off various strong attacks on
the entire idea of judicial [i.e., constitutional] review.5 44
Sensitivity of this degree would assuredly induce extreme hesitancy to
join in any Court decision manifesting characteristics of spurious con-
stitutional interpretation.
But this degree of sensitivity does not trouble minds that have long
accommodated to the full-blown practice of constitutional review. Once
acclimatized to the proposition that the Court is the ultimate interpreter
541. 96 S. Ct. at 2487, 2485.
542. And even he bears prior taint from the dissent of Mr. Justice Black by virtue
of his concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut.
543. E.g., R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY v (1941); cf. the
valiant effort of Professor Rostow to demonstrate the democratic character of constitu-
tional review provided the power is exercised only with respect to civil liberties. Ros-
tow, supra note 330.
544. B. White, Remarks on the Occasion of the Laying of the Cornerstone of the
Kansas Supreme Court Building, July 5, 1976 (edited text obtained from Kansas Bar
Association, on file in University of North Carolina Law School Library). A short
newspaper report of the Justice's remarks discloses that at least one person at the
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of the Constitution,5 45 it then does not come hard to think of the Court
as an appropriate institution for fulfilling the representational function
as surrogate of the People. Reasoning thereby comes full circle; consti-
tutional amendment by judicial decision claims a legitimacy alongside
that of the formal amendment process provided by article V. Impulses
in this direction within the Court are encouraged by enticements on the
part of commentators artfully pressing for causes obtainable only through
constitutional interpretation amendatory in character. In this year of
the bicentenary there thus remains a strong temptation in and for the
Court to embrace the seductive role of Platonic Guardians, to make the
question of who is to play the dominant role in constitutional amend-
ment one of the major political issues as the Nation completes celebra-
tion of its two-hundredth anniversary.
occasion felt the Justice entertained on his own account an even stronger view of the
fundamental contradiction that constitutional review poses for American representative
government. N.Y. Post, July 6, 1976, at 8, col. 4.
545. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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